# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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

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

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

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Pierre Schneider is chief art critic for the news magazine L'Express and is producer of a regular program on art for French television. He is an art historian, currently working on a biography of Matisse.

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

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

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

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*The articles in* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

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# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 48 APRIL 1970 No. 3

## TO PREVENT A WORLD WASTELAND

### A Proposal

*By George F. Kennan*

NOT even the most casual reader of the public prints of recent months and years could be unaware of the growing chorus of warnings from qualified scientists as to what industrial man is now doing—by overpopulation, by plundering of the earth's resources, and by a precipitate mechanization of many of life's processes—to the intactness of the natural environment on which his survival depends. "For the first time in the history of mankind," U.N. Secretary-General U Thant wrote, "there is arising a crisis of worldwide proportions involving developed and developing countries alike—the crisis of human environment. . . . It is becoming apparent that if current trends continue, the future of life on earth could be endangered."

Study and debate of these problems, and sometimes even governmental action, have been developing with cumulative intensity. This response has naturally concentrated largely on environmental deterioration as a national problem. It is normally within national boundaries that the first painful effects of deterioration are felt. It is at the national level that the main burden of legislation and administrative effort will admittedly have to be borne, if certain kinds of pollution and destruction are to be halted.

But it is also clear that the national perspective is not the only one from which this problem needs to be approached. Polluted air does not hang forever over the country in which the pollution occurs. The contamination of coastal waters does not long remain solely the problem of the nation in whose waters it has its origin. Wildlife—fish, fowl and animal—is no respecter of national boundaries, either in its movements or in the sources from which it draws its being. Indeed, the entire ecology of the

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planet is not arranged in national compartments; and whoever interferes seriously with it anywhere is doing something that is almost invariably of serious concern to the international community at large.

II

There is today in existence a considerable body of international arrangements, including several of great value, dealing with or affecting in one way or another the environmental problem. A formidable number of international organizations, some intergovernmental, some privately organized, some connected with the United Nations, some independently based, conduct programs in this field. As a rule, these programs are of a research nature. In most instances the relevance to problems of environmental conservation is incidental rather than central. While most of them are universal in focus, there are a few that approach the problem—and in some instances very usefully—at the regional level. Underlying a portion of these activities, and providing in some instances the legal basis for it, are a number of multilateral agreements that have environmental objectives or implications.

All this is useful and encouraging. But whether these activities are all that is needed is another question. Only a body fortified by extensive scientific expertise could accurately measure their adequacy to the needs at hand; and there is today, so far as the writer of these lines is aware, no body really charged with this purpose. In any case, it is evident that present activities have not halted or reversed environmental deterioration.

There is no reason to suppose, for example, that they will stop, or even reduce significantly at any early date, the massive spillage of oil into the high seas, now estimated at a million tons per annum and presumably steadily increasing. They will not assure the placing of reasonable limitations on the size of tankers or the enforcement of proper rules for the operation of these and other great vessels on the oceans. They will not, as they now stand, give humanity in general any protection against the misuse and plundering of the seabed for selfish national purposes. They will not put a stop to the proliferation of oil rigs in coastal and international waters, with all the dangers this presents for navigation and for the purity and ecological balance of the sea. They will not, except in a degree already recognized as quite unsatisfactory, protect the fish resources of the high seas from progressive de-

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struction or depletion. They will not seriously reduce the volume of noxious effluence emerging from the River Rhine and being carried by the North Sea currents to other regions. They will not prevent the automobile gases and the sulphuric fumes from Central European industries from continuing to affect the fish life of both fresh and salt waters in the Baltic region. They will not stop the transoceanic jets from consuming—each of them—its reputed 35 tons of oxygen as it moves between Europe and America, and replacing them with its own particular brand of poisons. They will not ensure the observance of proper standards to govern radiological contamination, including disposal of radioactive wastes, in international media. They will not assure that all uses of outer space, as well as of the polar extremities of the planet, are properly controlled in the interests of humanity as a whole.

They may halt or alleviate one or another of these processes of deterioration in the course of time; but there is nothing today to give us the assurance that such efforts will be made promptly enough, or on a sufficient scale, to prevent a further general deterioration in man's environment, a deterioration of such seriousness as to be in many respects irreparable. Even to the nonscientific layman, the conclusion seems inescapable that if this objective is to be achieved, there will have to be an international effort much more urgent in its timing, bolder and more comprehensive in its conception and more vigorous in its execution than anything created or planned to date.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has not been indifferent to the gravity of this problem. Responding to the timely initiative and offer of hospitality of the Swedish government, it has authorized the Secretary-General to proceed at once with the preparation of a "United Nations Conference on the Human Environment," to be held at Stockholm in 1972. There is no question but that this undertaking, the initiation and pursuit of which does much credit to its authors, will be of major significance. But the conference will not be of an organizational nature; nor would it be suited to such a purpose. The critical study of existing vehicles for treating environmental questions internationally, as well as the creation of new organizational devices in this field, is a task that will have to be performed elsewhere. There is no reason why it should not be vigorously pursued even in advance of the Conference—indeed, it is desirable

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for a number of reasons that it should. As was stated in the Secretary-General's report, "the decision to convene the Conference, and the preparations for it, should in no way be used to postpone or to cancel already initiated or planned programs of research or coöperation, be they at the national, regional or international level. On the contrary, the problems involved are so numerous and so complicated that all efforts to deal with them immediately should be continued and intensified." It will be useful to attempt to picture the functions that need to be performed if this purpose is to be achieved.

III

The first of these would be to provide adequate facilities for the collection, storage, retrieval and dissemination of information on all aspects of the problem. This would involve not just assembling the results of scientific investigation but also keeping something in the nature of a register of all conservational activities at international, national, regional and even local levels across the globe. The task here is not one of conducting original research but rather of collecting and collating the results of research done elsewhere, and disposing of that information in a manner to make it readily available to people everywhere.

A second function would be to promote the coördination of research and operational activities which now deal with environmental problems at the international level. The number of these is already formidable. To take a parallel from the American experience, it was calculated, when the President's Cabinet Committee on Environmental Quality was recently established in the White House, that there were already over 80 programs related to environmental questions being pursued just within the executive branch of the Federal Government. If a similar census were to be taken in the international field, the number would scarcely be less. A recent listing of just those bodies concerned with the peaceful uses of outer space noted 17 entities.

These activities have grown up, for the most part, without central structure or concept. There is not today even any assurance, or any means of assuring, that they cover all the necessary fields. The disadvantages of such a situation—possibilities for confusion, duplication and omission—are obvious.

A third function would be to establish international standards in environmental matters and to extend advice and help to indi-

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vidual governments and to regional organizations in their efforts to meet these standards. It is not a question here of giving orders, exerting authority or telling governments what to do. The function is in part an advisory one and in part, no doubt, hortatory: a matter of establishing and explaining requirements, of pressing governments to accept and enforce standards, of helping them to overcome domestic opposition. The uses of an international authority, when it comes to supporting and stiffening the efforts of governments to prevail against commercial, industrial and military interests within their respective jurisdictions, have already been demonstrated in other instances, as, for example, in the European Iron and Steel Community. They should not be underestimated here.

The fourth function that cries out for performance is from the standpoint of the possibilities in international (as opposed to national or regional) action, the most important of all. In contrast to all the others, it relates only to what might be called the great international media of human activity: the high seas, the stratosphere, outer space, perhaps also the Arctic and Antarctic —media which are subject to the sovereign authority of no national government. It consists simply of the establishment and enforcement of suitable rules for all human activities conducted in these media. It is a question not just of conservational considerations in the narrow sense but also of providing protection against the unfair exploitation of these media, above all the plundering or fouling or damaging of them, by individual governments or their nationals for selfish parochial purposes. Someone, after all, must decide at some point what is tolerable and permissible here and what is not; and since this is an area in which no sovereign government can make these determinations, some international authority must ultimately do so.

No one should be under any illusions about the far-reaching nature, and the gravity, of the problems that will have to be faced if this fourth function is to be effectively performed. There will have to be a determined attack on the problem of the "flags of convenience" for merchant shipping, and possibly their replacement by a single international régime and set of insignia for vessels plying the high seas. One will have to tackle on a hitherto unprecedented scale the thorny task of regulating industrialized fishing in international waters. There may have to be international patrol vessels charged with powers of enforce-

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ment in each of these fields. Systems of registration and licensing will have to be set up for uses made of the seabed as well as outer space; and one will have to confront, undaunted, the formidable array of interests already vested in the planting of oil rigs across the ocean floor.

For all of these purposes, the first step must be, of course, the achievement of adequate international consensus and authorization in the form of a multilateral treaty or convention. But for this there will have to be some suitable center of initiation, not to mention the instrument of enforcement which at a later point will have to come into the picture.

IV

What sort of authority holds out the greatest promise of assuring the effective performance of these functions?

It must first be noted that most of them are now being performed in some respects and to some degree by international organizations of one sort or another. The United Nations Secretariat does register (albeit ex post facto and apparently only for routine purposes) such launchings of objects into outer space as the great powers see fit to bring to its attention. The International Maritime Consultative Organization is concerned with the construction and equipping of ships carrying oil or other hazardous or noxious cargos. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation does assemble data on radiation and radioactivity in the environment and give advice to individual governments concerning standards and tolerances in this field. The Organization for Economic Development and Coöperation has recently announced its intention to work out international tolerance levels for pollutants and to tax those of its members which exceed these limits.

This list could go on for pages. Dozens of organizations collect information. Several make recommendations to governments. Some even exercise a limited coördinating role in individual fields. They cover a significant portion of needs; and they obviously cannot be ignored when it comes to the examination of the best organizational response to the problem in question. On the contrary, any approach that failed to take advantage of the work they are already accomplishing, any approach in particular that attempted to duplicate their present activity or to centralize it completely, would assuredly fail. But even in

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their entirety, they do not cover the whole spectrum of the functions that need to be performed, as listed above; and those that they do perform they perform, for the most part, inadequately.

The question therefore poses itself: How should these organizations be reinforced or expanded? Do they provide in themselves an adequate basis for the necessary expansion of function and activity? Or do they need to be supplemented by new organizational forms, and, if so, of what nature? Is there need for a central organization to bring all these activities under a single hat? Should there be several centers? Or none at all?

There is a view—and it is based on impressive experience and authority—which holds that there is no need for any unifying effort in these various forms of activity, at least not beyond such limited coördinating influence as United Nations bodies are able to exercise today; that any effort in this direction might only further confuse an already confused pattern; and that the most promising line of attack is for governments to intensify their support of activities already in progress, letting them develop separately according to function, letting one set of organizations continue to occupy itself with radiology, another with other forms of air pollution, another with the ecology of fresh water lakes and rivers, another with wildlife, another with oil pollution on the high seas, another with the ocean bed, etc. This is, of course, in many ways the easiest course. Existing efforts, under this procedure, are not disturbed. Existing arrangements for international control and support are not placed in question. Established competencies, sometimes conquered and defended in past years with much effort, are not jeopardized.

But there are weighty considerations that argue against such a course. A number of the existing organizations, including particularly ones connected with the United Nations, have primarily a developmental focus; yet developmental considerations are frequently in conflict with the needs of environmental conservation. Others are staffed, at least in considerable part, by persons whose professional enthusiasm runs to the exploitation of the very natural media or resources whose protection is here at stake. Others are closely connected with commercial interests engaged in just this sort of exploitation.

There is a considerable body of opinion, particularly in U. N. circles, to the effect that it is a mistake to separate the function of conservation and protection of natural resources from that

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of the development and exploitation of these resources for productive purposes. According to this view, there should not be separate organizations concerned with conservation. Considerations of an environmental nature should rather be built from the outset into all those activities that are concerned with the productive exploitation of natural resources, so that environmental needs would be met, so to speak, at the source.

This writer must respectfully disagree. This is an area in which exploitative motives cannot usefully be mingled with conservational ones. What is needed here is a watchdog; and the conscience and sense of duty of the watchdog must not be confused by contrary duties and undertakings. It may be boldly asserted that of the two purposes in question, conservation should come first. The principle should be that one exploits what a careful regard for the needs of conservation leaves to be exploited, not that one conserves what a liberal indulgence of the impulse to development leaves to be conserved.

V

What is lacking in the present pattern of approaches would seem to be precisely an organizational personality—part conscience, part voice—which has at heart the interests of no nation, no group of nations, no armed force, no political movement and no commercial concern, but simply those of mankind generally, together—and this is important—with man's animal and vegetable companions, who have no other advocate. If determinations are to be made of what is desirable from the standpoint of environmental conservation and protection, then they are going to have to proceed from a source which, in addition to including scientific competence and having qualified access to all necessary scientific data, sees things from a perspective which no national body—and no international one whose function is to reconcile conflicting national interests—can provide.

The process of compromise of national interests will of course have to take place at some point in every struggle against environmental deterioration at the international level. But it should not occur in the initial determination of what is and is not desirable from the conservational standpoint. This determination should at first be made, so to speak, in its pure form, or as near as one can get to it. It should serve as the point of departure for the long, wearisome, often thorny and frustrating, road of

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accommodation that will have to be traversed before it can be transformed into reality. But it should not itself be compromised at the outset.

Nor is this the only reason why one cannot make do with just the reinforcement of what now exists. If the present process of deterioration is to be halted, things are going to have to be done which will encounter formidable resistance from individual governments and powerful interests within individual countries. Only an entity that has great prestige, great authority and active support from centers of influence within the world's most powerful industrial and maritime nations will be able to make headway against such recalcitrance. One can conceive of a single organization's possessing such prestige and authority. It is harder to conceive of the purpose being served by some fifty to a hundred organizations, each active in a different field, all of them together presenting a pattern too complicated even to be understood or borne in mind by the world public.

All of this would seem to speak for the establishment of a single entity which, while not duplicating the work of existing organizations, could review this work from the standpoint of man's environmental needs as a whole, could make it its task to spot the inadequacies and identify the unfilled needs, could help to keep governments and leaders of opinion informed as to what ought to be done to meet minimum needs, could endeavor to assure that proper rules and standards are established wherever they are needed, and could, where desired, take a hand, vigorously and impartially, in the work of enforcement of rules and standards. It would not have to perform all these various functions itself—except perhaps where there was no one else to do so. Its responsibility should be rather to define their desirable dimensions and to exert itself, and use its influence with governments, to the end that all of them were performed by *someone,* and in an adequate way.

This entity, while naturally requiring the initiative of governments for its inception and their continued interest for its support, would have to be one in which the substantive decisions would be taken not on the basis of compromise among governmental representatives but on the basis of collaboration among scholars, scientists, experts, and perhaps also something in the nature of environmental statesmen and diplomats—but true international servants, bound by no national or political mandate,

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by nothing, in fact, other than dedication to the work at hand.

VI

It is impossible to picture an entity of this nature without considering, in the first instance, the possible source of its initiation and sponsorship in the international community. Who would take the lead in establishing it? From whom would it draw its financial resources? Who would constitute the ultimate sanction for its existence and its authority?

Obviously no single government could stand as the patron for such an agency. To seek, on the other hand, the sanction of the entire international community for its inception and activity would scarcely be a promising undertaking. Aside from the fact that this would then necessitate procedures practically indistinguishable from those of the United Nations itself, it would mean involving in the control and operation of the entity to be established a host of smaller and less developed countries which could contribute very little to the solution of the problems at hand. It would also involve formidable delays and heavy problems of decision-taking. Were this to be the course selected, one would do better to content one's self, throughout, with the existing facilities of the United Nations, which represent just about the limit of what can be accomplished on the basis of a universal, or near-universal, governmental consensus.

One is driven to the conclusion that if anything very constructive is going to be accomplished along this line, the interest and initiative will have to proceed from a relatively small group of governments; and logic suggests that these should be those of the leading industrial and maritime nations. It is they whose economies produce, in the main, the problem of pollution. It is they, again, who have the means to correct it. It is they, finally, who have the scientific and other resources to analyze the problem and to identify the most promising lines of solution. The devastation of the environment is primarily, though not exclusively, a function of advanced industrial and urban society. The correction of it is primarily a problem for the advanced nations.

One can conceive, then, by an act of the imagination, of a small group of advanced nations, consisting of roughly the ten leading industrial nations of the world, including communist and non-communist ones alike, together (mainly for reasons of their maritime interests) with the Scandinavians and perhaps with the

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Benelux countries as a bloc, constituting themselves something in the nature of a club for the preservation of natural environment, and resolving, then, in that capacity, to bring into being an entity—let us call it initially an International Environmental Agency—charged with the performance, at least on their behalf, of the functions outlined above. It would not, however, be advisable that this agency should be staffed at the operating level with governmental representatives or that it should take its decisions on the basis of intergovernmental compromise. Its operating personnel should rather have to consist primarily of people of scientific or technical competence, and the less these were bound by disciplinary relationships to individual governments, the better. One can imagine, therefore, that instead of staffing and controlling this agency themselves, the governments in question might well insert an intermediate layer of control by designating in each case a major scientific institution from within their jurisdiction—an Academy of Science or its equivalent—to act as a participating organization. These scientific bodies would then take over the responsibility for staffing the agency and supervising its operations.

It may be argued that under such an arrangement the participating institutions from communist countries would not be free agents, would enjoy no real independence, and would act only as stooges for their governments. As one who has had occasion both to see something of Russia and to disagree in public on a number of occasions with Soviet policies, the writer of this article is perhaps in a particularly favorable position to express his conviction that the Soviet Academy of Sciences, if called upon by its government to play a part in such an undertaking, would do so with an integrity and a seriousness of purpose worthy of its great scientific tradition, and would prove a rock of strength for the accomplishment of the objectives in question.

The agency would require, of course, financial support from the sponsoring governments. There would be no point in its establishment if one were not willing to support it generously and regularly; and one should not underestimate the amount of money that would be required. It might even run eventually to as much as the one-hundredth part of the military budgets of the respective governments for the same period of time, which would of course be a very substantial sum. Considering that the threat the agency would be designed to confront would be one

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by no means less menacing or less urgent than those to which the military appropriations are ostensibly devoted, this could hardly be called exorbitant.

The first task of such an agency should be to establish the outstanding needs of environmental conservation in the several fields, to review critically the work and the prospects of organizations now in existence, in relation to those needs, to identify the main lacunae, and to make recommendations as to how they should be filled. Such recommendations might envisage the concentration of one or another sort of activity in a single organization. They might envisage the strengthening of certain organizations, the merging of others. They might suggest the substance of new multilateral treaty provisions necessary to supply the foundation for this or that function of regulation and control. They might involve the re-allotment of existing responsibility for the development of standards, or the creation of new responsibilities of this nature. In short, a primary function of the Agency would be to advise governments, regional organizations and public opinion generally on what is needed to meet the environmental problem internationally, and to make recommendations as to how these needs can best be met. It would then of course be up to governments, the sponsoring ones and others as well, to implement these recommendations in whatever ways they might decide or agree on.

This, as will be seen, would be initially a process of study and advice. It would never be entirely completed; for situations would be constantly changing, new needs would be arising as old ones were met, the millennium would never be attained. But one could hope that eventually, as powers were accumulated and authority delegated under multilateral treaty arrangements, the Agency could gradually take over many of the functions of enforcement for such international arrangements as might require enforcement in the international media, and in this way expand its function and designation from that of an advisory agency to that of the single commanding International Environmental Authority which the international community is bound, at some point, to require.

All this, however, belongs to a later phase of development which it is idle to attempt to envisage in an enquiry so preliminary as this. In problems of international organizations, as in war, one does well to follow the Napoleonic principle: "*On*

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*s'engage et puis on voit.*" To engage oneself means, in this instance, to bring into being the personality. The rest will follow.

VII

The above is intended only as a suggestion of certain lines along which international action in this field might usefully and hopefully proceed. In the mind of the writer, these considerations would have validity even if founded only on the strictest and narrowest view of the environmental factors alone. They need no extraneous arguments for their justification.

It would be wrong, however, to close this discussion without noting that no such undertaking could be without its political and psychological by-products. The energies and resources men have to devote to international activities are not unlimited. To the extent that a place can be found in their hopes and enthusiasms for constructive and hopeful efforts, these must proceed at least to some extent at the expense of the sterile, morbid and immensely dangerous preoccupations that are now pursued under the heading of national defense.

Not only the international scientific community but the world public at large has great need, at this dark hour, of a new and more promising focus of attention. The great communist and Western powers, particularly, have need to replace the waning fixations of the cold war with interests which they can pursue in common and to everyone's benefit. For young people the world over, some new opening of hope and creativity is becoming an urgent spiritual necessity. Could there, one wonders, be any undertaking better designed to meet these needs, to relieve the great convulsions of anxiety and ingrained hostility that now rack international society, than a major international effort to restore the hope, the beauty and the salubriousness of the natural environment in which man has his being?

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# YOUTH AND FOREIGN POLICY

*By Steven J. Kelman*

PROTEST against the war in Vietnam became, along with marijuana and long hair, the symbol of the Revolt of Youth in America of the sixties. To be sure, the Revolt of Youth was far from a universal phenomenon among young people. Many millions continued going about the business of studying, staking out a life's work for themselves, launching a family—or fighting in the Vietnamese jungles. To a large extent, this was a revolt of the best educated, the most articulate, the most self-confident and self-conscious. In short, it was a revolt of the élite among youth. The rebels gained influence far beyond their numbers precisely because "The Establishment" was more interested in the escapades of élite youth than in the activities of, say, the blue-collar young. Youthful dissenters and revolutionaries benefited in this way from precisely the élite status they claimed to be rejecting.

The rebels could not escape the consequences of this status, however. The influence of this relatively small youthful pressure group on the American debate over Vietnam was all the more marked because foreign policy questions, unlike domestic bread-and-butter issues, traditionally involve only a relatively small percentage of the electorate. Policy-makers in the foreign policy field have been forced to reckon with the outlooks of youth on foreign policy issues.

With the beginning of the seventies and the gradual end of the American combat engagement in Vietnam, it is appropriate to assess the views of young people on the future direction of American foreign policy as a whole, and the contribution they might make toward changing its direction. For protesting a specific wrong is easier than formulating a thought-out alternate conception of a nation's role in the world. From my own standpoint, as one young person concerned with redirecting American foreign policy, any lasting role youth could play in this regard has been severely limited by a lack of hard thought conditioned by the environment in which college-age students today have reached political maturity. The domination over the entire international scene of the war in Vietnam during our period of political maturation has discouraged thought about the role of

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America in the world in general. The Vietnam environment has also distorted the perception of my generation of the role of the various power-blocs in world affairs in a way it would not for someone who also remembers World War II and the late forties.

As a result of the generalized lack of hard thought, the student seeking constructive changes in American foreign policy is caught between the Scylla of campus liberalism and the Charybdis of the campus New Left. Campus liberalism is full of decent humanitarian instincts, but weak on analysis and program. The New Left presents an analysis which is at least internally consistent and a program which is specific, in fact frighteningly so. For the New Left's program is to support bloody totalitarian terror.

In addition, liberalism and New Leftism have come to exist in symbiotic relationship on the campus. Many of the same students violently occupy an administrator's office one day and participate in a Vietnam Moratorium the next.

II

The earlier juxtaposition of protest against American policy in Vietnam with drugs and shaggy hair was neither fortuitous nor viciously intended. It is no accident that the constantly repeated refrain, "All We Are Saying Is Give Peace A Chance," which welled up again and again from the hundreds of thousands of youthful antiwar protesters in Washington on November 15, 1969, is from a melody composed by John Lennon of The Beatles. Nor is it surprising that many participants in the protest described the event as a political Woodstock Festival, referring to a rock festival in the summer of 1969 attended by over one hundred thousand young people. The reflexes of campus liberals when they judge American foreign policy come from the same value system which my generation uses to determine attitudes toward premarital sex, drugs, blacks, mod clothes and rock music. It is crucial to understand that opposition to the war in Vietnam, and by extension support for a foreign policy based on the slogan "Peace Now!", has become part of the life style of youth.

In order to understand how this connection came about, a brief digression far afield from international questions and into the world of the "youth culture" will be necessary.

Growing up in a period of unprecedented affluence, young

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people tend to be most preoccupied with the age-old search for a sense of human community, for the development of bonds between people. Taking material plenty for granted and not seeing that its prerequisite might well be some "psychic repression" of individual emotions and immediate gratification, the youth culture tends to see the rigors of the social order, and particularly its rigidities and conventions, as the great barrier preventing people from "coming together." Hence the immense popularity on campus of rehashed and refurbished versions of Freud's "Civilization and Its Discontents" in the works of men like Norman O. Brown, Herbert Marcuse and R. D. Laing. To Freud, the paradox of civilization was that the psychic repression which makes the advances of civilization possible makes men individually unhappy. Freud believed, however, that without the repression exacted by civilization, men would be at each other's throats.

What appears as paradox in the work of Freud becomes polemic in Brown and Marcuse. They see in society only the rigidities and conventions it sets up. They postulate a utopia if only these artificial boundaries and conventions can be broken down.

It is the impulse to break down what are seen as artificial barriers which is at the center of the youth culture's value system, and which explains much of the youth culture's political and nonpolitical mores. Young people view long hair as unruly and uninhibited. Closely cropped hair, held in place with tonic, is rigid and stultifying. Marijuana can be both a means of communal experience in itself, and, when the adult world provides an example of convention-bound opposition to what appears a harmless pleasure, an occasion to protest the barriers society places between people simply trying to "come together." The loud and insistent beat of rock music provides not only a verbal and musical language for the youth culture, but also a calm-shattering inducement to tear down inhibitions and barriers.

What of the reflection of this impulse in the political sphere? The distinctive aspect of the politics of the youth culture in the sixties was the spread of a genuine "end of ideology" attitude. Students have traditionally participated in politics under the banners of various dogmatic ideologies and obscure sects. The youth culture today objects to ideology, *any* ideology, because it rigidifies, atomizes and separates people into warring camps.

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Ideology is a barrier to the looseness necessary if people are to "come together." People who think ideologically are rigid and "up tight." The feeling is that were it not for the clash of rigid ideologies, each trying to impose itself upon other people, the world would be a better place. Ideology is the password which opens the door to bombing innocent children, invading other people's countries, beating demonstrators with clubs. Ideologies, like other conventions, serve to prevent people from getting along naturally with one another.

Given this attitude in the youth culture, campus liberals tend to view the entire ideological conflict between East and West simply as a cause of war and brutalization. The cold war of the forties and fifties is regarded as a relic of ancient history, or a fraud. The most common single objection one hears on campus to the war in Vietnam is that we are killing Vietnamese in order to impose "our way of life" on them. We are killing for our ideology. Campus liberals are vehemently and genuinely repelled by the argument frequently heard against immediate withdrawal from Vietnam that the United States must "save face." The anguished reply they make sums up their view of the murderous consequences of ideology: "Which is more important, saving face or saving lives?"

Any attempt to justify the war in Vietnam, or to formulate a foreign policy for America in terms of "national interest," offends campus liberals as an example of rigid ideological thinking. When a member of the conservative Young Americans for Freedom in a suburban upper-middle-class high school posted on the school's bulletin board a bumper sticker reading, "AMERICA—LOVE IT OR LEAVE IT," a number of students scrawled under it comments like "Good-bye" or "I'm leaving." Patriotism, a traditionalistic and particularistic convention which keeps people from "coming together," has simply disappeared as a motivating value in today's youth culture. This does not, of course, mean that most protesters are "anti-American," although a fair number are. Nor does it mean that most don't enjoy living in America. Youth are instinctively "turned off" by the sight of knee-jerk defenders of America's role in the world parading under a sea of American flags. It strikes them as a perfect example of ideology closing minds. (The use of an American flag as decoration sewn onto a leather jacket, introduced by the star of the movie "Easy Rider," quickly caught on

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among young people in 1969, and represents a more likely use of the flag by the youth culture.)

There is absolutely no trace among young people today of a "my country right or wrong" attitude. Most will support a given American policy if they happen to decide that it is "right," but to support a policy because it is the policy of the United States strikes young liberals as nonsensical. Young people have regarded the whole debate as to whether Vietnam war critics are patriotic or not as irrelevant. Even the statement one frequently hears from young people to the effect that "we are protesting because we want to make our country the best in the world" is manufactured largely for adult consumption.

The weakness of the attempt by campus liberals to graft their value system directly onto the analysis of political questions becomes immediately apparent when an attempt is made to evolve out of the youth culture values general foreign policy guidelines. For the only insight which young liberals end up presenting the policy-maker in the complex field of international relations is that America should conduct its affairs in the world the way members of the youth culture conduct their relations with each other. It is not, in my opinion, unfair to say that the totality of campus liberalism's "thought" on the question of a model for American foreign policy could be summarized in the following refrain from a hit song of The Youngbloods:

> Come on people now,
> Smile on your brother.
> Everybody get together,
> Try to love one another right now.
>
> © 1963, 1965, Irving Music, Inc.

One searches in vain, either in printed writings or even more in campus bull sessions with student liberals, for either thought on *or even interest in,* questions like: What steps might be taken to extend a system of world law? How should nations deal with the problem of aggression by large states against small ones? Is democracy an "ideology" in the same way either fascism or communism is, or merely a set of rules by which people can decide what if any conventions they wish to live under; and if so, is it appropriate to take steps of some sort to encourage democracy in the world? Would an American foreign policy based on "do your own thing" be reciprocated by other ideological blocs, and if not, what steps would be appropriate in that case?

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In short, having come to maturity in a Vietnam world where America seems the "bad guy," campus liberalism's foreign policy suggestions do not go beyond the demand that the United States cease being bad. The problem of other potential "bad guys" and what to do about them receives little or no attention. This is why the tone of campus liberalism's critique of American foreign policy often appears isolationist. Its underlying assumption is that if America would stop using her military power in the world, things would be more or less peaceful and quiet. The world could get along on its own; it is American military power which upsets the calm.

There is one area of the world for which campus liberals do have foreign policy recommendations to make: the underdeveloped countries. Just as student liberals when looking at American society are concerned about the problems of the poor and the black and unaware of the more prosaic ones of the auto or electrical worker, they are interested in the sufferings of the world's poor and unaware of other international problems. In aiding the underdeveloped countries, it is not so much American power which campus liberalism would like to see applied as American money. The suggestion is prosaic, and the political strategy to get it through the Congress is not specified, but the demand has a simple humanitarian motivation.

Europe does not receive from student liberals even the courtesy of a polite yawn. Interest has completely shifted away from European affairs to the problems of the underdeveloped world. Czechoslovakia received pro forma expressions of sympathy, but there was little interest in the events which led up to the crisis. An index of the declining interest in Europe can be seen in course enrollments at Harvard. Different courses on aspects of the urban crisis in America have had enrollments of five to eight hundred students. Courses on different aspects of modernization in the third world attract one hundred to three hundred. But a course on problems of modern Western European politics was attended by under seventy-five, although the professor teaching it had an excellent reputation, and a survey course on modern European history had an enrollment of under forty students. Only thirty students took a course offered on international politics in modern Western Europe.

Campus liberals present the policy-maker more with an outlook than a policy program: that American foreign policy not

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be determined on the basis of aggrandizing American power, but on the basis of seeking to alleviate the problems of poverty around the world. Policy-makers might argue to the young that the two goals do not contradict each other; the young probably feel that the latter goal has been completely or largely ignored in American policy. Without passing judgment on the polemics over the specifics, perhaps the demand of campus liberals can be rephrased in this way: that policy-makers, when formulating policy, begin to ask different questions and set different standards for what constitutes success and failure.

III

Although there are differences in emphasis which occasion violent arguments—and sometimes physical violence as well—among various factions of the New Left, the general thrust of New Left attitudes on international questions is clear to anyone who can struggle through the sloganized rhetoric of New Left polemic. These attitudes, however, continue to be hidden or obscured in many discussions of the New Left in the press. *The New York Times* to this day labels supporters of revolutionary violence like David Dellinger as "pacifists." Students for a Democratic Society, even after adopting the slogan "Bring the War Home Now," continues to be referred to as an "antiwar group."

All factions of SDS affirm their support of various "revolutionary" countries of the third world and their hostility to any of the democratic reformist régimes in the third world, such as Venezuela, Chile or Singapore. For the advanced countries they are seeking to establish a "revolutionary communist" dictatorship. They affirm their opposition to a multiparty political system and to "bourgeois" civil liberties. They are more sympathetic with the Soviet Union in its old Stalinist revolutionary terroristic stage than in its current "bourgeois" flabbiness.

It is impossible to answer the question, "How would the New Left change American foreign policy?" because the question assumes a frame of reference not shared by New Leftists. They are not agitating for this or that specific change. They aim to become the government as the result of a successful revolution in America. Short of revolution, the intermediate-range goal of the New Left is to attempt to prevent the United States Government from having any foreign policy. For, if the American sys-

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tem is an utterly evil one, then any role the United States plays in the world is automatically evil as well. This is not merely a slogan on the part of the New Left; New Leftists present a logic behind this attitude. If the United States acts, say, to help put down a guerrilla war, supports a backward dictatorship, or builds an ABM, such actions are clearly reprehensible from the point of view of the liberal as well as the New Leftist. But, the New Leftist adds, if the United States helps a nation build a hydroelectric dam to provide cheap power for peasants, reaches an amicable settlement with a régime which nationalizes American investments, or supports land reform, this is also bad, for it merely improves the prestige of America in the eyes of the world and postpones the "revolutionary consciousness" which will eventually overthrow "American imperialism."

Thus at Harvard, an SDS "exposé" of ways in which research by Harvard professors contributes to "administering the (American) Empire" listed not a single research project which could remotely be described as conservative or militarist in effect. Projects listed by SDS included developing a system by which Chile could effectively tax its rich people, discovering new strains of grain to improve agricultural productivity in underdeveloped countries, or curing certain African tropical diseases. American moves toward any détente in the cold war, traditionally looked upon with favor by liberals, are vociferously opposed by the New Left. Arms limitation is seen as a plot to "build the idea of pacifism and discourage struggle by the people of the world against American imperialism" by *Progressive Labor* magazine. *Challenge* saw the debate over the ABM as "shadow boxing" between elements in the ruling class which sought to spend money for arming against external threats and those who preferred to spend the money to put down revolution at home.

International questions are at the heart of New Left concern. Even when participating in a seemingly unrelated domestic policy activity, the New Left attempts to add an international "twist." An SDS campaign during 1968 against a transit fare increase in Boston exhorted the people of Boston to "struggle hard, like the Vietnamese people have struggled against American imperialism." SDS activities during the winter of the 1969 strike by General Electric workers emphasized that General Electric was an "imperialist corporation" seeking "cheap labor"

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abroad and defense contracts at home. Furthermore, when one attempts to probe New Leftists further about how they expect the unlikely event of a successful revolution in America to take place, the discussion quickly resolves into Lin Piao-like visions of the revolutionary countryside of the world coming to surround advanced countries like the United States. According to this view, it is the exploitation of the third world which is the major source of America's wealth, and, once America is "kicked out" of the underdeveloped countries, the workers will rise up as they cease gaining the "crumbs from the imperialist table." This approach to international economics may be utter fantasy, but we must seek to answer the question of why it has a relatively wide appeal on élite campuses.

The New Left's emphasis on international questions is simply a reflection of the fact that it is such questions, rather than prosaic issues of domestic policy, which have always had the greatest appeal to the New Left's constituency. It was not the civil rights activities of the early sixties but protests against the war in Vietnam which turned the New Left into a mass movement. Vietnam provided the right mixture of a cause that was both abstract and immediate. Abstract in that concern with the problem could show how much more "sensitive" the student was than the ordinary American, preoccupied with beer and television; and immediate in that the draft threatened most college-age young people.

International questions, and specifically Vietnam, were also the driving factor which moved the New Left from a left-liberal toward a revolutionary totalitarian ideology. The dynamic in the changes in New Left ideology is provided by the attempt of students to answer the question which is at the source of their frustrations: why haven't our protests ended the war in Vietnam? If several years of civil rights activity did not succeed in eliminating racism in America, this failure could plausibly be attributed in significant measure to the widespread extent of racial prejudice in the United States. Convinced that opposition to American policy in Vietnam was as self-evident as opposition to racial prejudice, and extremely frustrated by their inability to bring about the change sought after, antiwar students began groping for explanations of this failure. Through a winding and degenerating path which started with theorists like C. Wright Mills and the "power élite" and ended with Lenin's theory of

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imperialism, antiwar protesters on the New Left evolved their answer: our protests can't change foreign policy because American foreign policy is in the "economic interests of the class which rules this country." It is not "accidental," "misguided," or a question of "saving face": it is a question of coldly calculated economic interests.

While most students were naturally led to seek the cause for racism below, it seemed more plausible to seek the explanation for foreign policy above. And the key to the growth and success of the New Left on campus lies in its ability to provide an answer to the question, "Why haven't our demonstrations succeeded?" New Left leaflets constantly berate the liberal student for his belief that the war is a "mistake," and repeat, again and again, the litany of an explanation which, in the curious response of most student liberals, is "at least internally consistent." The most frequent explanation one hears from New Leftists about why they ceased attempting democratically to bring about the changes they sought goes something like, "We wrote letters to the President, we signed petitions, we marched, and the war still went on." Never once does one hear the question posed, "But did we ever convince a majority of Americans that our views are right?"

What is the view which SDS presents to students about the sources of American foreign policy? It is disarmingly simple and traditional. American corporations, obeying the profit maximization principle, are rushing into the third world, where better profit opportunities are available than at home. America is in Vietnam to protect its investments around the world. Profit opportunities in the third world are tremendous—"the maximum wage in South Vietnam is $1.40 a day"—and it is for our profits around the world that we are fighting in Vietnam. SDS accepts with a vengeance the domino theory: if Vietnam falls, the entire third world will fall. The theory of imperialism provides, says SDS, the reasons why American engagement in Vietnam is logical, from the point of view of capitalists, and tells why the war continues despite protests.

Of course this theory will not survive any careful reading of the evidence. Low wage levels should not be confused with high profits, for productivity and transport costs must be considered. If it were merely a question of taking advantage of labor which is paid much less than American workers, Cuba and China could

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develop quickly into industrial superpowers. But more importantly, American investment in the third world—as those who urge business to invest there bemoan—is pitifully small. The total value of capital invested in the entire third world (Asia, Africa, Latin America) is a mere $16 billion, an insignificant 1.1 percent of the $1.4 trillion of capital investment in this country and over $1 billion less than our investment in Canada. In Latin America and East Asia the rate of return on American investment is lower than it is domestically. In 1966, the last year for which complete figures are available, Latin American investment returned 13 percent and East Asian investment returned 11.2 percent (the American rate of return was 13.4 percent). Profits from American investments in *all of East Asia* (including Japan) amount to some $248 million annually. To say we are spending $30 billion annually in Vietnam to protect some fraction of $248 million is ludicrous. America's dependence on the raw materials of Asia, most notably rubber, is declining with the development of synthetics. While business interests may very well influence American foreign policy in non-liberal directions, the New Left notion that American capitalism as a whole is dependent or even vitally interested in investments in the third world is simply nonsense. That this "theory" has received such widespread support casts grave doubt on the intellectual integrity of much of the student community. While the New Leftists are ideologically dishonest for presenting such ideas, campus liberals are ideologically bankrupt for not making any attempt to refute them.

Caught in the mire of anti-democratic and élitist thought which it discovered in the attempt to answer the question of why their protests did not end the war, the evolving New Left also began to pick up positive models for identification from anti-democrats on the Left. At the same time as they began talking about imperialism two or three years ago, the pages of *New Left Notes* began to be filled with explanations of why strikes are not permitted in Cuba, articles praising the Arab liberation movement, criticism of the Czech reformers for opening up contacts with Western imperialism, and pictures of North Vietnamese infantrymen heading off to the front.

The totalitarianism of the New Left was born in the attempt to resolve why they had been unsuccessful in the attempt to change U.S. foreign policy toward détente, arms reduction and

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internationalism. It ended with the New Left hawks and hard-liners—in vociferous support of an expanding communism.

IV

In the real world of the campus, a major problem of the liberal position is that it is far too other-worldly and vague to be viable. To be sure, the New Left position is rigidly ideological and therefore contrary to the gut do-your-own-thingism of the youth culture. But it is being advocated by other young people, and it answers some of the same frustrations that campus liberals feel. Thus New Left ideology tends to be granted a special dispensation, especially since so many New Leftists come out of youth culture backgrounds and still wear the clothes, hair and other appurtenances of the youth culture. Most students do not adopt the New Left ideology as their own, but painfully few are those who will roundly condemn it. Indeed, campus liberalism persists as the dominant undercurrent at the university for reasons having little to do with politics at all. It persists because it allows a "groovy" lifestyle without sacrificing the student's desire for material success after the years of his college fling. Nobody should underestimate the amount of careerism which still exists on the campus, paeans to the so-called "rejection of material success" of my generation not withstanding. But guilt persists about this, and the New Leftist is secretly admired, even when he is not joined, for his "commitment" and "self-sacrifice."

Given all this, the general pattern on campus is for a de facto alliance between liberals and New Leftists, on the terms of the latter. On the rare occasions, like the Vietnam Moratorium, when the New Left does not provide the tactics, it provides the rhetoric and—because the liberals have none—the ideology. When one hundred thousand Boston youths assembled in the Boston Common on October 15, 1969, for the first Moratorium, a brief appeal by Senator McGovern for America to save her national honor by leaving Vietnam (which might better have been addressed to a middle-aged audience) was followed by a series of bloodcurdling exhortations by members of various extreme Left sects to root for the Vietcong, to smash the State, or to back the Black Panthers. The overwhelming majority of those present had come out on a beautiful afternoon to protest the war—and to show off their clothes, lie together on the grass

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with a friend of the opposite sex, to sing and to make peace signs. The speeches were alien to the spirit of their gathering. But the perversion of the event is a commentary on the weakness of the do-your-own-thing position.

Out of the value system of the youth culture could come an intelligent outline for an alternate model of American foreign policy. In my view, the perhaps simpleminded ethical imperatives of my generation represent a justified reaction to the excesses of "tough-mindedness" and "thinking about the unthinkable" among policy-makers. I would like to see young people present a foreign policy based on three major considerations.

First, that none of the major power blocs in world politics represents the embodiment of the Forces for Good. The Western democracies are frequently allied with backward and repressive forces in the third world, forces which hinder the modernization of underdeveloped countries. At the same time, the communist blocs represent régimes that are both internally repressive (and hardly sympathetic to the do-your-own-thingism of the youth culture) and allied in the third world with violent revolutionaries whose brutal practice is in stark contradiction to the rhetoric of bread and liberation.

Second, that regardless of the fact that there are ideological and political struggles going on in the world, the murderous potential of world armaments makes moves toward arms limitation and détente a practical necessity.

Third, that America has a positive role to play in the world, not only in Europe but in promoting economic development and political pluralism in the third world. Isolationism or agnosticism about the spread of totalitarian régimes in the third world is scarcely less reprehensible than the New Left's support for the spread of communism.

In short, the existence of different political ideologies in the world simply cannot be avoided, however much the liberal may want to, and the student liberal has the duty to favor a foreign policy course which gives peaceful encouragement and aid to pluralistic institutions around the world—the only institutions where divergent lifestyles are tolerated. Until student liberals develop their own set of coherent proposals, the proposals of the New Left will continue to dominate the stage. From the point of view of changing American foreign policy, nothing could be more counterproductive.

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# A NUCLEAR CHINA AND U. S. ARMS POLICY

*By A. Doak Barnett*

CHINA's emergence as a nuclear power poses new and important issues for U.S. strategic and arms-control policy. How one assesses the "China problem," and the alternative means to cope with it, has a direct bearing on what the American position should be on key questions in the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during the months and years ahead. It will certainly influence—directly or indirectly—major decisions of the United States and the Soviet Union on whether to build or forgo new weapons systems.

In analyzing the "China problem," one point must be kept in mind. Despite Peking's ambition to be a great power, its support for revolutionary struggles in the underdeveloped world, and its obvious efforts to increase China's international influence, the Chinese military-strategic position in relation to the superpowers is fundamentally weak, and the Chinese know it. As a consequence, China's basic military posture in big-power relations is of necessity defensive.

There is no doubt that ever since 1949 the Chinese communist régime has felt very vulnerable to external pressures and possible attack by one or both of the major nuclear powers. Particularly since the late 1950s—following the Sino-Soviet split and the start of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in the arms-control field—Peking has felt itself to be, in a sense, "encircled" by the two superpowers.

One of China's basic aims, therefore, has been and still is to acquire at least a minimal nuclear deterrent to improve its ability to deal with the United States and the Soviet Union. Its hope is to achieve a position less unequal than in the past, and to strengthen its bargaining position and leverage in relations with the big powers. Above all, its aim is to deter attack against China and reduce China's vulnerability to external pressures.

Without attempting here to summarize in detail the progress of China's nuclear program, one can say that while its technological progress has been impressive in many respects, its actual capabilities are very limited and will remain so for a long time to come because of the relative weakness of China's resource

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base. By the middle or latter 1970s China will at best have accumulated 15 to 40 operational intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) plus one to two hundred medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a limited number of other bombs deliverable by aircraft. Despite some evidence that the Chinese are working toward developing nuclear-armed submarines, it now appears doubtful that this effort will be important in their general nuclear program, at least in the next decade. To provide a crude basis of comparison, today the United States and the Soviet Union each has over 1,000 ICBMs, plus many thousands of other nuclear weapons deliverable by a variety of sophisticated systems including missiles, airplanes and submarines.

Projections of China's nuclear capabilities in the years ahead make several things clear. There is no possibility that in the foreseeable future Peking can aspire to genuine parity with the United States and the Soviet Union in the nuclear field. The Chinese cannot, in short, come close to achieving a first-strike capability against either of the superpowers. Under any conceivable circumstances, in the event of a Chinese attack, Washington or Moscow could retaliate massively. The important question, therefore, is whether—and if so when and with what consequences—China may be able to acquire a limited, defensive, second-strike capability which will serve as a minimal deterrent against attack. Such a deterrent would have the capacity, if subjected to U.S. or Soviet nuclear attack, to retaliate and hit at least some targets in the attacking country, or, in the U.S. case, possibly American forces in the Pacific or bases in allied countries. It has yet to achieve this.

China's attitudes toward basic strategic and arms-control problems are, in many respects, a corollary of these facts, as well as a reflection of its general ideological and political outlook. To date, the Chinese have consistently opposed all U.S.-Soviet steps toward arms control, in part because they have not themselves been willing to accept any limitation on their freedom of action until China has improved its defensive position vis-à-vis the United States and the Soviet Union.

In 1963 the Chinese bitterly attacked the limited test ban because they regarded it as a U.S.-Soviet effort to prevent other powers, including China, from developing independent nuclear deterrence. They also felt that the ban was directed specifically against China.

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In 1964, when the Chinese exploded their first nuclear bomb, Peking made a strong "no-first-use" pledge. This was probably genuine in the sense that the Chinese recognized their relative weakness and wanted to exert political pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union to deter them from considering "first use." Since then they have on many occasions called on the other powers to make a similar pledge. Peking at that time also made sweeping proposals for total nuclear disarmament. These were primarily for propaganda purposes, since China undoubtedly knew that they would not be acceptable to other powers. Probably Peking's aim was to highlight the belief that steps toward arms limitation, short of restrictions that genuinely reduce the superiority of the two superpowers, will work to the advantage of the United States and the Soviet Union in relation to weaker powers, including China, at least until such powers can obtain a credible nuclear deterrent. In connection with their 1964 proposals, the Chinese called for various nuclear-free zones as steps toward total nuclear disarmament. Subsequently, however, they have shown less interest in this idea, and they have said little about it recently.

The Chinese have consistently opposed the nonproliferation treaty, and at various times—for example, in 1963 and 1965—have stated that they actually favored proliferation, at least among socialist states, because this would reduce the freedom of action of the United States and the Soviet Union and would exert pressure toward general nuclear disarmament. In fact, they have not aided any other nation in its nuclear development and seem unlikely to do so. If at any point China were seriously to consider actively encouraging proliferation, it would probably be more tempted to do so in areas fairly distant from China, such as the Middle East.

The Chinese have condemned proposed seabed agreements, calling them simply another example of U.S.-Soviet collusion which would not benefit weaker powers because there would be no limitation on nuclear-armed submarines or any real reduction of U.S.-Soviet nuclear dominance. They have criticized American and Soviet steps toward building anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, labeling ABM development another example of U.S.-Soviet collusion specifically directed against China. They have not had much to say about multiple independently targeted reëntry vehicles (MIRVs), but they have mentioned

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them and called them another sign of big-power aggressive intentions.

Surprisingly, the Chinese have not had very much to say so far about the U.S.-Soviet SALT talks. Interestingly, however, the Chinese have referred to the United States and the Soviet Union as "contending and yet colluding with each other," a sign of Peking's increased sensitivity to the complexities of the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangular relationship.

II

Although Peking's views on all arms-control measures sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union have so far been consistently hostile, this does not mean they will be immutable. It should be remembered that Peking's position in regard to arms control crystallized at a time when the Sino-Soviet dispute was developing and China found itself increasingly at odds not only with the United States but with the Soviet Union as well. Even more important, this was a time when China itself had just started on its plan to develop an independent nuclear capability, and Peking wanted no restrictions or limitations imposed on its own program. The general Chinese strategy—a Maoist strategy —which took shape at that time was based on intense hostility toward both the United States and the Soviet Union and put primary stress on the need for Chinese "self-reliance."

Looking to the future, it is certainly possible that China's overall international strategy, and its specific foreign policies, could undergo significant changes, for they have changed on several occasions in the past. After Mao Tse-tung dies, and even before, a new leadership will emerge in China, in all probability some sort of collective leadership prone to compromise policies. It seems likely that such a leadership will react against many aspects of recent Maoist policies. It is at least possible that future leaders will put less stress on ideology than Mao has done, and be more pragmatic, realistic and possibly flexible in their approach to both domestic and foreign policy.

As a result of the internal disruptions caused by the Cultural Revolution in China during the past four years, the Peking régime has clearly been weakened in some respects. Consequently, there are now new constraints, in fact if not in theory, on Chinese policy, which will certainly affect its strategies abroad. The steady deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the

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1960s, and the growing complexities of the triangular relationship involving the United States, the Soviet Union and China, also seem to have impelled the Chinese leadership to consider new options and strategies, to reduce China's present isolation and vulnerability and explore new opportunities for manœuvre and flexibility. At this point in time, it is extremely difficult to say what Chinese leaders, as they look ahead, hope to achieve in terms of specific strategic relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. There is undoubtedly debate and uncertainty in China about this, and future Chinese policy will almost certainly be influenced by decisions made in both Washington and Moscow.

During the last few years, as Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated, the "Russian threat" appears to have replaced the "U.S. threat" as Peking's major foreign policy preoccupation. Yet, there always have been, and presumably still are, some Chinese leaders who believe China should move to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union and try to work out a modus vivendi with Moscow. However, it also seems likely that today there are leaders in Peking who are urging greater flexibility in China's approaches to powers other than the Soviet Union, including the United States, in the hope that this can provide a counterbalance to the "Soviet threat" or at least reduce the external pressures on China. To date, the Chinese have not basically changed their posture toward the United States, but there are signs of at least uncertainty and possible debate in Peking in this regard. The resumption of U.S.-Chinese talks at Warsaw in January 1970 may prove to be a step toward more flexibility on Peking's part.

The fact is that, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, China is now undergoing a very important transition period. New leadership and new policies will emerge in time. This could result in important changes in China's general foreign policy strategy and in its positions regarding many international issues, including strategic problems and arms control. However, fundamental changes in China's posture on strategic and nuclear arms-control issues will not be easy for Peking to make because of China's basic weakness in relation to the two superpowers.

III

If one asks when and under what conditions a more flexible

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and pragmatic leadership in China might be inclined to change its posture on arms control, and begin to see arms-control measures as in the interest of China as well as of the other powers, the answer would seem to be: when China is convinced that its own nuclear development has reached a stage where it has a minimal credible nuclear deterrent—that is, some kind of second-strike retaliatory capacity—that will enable it to deal with the United States and the Soviet Union on terms less unequal than at present.

It is not easy, however, to define the point at which China may believe itself to have achieved this goal. Somewhat elusive psychological factors are involved. By simply calculating and comparing numbers of nuclear weapons, one can argue that the United States and the Soviet Union should continue to have a first-strike capability against China for the almost indefinite future. In other words, they should have a theoretical capability of destroying all of China's nuclear weapons in a first strike. Therefore, simply in terms of numbers of nuclear weapons, China's inferiority will persist, and it may not have a dependable or credible deterrent for a very long time to come.

It seems doubtful, however, that a simple numerical calculus, comparing weapons stockpiles, will determine the attitudes of leaders either in China or in the United States and the Soviet Union. At some point, China will have acquired a sufficient nuclear capability so that the United States and the Soviet Union —as well as China itself—will believe that China *might* have the capacity, after a first strike, to mount a retaliatory attack against the United States or the Soviet Union or other related targets including Asian allies.

At what point, then, will this element of uncertainty in the balance be such that in practice China will have acquired what must be considered a credible deterrent? Stated another way, at what point will the United States and the Soviet Union feel they must act as if they believe that the principles of mutual nuclear deterrence operate in their relations with China, and at what point will China genuinely believe that they are acting in this fashion?

There are no simple answers to these questions, because they depend, to some extent at least, on American and Soviet attitudes toward China's nuclear capabilities, as indicated both by their statements and their actions.

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One can say, though, that when such a point is reached, China may reconsider, and possibly revise, its views on strategic and arms-control questions. The realization that pursuit of parity is a will-o'-the-wisp is likely to begin to sink in in China. Moreover, once China has acquired any sort of credible deterrent, some Chinese leaders may conclude that it is more feasible to try to reduce the gap between China and the superpowers through agreements limiting—or reducing—American and Soviet capabilities than by trying to catch up in a hopeless race. And, as the cost of deterrence goes up (it inevitably must, as China gets involved in more sophisticated hardware), and as the competition for resources in China increases between those stressing economic development and those emphasizing defense, there may be greater pressures within China on economic grounds to limit investment in strategic arms development.

Factors such as these may come into play in time. But it does not seem likely that they will have a significant effect on Chinese policy until China is convinced it has acquired a minimal deterrent and until the Soviet Union and the United States have adjusted their attitudes and policies to this fact. Until that point has been reached, China's investment in nuclear development will not really have achieved any very significant result from the Chinese point of view, at least in military-strategic terms.

## IV

If this analysis is correct, the United States and the Soviet Union have two quite different options in approaching the "China problem." They can, if they so choose, take a variety of steps to try to postpone as long as possible the time when China will have acquired a credible deterrent. Specifically, they can strive to insure that they have total damage denial capability against China. This would clearly put off the day when China must be accepted into the international community in which the principles of mutual deterrence are assumed to operate.

If this course is chosen, there will be a number of problems, even if the technical problems all prove to be solvable. One can argue that, to be wholly effective, this would require not only ABM area coverage ensuring total damage denial for all of the United States and the Soviet Union but also measures that would fully protect allies that might be targets for retaliatory second-strike threats by China.

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At best, this approach would probably only postpone—not prevent—China's ultimate acquisition of a second-strike capability. It seems likely that eventually China would be able to acquire sufficient numbers of nuclear weapons, at least some of them "hardened," or develop penetration aids that would make ABM systems no longer capable of ensuring total damage denial. But that day would be put off. While taking such measures, the United States and the Soviet Union could downgrade the significance of China's nuclear capabilities and indicate to Peking that in Washington's and Moscow's view the Chinese deterrent is not credible.

Despite some possible advantages, however, this course would virtually guarantee that China will continue devoting major resources to nuclear development, until it believes it has achieved a credible deterrent. In short, it would tend to raise the level of nuclear development which Peking would consider essential as a minimum goal. It would also virtually ensure China's continued opposition and refusal to participate in any arms-control measures sponsored by the United States or the Soviet Union.

An alternative and very different approach would be for the United States and the Soviet Union to refrain from deploying ABM defenses or taking any other measures obviously designed to prevent China from acquiring even a limited second-strike capability, and instead, as soon as it is justifiable, accept the fact that China has acquired a credible deterrent of a minimal sort. At that point Washington and Moscow might indicate to Peking that, in the American and Soviet view, China has reached the stage in its nuclear development where it is assumed the principles of mutual deterrence apply to it as well as to the two superpowers.

This need not, and should not, involve unrealistic exaggeration of China's power. Peking's acquisition of a minimal deterrent will not make it a superpower. The overwhelming superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union will continue and will be obvious not only to the Chinese but to others as well. So, too, will be the fact of China's continuing weakness in economic and other terms relative to Japan and Western Europe as well as to the United States and the Soviet Union. Peking will doubtless learn, as other nuclear powers have, that a small nuclear capability cannot be automatically translated into increased political influence in international affairs and may even

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complicate the problems of national security rather than clearly solve them.

There is no real reason, therefore, why China's example—any more than the examples of France and Britain—should convince non-nuclear powers that they should themselves "go nuclear." Acceptance of the fact that China has acquired a minimal deterrent would simply involve recognition of Peking's improved defense capabilities, not a general upgrading of China's overall power position in the world balance. A conscious effort should be made, however, to convince non-nuclear powers that international political influence does not depend on nuclear status. It might be desirable, for example, to reconstitute the U.N. Security Council so that it includes non-nuclear powers such as Japan.

One could even argue that it might be worthwhile to jump the gun and begin talking and acting as if China has acquired a credible nuclear deterrent as soon as it has placed a minimal nuclear missile force in operation—and before its deterrent is wholly and unquestionably credible—in the hope that China might then begin to reëxamine its posture on strategy and arms control in the belief that it has achieved one of its basic goals.

At this point—and probably not before—one could press more vigorously for China to participate in international arms-control efforts with some realistic basis for hope that there would be a greater possibility than at present that it would consider participating.

What risks or costs would this involve? It would require acceptance of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union cannot with impunity consider or threaten nuclear first strikes against China. One can question, however, whether this would involve high costs, at least for America. The arguments and inhibitions against considering nuclear first strikes in most conceivable situations are already very great, though this may be less true for the Soviet Union, as the vague hints in 1969 about a possible preëmptive strike suggest. But even Moscow must feel strong inhibitions about initiating a nuclear first strike. Moreover, in most limited conflicts in Asia, nuclear weapons are likely to be almost irrelevant.

The possibility that key non-nuclear powers such as Japan, India and Australia might feel more vulnerable and threatened cannot be ignored. If this impelled them to embark on independent nuclear programs, the cost in relation to U.S. aims, includ-

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ing the desire to prevent proliferation, would be substantial. Yet as long as such countries have confidence in the U.S. commitment to defend them against nuclear threats, and as long as it is clear that American nuclear superiority in relation to China is such that any offensive nuclear threats by China would not be credible, there is no reason why China's acquisition of a minimal deterrent should basically alter the position or the views of such countries.

It is sometimes argued that if the United States maintains a first-strike capability against China and builds invulnerable defenses, for example by developing ABMs, the Japanese are likely to have greater confidence in our defense pledges. It can also be argued, to the contrary, that if the United States focuses on such a defense strategy rather than relying on the continued applicability of mutual deterrence, the Japanese may conclude that America in a crisis situation might concern itself only with its own defense and abandon interest in allies not protected by such defenses. The fact is that not only have the Chinese to date resisted whatever temptation they may have felt to engage in "bomb rattling," it is difficult to see how, from their position of nuclear inferiority, they will have any significant capacity for credible "nuclear blackmail" in the years immediately ahead. To date, Peking's cautious emphasis on defense as its sole aim in developing nuclear weapons suggests that Chinese leaders may already realize this.

## V

Some might fear that once the Chinese believe they have acquired a credible deterrent, they might tend to become more aggressive in areas such as Southeast Asia, feeling that they could take more risks in non-nuclear or sub-nuclear situations because they would be less vulnerable to nuclear counterthreats. Whether one considers this to be a significant risk depends very much on one's general assessment of China's foreign policy goals, strategy and behavior.

If one views China as a power committed to territorial aggression and expansionism, willing to take large risks and prone to irrational action, *i.e.* inclined to commit aggression without regard for possible consequences, there would be cause for major concern. However, among specialists on Chinese affairs, both in and out of the American government, there appears to be a fairly

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broad consensus that China's behavior and doctrine over the past two decades do not support this view. In general, this consensus maintains that:

China is not committed to broad territorial expansionism. Among its national goals, certainly, is the recovery of what it considers to be lost territories, but even in regard to these territories its inclination is to pursue long-term, low-risk policies.

It appears to be predisposed to keep Chinese military forces within China's boundaries, and it seems likely to continue doing so, except in cases where it feels Chinese security—or that of a communist buffer state on its periphery—is seriously threatened, as in Korea.

Its primary stress, both in the structure of its conventional military forces and the doctrine governing their use, is on defense rather than offense.

It cannot and does not ignore the possible risks and costs of large-scale conventional war, even when nuclear weapons are not involved, and it places a high priority on the desirability of avoiding large-scale war of any sort with the major powers.

It is strongly predisposed, in general, to low-cost, low-risk policies, and while it encourages and supports revolutionary struggles in other countries, such support does not include Chinese manpower on any significant scale. Even Maoist doctrine insists that all revolutionaries must be "self-reliant," and should depend primarily on indigenous resources; it thus opposes the use of Chinese forces to fight other revolutionaries' battles for them.

It uses pressures and probes against its neighbors for a variety of purposes, but in doing so its use of force is generally carefully calculated and controlled.

In crisis situations, it tends to act with considerable prudence and caution, and repeatedly it has moved to check escalation when there has appeared to be a serious risk of major conflict.

There is, of course, no guarantee that these patterns of behavior, which seem to have characterized Chinese actions over the past two decades, will persist in the future. Nevertheless, there is general agreement among China specialists that they are likely to continue. As indicated earlier, there is also a belief that post-Mao leaders are likely to be more pragmatic than Mao and subject to greater internal as well as external constraints. It is plausible to believe that such leaders may down-

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grade the importance of revolutionary aims, not ending, but possibly decreasing, Chinese activity in this field, and upgrade the importance of state-to-state relationships and more conventional political and economic instruments of policy. There is remarkably little support among China specialists for the idea that China is now—or is likely to be in the future—prone to act in an irrational or highly reckless manner. And it would certainly be doing this were it to ignore the continuing fact of its nuclear inferiority, and its vulnerability to both conventional and nuclear retaliation, even after it acquires a minimal deterrent.

If these judgments are correct, there are strong reasons to assume that once China achieves a nuclear deterrent it can be expected, in a basic sense, to act much as the other nuclear powers have, and to be constrained, as they are, by the realities of nuclear deterrence. There is little basis for arguing that the United States and the Soviet Union can feel secure vis-à-vis China only if they have a total damage denial capability and an unquestionable ability to threaten China with a first strike. To argue this is to argue, in effect, that the United States and the Soviet Union can feel secure only under conditions that guarantee that the Chinese will continue to feel highly insecure.

Despite the fact that the above judgments have been accepted by many as a basis for policy even within the American government, others have argued—although not convincingly in the view of those who accept the judgments summarized above—that somehow Peking may be able in the future to engage in "nuclear blackmail" against the United States or its Asian allies. This belief helps explain continuing pressure in Washington for construction of a full-scale anti-Chinese ABM.

One other element of possible uncertainty and risk must be considered, namely the danger of accidents. Very little is known of China's command and control mechanisms affecting nuclear weapons. However, in almost all crisis situations during the past 20 years the Chinese have exercised careful control over their forces. This, plus the fact that Peking has adopted an extremely cautious posture regarding nuclear weapons since its first detonation, would not lead one to conclude that China will be indifferent to the problem of control.

It would certainly be desirable for the United States and the Soviet Union to have greater confidence in the dependability of China's command and control techniques in the nuclear field.

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Perhaps the best way to achieve this, however, is to try to draw China into international efforts toward arms control. The hope should be that in time Peking as well as Washington and Moscow will be genuinely concerned with the problem of strategic stability and willing to collaborate in efforts to achieve it.

## VI

In the light of these facts and judgments, how should the "China problem" be taken into account by the United States and the Soviet Union in their approaches to arms limitations?

It should be recognized, first of all, that the mere fact of major American and Soviet talks on strategic arms limitation involves the danger that China may be confirmed in its view that they are actively collaborating against China. It may tend to reinforce Peking's suspicions that the superpowers are determined to perpetuate their total strategic superiority and prevent China from developing any sort of credible deterrent in order to exclude it from the international community of mutual deterrence.

Clearly, the crucial importance of concluding U.S.-Soviet agreements which can check the arms race and achieve a higher degree of strategic stability in relations between the two superpowers is overriding, and China's attitude cannot be allowed to wreck or even unduly complicate this effort.

Nevertheless, the long-run problem of incorporating China into the international community and bringing its nuclear establishment under the same restraints that affect those of other countries cannot be ignored either. There is good reason, therefore, to make a conscious effort to convince the Chinese that no arms-control agreements are especially directed against them, and to attempt to reduce their feeling that the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in "collusion" to China's detriment. Washington should try to make this absolutely clear.

Though it is to be hoped that the Soviet Union will agree on the importance of this, one cannot be certain that it will. If, as is conceivable under certain circumstances, the Russians try to convey to Peking the impression that Washington tacitly supports Moscow in pressures directed against China, the United States should make clear that it will not be put in the position of supporting anti-Chinese Soviet policies, and that U.S. policies which give high priority to the need for arms-control agreements are not specifically directed against the Chinese.

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One way of doing this is for the United States, while negotiating with the Russians on strategic arms limitations, to continue the kinds of initiatives toward Peking that were begun by the Nixon administration in July 1969, taking steps designed to make clear that Washington, in fact as well as theory, is committed to pursue an even-handed policy toward both the Soviet Union and China. We should reiterate that the United States desires to work toward normalization of relations with mainland China and would welcome its eventual involvement in international arms control. Even if the Soviets are not enthusiastic about any sort of conciliatory moves by the United States toward China, Washington should not let this interfere with its continuing efforts to work toward reasonable relationships with the Chinese as well as the Russians.

In more specific terms, however, the "China problem" must also be taken into account both in Washington's unilateral decisions on arms policy and in the U.S.-Soviet arms limitation talks. The key immediate issue concerns ABM defenses.

Debate continues in Washington over the issue of whether to build a comprehensive American anti-Chinese ABM system. In January 1970, President Nixon moved one further step toward construction of such a system. During his press conference on January 30, in outlining the present rationale for moving in this direction, he stated that although 10 years from now Communist China "will not be a major nuclear power," it "will have significant nuclear capacity." He then reiterated his desire for a "breakthrough in some normalization" of relations with Peking, but said that if "we have not made a breakthrough," we would need an anti-Chinese ABM defense as protection against the possibility of Chinese "nuclear blackmail" directed against either the United States or its Asian allies, in order to maintain the credibility of American foreign policy in the Pacific.

In the weeks and months ahead, as the United States proceeds with substantive arms-control negotiations with the Russians, and continues to explore the possibilities of improving relations with the Chinese, it can be assumed that the ABM issue will be subject to further debate and reëxamination. The importance of improving both U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese relations is too great for positions on an issue of this sort to be irrevocably frozen. As President Nixon put it on March 14, 1969, America is committed "to move from an era of confrontation to an era of

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negotiation" and will periodically review decisions concerning ABM deployment in the light not only of technical considerations and current intelligence estimates but also "any talks that we are having" regarding arms control.

What should the American position be in regard to anti-Chinese ABM systems in the SALT talks? There are strong arguments in favor of trying to reach agreement with the Russians that we will both forgo building ABM systems, to avoid competitive development of costly weapons that might not only have undesirable effects on U.S.-Soviet strategic relations but would also affect adversely the long-run problem of dealing with China and would reduce future prospects for drawing it into more responsible roles within the international community.

If, in the SALT talks, we try to insist on the American need for an anti-Chinese ABM system, the Russians will almost certainly insist on a quid pro quo. They might insist on further development of their own ABM. One can imagine arguments, in theory at least, that the Russians might present for a special need, on their part, for an anti-Chinese ABM. They could point to the undeniable fact that because of geography the U.S. and Soviet situations are different. As soon as the Chinese acquire a significant MRBM capability, they will be able to reach many Soviet targets (they will be able to do so, in fact, even before that, with aircraft), whereas it will be some years before China has acquired ICBMs capable of reaching U.S. targets. It is significant, however, that there is no clear evidence that the Russians have a strong desire to build an anti-Chinese ABM system. In the Soviet view, the very fact of Russia's size and proximity to China may argue for relying primarily on deterrence rather than attempting the difficult task of achieving total damage denial; the Russians may believe this is feasible because of their overwhelming nuclear superiority vis-à-vis China.

If, therefore, the United States insists on an anti-Chinese ABM, it is possible that the Russians may insist on concessions regarding other weapons systems. In this situation the United States might find itself in the worst of all possible worlds, engaged in a process of agreed-upon arms escalation in U.S.-Soviet relations while bearing the principal onus for pursuing specifically anti-Chinese arms policies. If, on the other hand, we and the Russians were to decide that we would both build anti-Chinese ABM systems, we would doubtless reinforce Peking's

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view that Moscow and Washington are in collusion against China. The probable result would be not only to delay the prospect of Peking considering more reasonable policies in general but to affect adversely any possibility of a "breakthrough" in U.S.-Chinese relations.

The wisest course, therefore, for the United States to pursue regarding ABMs in the SALT talks would be to try to reach agreement with the Russians that neither they nor we will build anti-Chinese ABMs. This would not only help to check the U.S.-Soviet arms race but would also keep open the possibility of improving relations with Peking.

In sum, both the United States and the Soviet Union should concern themselves not only with the problem of strategic stability in their bilateral relations but also with the task of inducing China, over time, to participate in arms-control efforts and to accommodate itself more fully than it has to date to the requirements of the nuclear age. Neither need fear that the Chinese will be able to achieve a first-strike capability—or approach nuclear parity—in the foreseeable future. Nor should they consider China's acquisition of a minimal deterrent as a special danger. While it is true that China's acquisition of a credible deterrent will improve Peking's defensive capabilities, it will not significantly alter the overall balance. Moreover, China can be expected to act much as other nuclear powers have acted and to be constrained, as others are, by the realities of mutual deterrence. Equally important, when China achieves a credible deterrent, Peking's leaders may be more inclined than at present to reassess their strategic policies and consider the value of arms control. This may, in fact, be a prerequisite to incorporating China into the community of mutual deterrence.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union should consciously avoid, therefore, strategic and arms-control policies that will be viewed by Peking as being primarily anti-Chinese. Such policies will postpone rather than hasten the day when China may concern itself with problems of nuclear stability. The hope should be that Moscow as well as Washington will see the importance of this. But even if Moscow does not, the United States, in shaping its own strategic and arms-control policies, should take the "China problem," as well as the problems of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, fully into account.

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# THE FUTURE OF ISRAEL

*By Nahum Goldmann*

AFTER more than 50 years of Zionist activities—among them many decades over the international diplomatic front—and on looking back on the experiences gained in the 20 years of the existence of the state of Israel, I am beginning to have doubts as to whether the establishment of the state of Israel as it is today, a state like all other states in structure and form, was the fullest accomplishment of the Zionist idea and its twofold aim: to save Jews suffering from discrimination and persecution by giving them the opportunity for a decent and meaningful life in their own homeland; second, to ensure the survival of the Jewish people against the threat of disintegration and disappearance in those parts of the world where they enjoy full equality of rights. In expressing and explaining these thoughts, I want to make it clear that I have no doubt as to the historical justification and moral validity of Zionism. The concentration of a large part of the Jewish people in their own national home, where they are masters of their destiny, seems to me to be the only way to solve what has been called for centuries "the Jewish problem."

The character both of the Jewish people and of Jewish history can alone explain and justify the Zionist idea, criticized today by many anti-Israel countries and groups as a form of aggressive colonialism which has robbed the Arab people of a part of their patrimony. Any definition of the Jews as a race, a people, a religion, is incomplete; it is the combination of all these elements which accounts for the singular character and the unique destiny of Judaism. There is no other example of a people which has lost its own state and country of origin, which is dispersed in countries all over the world, which has gone through hundreds of years of persecution—from simple discrimination and denial of equal rights to the barbaric annihilation of millions by the Nazis—and which not only survived these tragic periods, but has consistently made notable contributions to civilization. In our own generation, the three greatest figures, who may have influenced our present life and thinking more than any others—Marx, Freud and Einstein—have been Jews. With such a history, the Jewish people certainly deserves to be given the means

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for its survival; and humanity, having been responsible for hundreds of years of suffering and having failed to do anything radical to save the Jewish people in the Nazi period, owes this people a moral debt which can be discharged only by helping it to secure its survival.

Experience has shown that only a country of its own, however small, can serve this purpose. And only Palestine can be this country, in view of the religious, emotional and even mystical attachment of the Jews to "Eretz Israel," the Land of Israel, in which they made their greatest contribution to human civilization; which in no period of their history they were ready to forget; and for the return to which they prayed and longed for during thousands of years. Only because of this particular attachment of the dispersed people to its country of origin can the Jewish claim to Palestine be justified against the Arab argument that it belongs to them because they lived there as a majority for several centuries. Under normal rules of international life, there is no question that the Arab claim has meaning and substance, and it would be foolish and unfair to deny its justification. Dr. Chaim Weizmann repeatedly declared that the Arab-Jewish conflict with regard to Palestine is a clash between two rights, not between right and wrong, and that is what makes it so complex and difficult. Only if one understands the singularity of the Jewish people (which has nothing to do with any notion of superiority) and its tragic history can one presume that the Jewish claim is morally and historically superior. The Arab peoples possess immense territories in which they are masters of their destiny, and their survival and future are in no way endangered by their renunciation of their claim to a very small part of their overall territorial expanse; whereas tiny Palestine is for the Jewish people the only means of survival and the sole guarantee of a creative future. The fact that in a relatively short period of time most of the peoples of the world have recognized this claim and that, under the impact of the Nazi tragedy, more than two-thirds of the United Nations approved the idea of a Jewish state in a part of Palestine—the Soviet as well as the Western bloc voting in favor—proves realistically the validity of the Jewish right as against the Arab one.

II

It is the very uniqueness of the Jewish problem and of the

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Zionist idea as its solution which, in the last analysis, makes me doubt whether the creation and existence of a Jewish state no different in structure and character from any other state can be the real implementation of Zionism. Even in those bygone years when I, with many other Zionist leaders, fought on the diplomatic front for the acceptance of the Jewish claim for a state in Palestine, I pondered whether we should not ask for a state of a specific character, more in conformity with the special nature of the Jewish people and Jewish history. Together with Dr. Weizmann, Ben Gurion and Moshe Sharett I was among the protagonists of the idea of a partition of Palestine as the inevitable condition for creating a Jewish state after the war. Even in those days I considered the possibility of asking for a specific form of state; but I felt then that, with all the difficulties inherent in getting the consent of the majority of nations for a Jewish state at all, it would be too much to ask at the same time for a unique character for this state.

More than 20 years have now gone by since the creation of the state of Israel. The experiences gained in these two decades have led me to the conviction that to guarantee its survival and to make sure that it fulfills its raison d'être as the main instrument of Jewish future, one must begin to think of a specific character and form for this state.

My growing skepticism as to the present form of Israel's existence is based on the two decisive conditions for its future and survival. These two conditions are, on the one hand, the relation between Israel and the Arab world in whose midst it exists, and on the other hand its relation with the Jewish people, in its large majority dispersed over the world. These two problems will decide the destiny of Israel. From a short-term point of view, it may seem that the United States and the Soviet Union are more important factors in Israel's international position, but seen from a long-term point of view, in the context of Jewish and general history, the Arab and the Jewish aspect of Israel's position is much more fundamental and decisive.

As far as the relations with the Arab world are concerned, it was one of the shortcomings of the Zionist movement that, in its early years, it did not fully realize the gravity and importance of this problem. Theodor Herzl, the author of the *Judenstaat* (the Jewish State) and founder of the Zionist movement, once said that the Zionist idea is a very simple one—that all it has to

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do is to "transport a people without a country to a country without a people." This formula, like all oversimplifications, was wrong in both its premises: a large part of the Jewish people after the Emancipation was already a people with a country, and Palestine, inhabited for centuries by the Arabs, was certainly not a country without a people. It is true at the same time that neither in ideology nor in practical political action Zionism ever thought of having to resort to an armed conflict with the Arab world in order to create the Jewish state. It was the—maybe naïve—hope and belief of the Zionist movement that it would be possible to get Arab consent to the creation of a Jewish homeland or a Jewish state by bringing the blessings of Western civilization into Palestine, which was then sparsely populated, by providing room for new immigrants through economic and social development of the country and through the fact of being part of the same Semitic race. Many Zionist leaders tried hard to bring about such a consent: from the negotiations of Dr. Weizmann after the First World War with Emir Faisal and his success in obtaining his agreement to a Jewish state, through all the years of endeavors by Ben Gurion, Sharett, myself (when I represented the Jewish Agency in Geneva at the League of Nations) and other Zionist leaders. All these attempts were unfortunately unsuccessful. And when the Arab states rejected the decision of the United Nations to partition Palestine and establish a Jewish state in part of it, and reacted to the creation of the state by the invasion of the country by their armies, it was inevitable that the state from its first days had to be defended by military action.

The inevitability of this development does not diminish its tragic character. The first War of Liberation was followed by two other major wars, and from all three Israel emerged victorious—most decisively from the 1967 Six Day War. But these victories have not, for the time being, brought nearer any solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Victories in themselves, however important they are psychologically both for the victor and the defeated, are meaningful only if they lead to stability and peace. The fact that nearly three years after the overwhelming victory of the Six Day War none of the Arab states is ready to negotiate directly with Israel and certainly not to sign a formal peace treaty indicates the depth of Arab resentment and the categorical Arab rejection of the Jewish state. The Arab world regards Israel as a foreign element in its midst and refuses to

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accept its existence. This feeling is growing with every new Israeli victory, so as to compensate for the Arab sentiment of humiliation and inferiority. The hope to impose peace on the Arab world, either by pressure of the big powers or by another Israeli victory, is more than slim. History proves that an imposed peace does not last long, even if a defeated people is forced for a certain time to accept a truce extracted by arms. In the case of Israel and the Arabs, this probability is much smaller in view of the tremendous numerical superiority of the Arab peoples which no Jewish immigration, however large, can hope to match and which must, particularly considering the much higher Arab birth rate, lead to an ever-growing numerical disproportion. At the moment, and probably for some time to come, the qualitative superiority of Israel is outstanding; it is unrealistic, however, to rely on it forever: the Arab peoples have created a brilliant civilization in the past and will no doubt one day acquire the technical know-how of the West, both in peaceful endeavors and in warfare.

III

For both parties to the conflict, the present state of affairs has disastrous consequences, by imposing on Israelis and Arabs alike the necessity to mobilize and strengthen their arms potential, by diverting their efforts to a large degree from social and economic progress to military efforts. For Israel these consequences are even more significant—in a negative way—than for the Arabs, because at least qualitatively it must maintain equality and even superiority against the many surrounding states and in view of the impact of the situation on its international position. The hope of some Israeli leaders that time is on their side and that the Arabs, recognizing Israel's military capability, will be more ready to accept the fait accompli of Israel's existence, seems to me based on very tenuous assumptions. The attitude of the Arab leaders, both of the conservative and the revolutionary type, and the state of mind of the new Arab generation, as reported by experts, show that rather than diminishing, their rejection of Israel and their determination not to accept it are growing.

The Arab peoples are characterized by an unusual capability of ignoring or discarding realities. When defeated they attach their hopes to a new war with a possible victory, and have been doing this, with regard to Israel, after three defeats. They draw

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an analogy with the Crusaders' state which, after long domination, was destroyed by Saladin. This fundamental psychological trait of the Arabs, which explains their seemingly unrealistic approach, is shared also by the Jews. If, in centuries of persecution, discrimination and misery, the Jewish people had accepted the realities of its fate, there would not be a Jewish people today; but against the tragedy of their situation, the Jews reacted with increasing faith and passionate hopes for the coming of the Messiah.

In addition to the growing hostility of the Arab world, from an international point of view, the political position of Israel is also becoming more difficult and isolated. It has lost much of the sympathy aroused by the brutal Arab threats of 1967 to annihilate the Jews in Israel physically in case of their victory, and by the admiration caused by Israel's brilliant victory. Today the whole communist world—with some exceptions—is fundamentally anti-Israel. France has changed its position from a friendly to an unfriendly one. Nobody can say whether England inclines more to the Arabs or to Israel. Over twenty Arab and Moslem states, and countries with large Moslem populations, like India, are hostile to Israel. The only real and decisive political support of Israel at the moment is supplied by the United States and a few smaller West European countries. But the experience of the last twenty years has shown that American backing cannot be taken for granted, as was demonstrated so dramatically in the wake of the Suez-Sinai campaign. The recent statements by Secretary of State Rogers, and the rejection of his proposals by the Israeli Government, indicate again the possibility of a deterioration of the fundamentally friendly policy of the United States toward Israel, and have caused serious worries and disquiet in Israel. One must realize that for a normal diplomat, whose policies are determined by day-to-day interests rather than by great visions or moral concepts, 80 to 90 million Arabs and many more million Moslems, in possession of the Middle Eastern lands with the richest oil resources in the world, weigh more heavily than the small state of Israel, even taking into account its Jewish periphery. In decades of political work I have nearly always found all foreign ministries to be anti-Zionist and anti-Israel. Only exceptional statesmen with a great historical outlook, like Lloyd George, Balfour, General Smuts, President Wilson, could overcome their prosaic, realistic con-

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cerns in favor of the moral concept underlying the Jewish claim for a country of their own.

Another negative consequence of this permanent state of war is the change of image of the young state of Israel, which is more admired in the world today for its military brilliance than for its spiritual achievements. Although the world justly admires the strength and the courage, the resourcefulness and the unexpected talents of Israel's army, this is certainly nothing either unique or specific to the Jewish people, nor have other peoples and civilizations been admired and remembered in history primarily for their military accomplishments. It is furthermore not to be underestimated that in many parts of the world it is the reactionary, nationalistic groups which have become the sponsors and admirers of Israel, whereas large parts of the progressive world have become disappointed and antagonistic to Israel. In its classical days, Zionism was a movement favored and supported by liberal, progressive and radical groups all over the world. This has changed considerably and may change even more if the present situation prevails.

From a Jewish point of view, too, the situation presents negative consequences of far-reaching importance. The large majority of the Jewish people lives outside the state of Israel and it must be taken for a fact that, despite all appeals, there is no reasonable expectation for very large immigration in the coming years. Israel had grown from its initial 650,000 to two and a half million inhabitants by absorbing the natural reservoir of Jews who had to come to the Jewish state as their only country of salvation—half a million Nazi victims from the camps after the war, hundreds of thousands of Jews in Moslem countries who were the first victims of Arab antagonism to Israel, and large numbers of Jews from Eastern Europe. The one remaining large community which could, in previous decades, have been an obvious source for large-scale immigration into Israel, Soviet Jewry, is unable to come as long as the U.S.S.R. is hostile. Even if one day this impediment should be overcome, I doubt whether a major part of Soviet Jewry would go to Israel; to count on a few hundred thousands may not be unrealistic, but there will certainly not be millions (and I refrain from speaking of the tremendous problem of their absorption). Unless something tragic and unexpected happens, like large-scale persecution of Jews in Western countries, it is unlikely that within the foreseeable fu-

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ture the large majority of Jews living outside the Jewish state will settle in Israel.

This too is characteristic of the specific situation and structure of the Jewish people, and it explains why the existence and development of Israel are so decisive for the survival of the Jewish people as a whole. The two great challenges—to use Toynbee's terminology—which account for the miracle of Jewish survival in the dispersion were, on the one hand, the permanent persecution, the impossibility for Jews to forget their Jewishness and the feeling of solidarity this generated and, on the other hand, the tremendous power of the Jewish religion, the set of laws which regulated the life of the Jewish individual and collectivity in the days of the ghetto and constituted, in Heinrich Heine's famous formula, the "portable fatherland" which every Jew carried along with him in all his migrations. (To give an example only of our days: the persecution and annihilation of millions of Jews by the Nazis made the survivors more conscious of their Jewishness, gave them a feeling of guilt for not having been able to save the victims and inspired them with the determination not to allow a similar tragedy to recur.)

Both these motivations have to a great degree lost their impact nowadays. Anti-Semitism is no more what it used to be in past centuries; Jews everywhere enjoy equality of rights and have become more and more integrated into the political, social, economic and cultural life of the countries in which they live. Simultaneously, the Jewish religion has ceased to be, at least for the larger part of the Jewish people, the great authoritative force which guides their daily life and guarantees their identity and distinctive character. It must be recalled that the Nazi holocaust destroyed precisely those great Jewish communities in Central and Eastern Europe which maintained fully the Jewish tradition and created all the ideas on which the Jewish people today bases its spiritual existence, and that they cannot be replaced by the Jewish communities in the free world of today, which do not lead their own separate cultural life. The existence of Israel as the new center where Jewish civilization can be continued and where new ideas will be created, as a source of challenge and inspiration for Diaspora Jewry, is therefore much more essential for Jewish survival today than was even envisaged by Zionist ideologists before the Nazi period.

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IV

For the survival of the Jewish people as a whole, but also from the point of view of Israel's future, it is no exaggeration to say that the problem of Israel-Jewish relations, the ties which attach Jewish communities and individuals in the Diaspora to the state of Israel, is the number-one problem on which the success or failure of the Zionist solution of the Jewish question will finally depend. There are other peoples who have diasporas, sometimes counting millions, but these diasporas are unimportant in comparison with the vast majority of the peoples living in their own country and state. For example, if—as is probable—the German diaspora in the United States or in South America will assimilate and disappear as a distinct minority in the future, or if the same thing happens to the Italian minority on the American continent, this will in no way endanger the existence of the German or the Italian people and state. But if, for argument's sake, the Jewish Diaspora were to assimilate itself to such a degree that it would lose all interest in the state of Israel, the survival of the state would be nearly impossible. Without the solidarity and coöperation of world Jewry, the state of Israel would never have come into existence, because it is ludicrous to assume that 650,000 Jews without the millions of others backing them could have established a Jewish state in the midst of the Arab world. Without the economic, financial and political help of Jewish communities in the Diaspora, the state would have been unable to secure its existence, develop its economy, build up its brilliant army and provide possibilities for the immigration of more than a million and a half needy Jews. To strengthen this solidarity is therefore the *condition sine qua non* for the future of Israel.

The present character and structure of the state, however, endanger this basic precondition of Israel's survival. Its participation in international politics and its conflict with the Arab countries must inevitably bring Israeli policies into situations which clash with the political attitudes of many other states. This, in turn, in the present atmosphere of state nationalism, must lead to problems as far as the attachment and solidarity of Jews in the Diaspora with the state of Israel are concerned. A few examples of events in recent years illustrate this fact: hundreds of thousands of Jews had to leave the Moslem countries because of the Arab-Israeli wars; the Jewish communities of South Africa and above all Russia have to face serious problems

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partly because of the policies of Israel, which may be fully justified from the point of view of the state as it is today, but create difficulties for the Jews living in countries to which Israel is in opposition (what happened in France is a clear and additional manifestation of this problem). All this means that a Jewish state which requires the solidarity and the coöperation of the great majority of the Jewish people for its survival must have a character which can claim the sympathy of Jewish communities wherever they live.

Finally, the present situation has another and by far not the least negative consequence for the moral, spiritual and cultural character of Israel. This aspect is important if Israel is to fulfill its historical task of securing Jewish survival all over the world; it requires that Israel become a center of attraction, the greatest challenge for the best, most idealistic elements of the young generation, which is in great danger of largely being lost to the Jewish people within a few decades. An Israel at war, in permanent mobilization, cannot become this center. There are limits to the possibilities and capabilities of even the most gifted and purposeful people. The tremendous effort which Israel had to make in order to maintain its military strength and superiority, and which it will have to continue to make to an ever-increasing degree, naturally deflects a large part of its creative resources from cultural and spiritual endeavors. An Israel at war can attract thousands of volunteers, but it will not attract tens of thousands of young Jews who are dissatisfied with their present form of life—particularly in such rich countries as the United States —who look for more idealistic ways of existence and who would be natural candidates for immigration into Israel. One can but imagine what even in the very short lapse of 20 years could have been created by the dynamic genius of Israel—culturally, scientifically, spiritually—if its young, gifted and creative generation, with its tremendous energy and élan, not to speak of the billions of dollars, had been concentrated on science, literature, social experiments and similar tasks, instead of having had to build and maintain, as its greatest and most successful achievement, the brilliant army of the young state.

V

What is the answer to these questions? I belong, as my record proves, among the very first proponents of the idea of partition of

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Palestine. I was always a political Zionist, in the sense that I believed that Jews must have a state of their own to secure their identity and civilization. More and more, however, I am coming to the conclusion that Israel cannot be one of the more than a hundred so-called sovereign national states as they exist today and that, instead of relying primarily and exclusively on its military and political strength, it should be not merely accepted but guaranteed, de jure and de facto, by all the peoples of the world, including the Arabs, and put under the permanent protection of the whole of mankind. This neutralization would certainly be an exception to the normal forms of modern states but, as I indicated before, the Jewish people and the Jewish history are unique. Their singular character and ceaseless suffering—particularly during the Nazi catastrophe—allow the Jewish state to demand from the world the right to establish its own national center in its old homeland and to guarantee its existence. How this guarantee should be practically formulated and implemented will have to be thought out and elaborated. There may be a slight precedent for it in the neutrality of Switzerland, which was guaranteed by the major powers more than 150 years ago, with lasting results. If Switzerland, because of its history and tradition, was and is entitled to claim and obtain the respect for its specific neutral character, the Jewish people and Israel certainly have an even greater moral claim to it.

This neutralization of Israel would naturally have important consequences for the character and the activities of the state. It would have to keep itself outside the sphere of power politics. Switzerland, for example, is not a member of the United Nations, because it is more than difficult to be in the United Nations and remain really neutral, abstaining from decisions which indicate a political position in favor of one or another of the groups and blocs in the world. Neutralization may even mean that a permanent symbolic international force may have to be stationed in the state of Israel, so that any attack on it would imply an attack on all the states guaranteeing Israel's existence and neutrality and participation in this international force. (To avoid misunderstandings, I would add that this does not signify the demilitarization of Israel and the abolition of its army, as long as there are no proof and experience to show the effectiveness of the international guarantee.) But by the nature of things, especially if this guarantee were tied up with a control of

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arms deliveries to the countries of the Middle East—a plan much discussed these days—the importance of the army and armaments would be reduced the more the guarantee and the neutralization become a reality, and this would allow Israel, as I said, to concentrate fully on its economic, cultural and spiritual efforts.

I can well imagine that such a neutralization could be the basis for an Arab-Israeli settlement and peace. Psychological and emotional motives are primarily at the root of the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict, as of most conflicts. All the factual problems—refugees, borders, etc.—could be solved without too great difficulties if there were goodwill and eagerness to reach an understanding. Seen from this aspect, the greatest hindrance in Arab-Israeli relations is the humiliation which the Arab world has suffered time and again by its military defeats. Whoever knows the Arabs, their history and character, agrees that pride is one of their most excessive virtues. But an appeal to the generosity of the Arabs, to be guarantors with the rest of the world for a Jewish state in a tiny part of the tremendous territories at their disposal—however unrealistic it may sound at the moment —may be more effective in the long run for an Arab-Israeli coexistence than one Israeli victory after another.

Neutralization would also do away with one of the major and understandable fears of the Arab world, namely the worry about possible Israeli territorial expansion on the one hand and, on the other, the obstacle which Israel, by its geopolitical position, represents to the ideal of a united policy for the Arab world. A guaranteed neutrality of Israel, including the guarantee of its boundaries after the settlement of the present conflict, would do away with the Arab fear of Israeli aggression and expansion. A neutralized Israel, outside the sphere of power politics, would not be a handicap for the policies of a united Arab world, which sooner or later will have to emerge in this period tending toward the creation of larger units comprising many sovereign states. I mention, in this regard, a conversation between Nasser and Dag Hammarskjöld, who tried several times in talks with him to find a basis for an Arab-Israeli agreement, and on which Hammarskjöld reported to me. Nasser, Hammarskjöld told me, had indicated that maybe the Arabs would acquiesce in the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state in part of it, but they could never accept that Israel, by its location, par-

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titions the whole Arab world—between Morocco and Iraq—and makes a united Arab policy very difficult. A neutralized Jewish state would do away with this fear.

The solution I suggest would depend on two preconditions. The first and obvious one is that the present crisis and war between Israel and the Arabs find an end by some kind of agreement between the parties, the exact nature of which this essay would not attempt to outline. Although nothing can be done concretely toward the implementation of my concept until this is achieved, if the concept should be accepted, it would naturally influence the character of the settlement of the present conflict.

The second precondition would be a basic settlement of the greatest human and emotional obstacle to Arab-Israeli understanding, namely the Arab refugee problem. Its main solution would have to consist in financing the settlement of the major part of the refugees in Cis- and Transjordan, which experts believe to be technically feasible; in Israel's acceptance, even as a matter of principle, of a limited number of Arab refugees; and possibly in yielding the Gaza Strip to Israel, on condition that it integrate the 200,000 Arabs living there as equal citizens.

There was a time when I advocated, privately and publicly, as a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the establishment of a confederation of states of the Middle East in which Israel should be a member. In such a confederation the Arabs would naturally be the majority and Israel would have to adapt its world policies to their desires. When I negotiated the idea of partition in 1945 with Dean Acheson, the then Undersecretary of State, and got his agreement, followed later by the consent of President Truman to this idea, I submitted to him a memorandum on behalf of the Zionist Executive, formulating our proposal as twofold: a Jewish state in part of Palestine and this state as part of a confederation of Middle Eastern states. In view of the experience of the last 20 years, I am no longer convinced of the practicability of this solution. First of all, because of Arab individualism and the tremendous cleavage between the feudalistic Arab forces of yesterday and the revolutionary forces of today, it will take a very long time for the Arab world to unite and form such a confederation. Secondly, and even more decisively, if this day should come, Israel as the only Jewish state in such a confederation would be overwhelmed by the enormous numerical superiority of the Arabs, even if a few non-Arab states were to participate.

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In the last two years, another solution suggested by certain Arabs as well as by some Israelis has been gaining the sympathy of Left-leaning pro-Arab groups in the free world. It proposes the recognition of the Palestinian people in Cis-jordan which (in the suggestion of El Fatah) would form one democratic Palestinian state together with Israel or (the solution favored by the Israeli proponents) would be recognized as a state of its own, linked in a federation with Israel. I do not regard this as practical, either from a Jewish or an Arab point of view.

From the Jewish aspect, such a unitarian Palestinian state would do away with the Jewish character of Israel. Had the purpose of Zionism been merely to save homeless and persecuted Jews, this concept might have been of value. But the Zionist ideal was to create a state which, beyond offering refuge to a number of suffering Jews, would be determined by its Jewish majority and would enable the Jewish people to maintain its traditions, develop its genius and contribute to world civilization. This aim could not be achieved by a binational Arab-Jewish Palestinian state, particularly in view of the higher birthrate of the Arab population, which would in a short while become the majority and do away with the Jewish character of this state—even if, as is the case in Lebanon, the equal position of both parts of the population, irrespective of their number, were to be guaranteed constitutionally. In addition, the Arab citizens of such a unitarian Palestinian state would, quite naturally, tend to side with the neighboring Arab states and would, consciously or unconsciously, constitute a "fifth column" within the state.

From an Arab point of view, genuine patriots will not agree to a Palestinian state which would imply their separation from the main body of the Arab world and would make them dependent on the superior strength and know-how of the Jewish citizens, with their greater technical and scientific knowledge and larger financial and economic means.

As for a federation between an Arab and a Jewish state, from an Arab point of view, the Israeli part would be economically and technologically so much superior that the Arab component would be practically a satellite of the Jewish one, which the Arab world would of course never accept.

For all these reasons, the idea seems to me—despite a certain attractiveness—unrealistic and unfeasible. I suggest, instead, the neutralization of the Jewish state of Israel.

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VI

Let me now deal with the chances for this proposal which at first glance may seem utopian and not to be implemented. The emergence of the state of Israel shows that one must not be too hasty in characterizing radical, visionary proposals as quixotic and unrealistic. We are living in a great revolutionary period, probably the most revolutionary of human history, with tremendous events taking place again and again that even experts would have regarded as impossible a short while before. There are a number of arguments and facts which favor my solution and make it appear as practicable.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is a permanent grave worry to the world at large. It is one of the possible major causes of a world conflagration, in view of the geopolitical importance of the area, rich in oil resources, significant by its location among three continents and a center of interest for all major powers and the three major religions. It has already had great international consequences. It has facilitated Soviet penetration into the Middle East and into the Mediterranean. It has made the Middle East a place of unremitting tension and turbulence, and as the years go by without a settlement, the explosive character of the situation is increasing. This danger gives the Arab-Israeli conflict a much wider international significance than it would normally have, and makes any program for its solution important to the whole world. I believe that neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R., the decisive international powers for the Middle East problems, desire a war and both wish to avoid a confrontation because of the Arab-Israeli conflict; their attitude in the Six Day War proved it. Both are interested therefore in reaching a solution as soon as possible, especially if there is a chance for some general and global agreement between them, which would be impossible without a Middle East settlement. I am not sure that the United States is delighted with its primary responsibility for Israel's survival, nor that Russia is happy with its burden of protecting and rearming the Arabs without any certainty as to the usefulness and effectiveness of their rearmament. The U.S.S.R. has gained, because of the Arab-Israeli conflict, what Russia had tried to obtain for centuries without success, namely a firm position in the Middle East; and nothing in my view justifies the belief that it is interested in a permanent state of war in this area in order to maintain its position. I have been told by

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communist statesmen close to the Soviet Union that the Soviet position in the Middle East is so strong and deeply rooted—economically, financially and militarily—that it is genuinely interested now in stability and peace, especially in view of the much more important and difficult problems which it has to face in some of the nearer communist countries. I have reason to hope that the Soviet Union would be ready, in case of a satisfactory agreement, to guarantee the stability and territorial integrity of the countries of the Middle East, together with the United States or with the Big Powers or within the framework of the United Nations.

As for the Arabs, once they know that the Big Powers guarantee the stability of the Middle East and may agree to a limitation of arms deliveries to the area, the hope of the extremists among them of destroying Israel with the help of the U.S.S.R. would fade away. Furthermore, as I said, an appeal to them to be generous and magnanimous and accept the fait accompli of the existence of the tiny Jewish state and even be among its guarantors, could have a tremendous psychological impact on the Arabs who are a very emotional people, given to extremes, able to be cruel and brutal on the one hand, noble and large on the other. It is worthwhile to note here that in Jewish history, with its many encounters with countless peoples, states and civilizations, the Arab-Jewish rencontre was much more human and fair than the instances of Jewish-Christian relations. The great Arab-Jewish civilization in Spain, and the freedom of life and creativeness of Jewish communities in many Moslem countries in the past, may encourage the hope of a positive Arab reaction to this solution of the problem.

Israel would, I am sure, as a neutralized country quickly become a major international cultural center, especially in view of the special character of Jerusalem, to which all religions and peoples of the world would naturally have free access. I could see many international organizations, religious, cultural and social, being established in the city of Jerusalem which, as the capital of a neutralized state, could be a holy place and center for Christian and Moslem religious institutions. Israel would above all become the natural center of the creativeness of the Jewish people as a whole. It would attract many of the most gifted and idealistic elements of the Jewish community in the world. It would become the great new source of Jewish in-

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spiration and challenges, and in the deepest sense of the word the spiritual center of the Jewish people.

One last observation. Zionism is a singular movement—the return of a people to its ancient homeland after two thousand years—the result of the unique history of a unique people. Seen from a large historical point of view, which alone justifies, explains and validates the Zionist idea, I am convinced that the Jewish state, in order to survive, must represent the singularity of this people and its destiny. I cannot imagine that the thousands of years of Jewish suffering, persecution, resistance and heroism should end with a small state like dozens of others today, living continuously in peril of its annihiliation, bound to remain mobilized and armed to the teeth, and concentrating its major efforts on physical survival. Nor am I sure that the enthusiasm and loyalty of the Jewish people in the world will forever be secure for such a state. What I suggest here is something exceptional, and therefore the fitting outcome of the exceptional Jewish history.

It may appear to hard-boiled politicians today as a quixotic vision. It is certainly no more quixotic by far than Herzl's *Judenstaat* seemed to the peoples of the world and to most of the Jews when it was published some 75 years ago. The history of the Zionist movement, as of many others, proves that the greatest real factors in history in the long run are neither armies nor physical, economic or political strength, but visions, ideas and dreams. These are the only things which give dignity and meaning to the history of mankind, so full of brutality, senselessness and crime. Jewish history certainly proves it: we survived not because of our strength—physical, economic or political—but because of our spirit. And therefore, seen from a historical point of view, this different concept of the character of a Jewish state as the solution of the Jewish problem may become not less realistic than the original Zionist idea proved to be and could, I am inclined to think, be implemented in a much shorter period than it took for the *Judenstaat* to be carried into effect in the state of Israel.

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# LENIN:
# HIS LEGACY

*By Adam B. Ulam*

OFFICIAL anniversaries are for the Soviets not merely occasions to celebrate and eulogize a famous man or event. They are also—if not mainly—occasions for that self-congratulation of which the Soviet régime has made such a rite, and against which the most uninhibited patriotic oratory on a similar occasion in the United States would appear a pallid understatement. In fact, the U.S.S.R. celebrates its thanksgiving several times a year. In speeches and editorials the pretext for the celebration is usually disposed of in the first few sentences and perhaps reverted to again at the very end. In between (and it is usually at length) the listener or reader is treated to production figures *then* and *now,* to assurances about the invincible might of the Soviet Union, and yet of its peaceful intentions, of the startling achievements of Soviet science. . . .

Should the occasion be a major one and the speaker or writer a leading Party figure, this general prospectus of Soviet progress in all branches of endeavor would be supplemented by a kind of state-of-the-union-message survey of the troublesome and yet (due to the correct efforts of the Party and government) generally hopeful and reassuring domestic and international situation; of the threats to world communism from dogmatism and sectarianism on the one hand and of revisionism on the other, both being unmasked and overcome through correct remedies prescribed by the Central Committee; of the diversionist strivings of the Maoist clique which are increasingly perceived and resisted by the masses of the Chinese people, who are unwilling to abandon their traditional feelings of friendship and gratitude to the Soviet Union; of the dangerous game which Zionism, in alliance with imperialism, is playing in the Middle East, a game which is being patiently exposed and countered by the U.S.S.R.

While all these elements will be present in this year's massive celebrations of Lenin's hundredth anniversary, it is certain that, for a change, statistics, achievements and policy announcements will not be allowed to obscure the object of the celebrations. This is Lenin's year, and in its descent from and continuity with his achievement, the Soviet régime sees a source of strength

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that is as important—and this will not be a mere oratorical phrase—as its material achievements since the Revolution.

This in turn reflects not only natural reverence for the principal mover of the October Revolution, and for the man who until stricken with his final illness in 1922 guided the Soviet state through its earliest and most perilous years. It reflects also a feeling, no more difficult to comprehend for a contemporary Western mind than it would be for somebody brought up in the classical Marxian tradition, that the Soviet state and society are ruled in the name and spirit of Lenin, that through the tragic vicissitudes of the last 50 years it is Lenin's teachings and spirit which have protected and guided the communist experiment.

This political mystique began immediately with Lenin's death. "Lenin lives, Lenin is more alive than those actually living," sang a Soviet poet. The mere concept of the Lenin Mausoleum would have appeared distasteful to an earlier generation of the revolutionaries, including the man whose remains it shelters, who had an unfeigned sense of personal modesty and simplicity. But to the oligarchs who succeeded him, the cult of Lenin was the only unifying force and the main link with political legitimacy. His name was invoked on all sides of the intra-party struggle which raged until the late twenties. And then what had begun as a political contrivance became the main ingredient of the official ideology of the civic religion, as it were.

Stalin built his cult upon that of Lenin. Then it was under the slogan "Back to Lenin" that the Party sought to recover from the numbing effects of Stalinism. And today when so many features of Soviet society and of the official creed have been questioned and occasionally, if clandestinely, assailed, it is a source of strength to the régime that these protests have for the most part been made in the name of rather than against Leninism. The passions and enthusiasms of the Revolution, of the great industrialization drive, the great hopes aroused by de-Stalinization—all are by now extinguished. But every day long lines still form in front of the Lenin Mausoleum to parade silently and reverently before the leader. The Mausoleum no longer contains the remains of the man who for much longer presided over the destinies of the country, and who, in fact, sacrilegious as it might sound to the contemporary Soviet generation, left a much stronger impact on Soviet institutions. For

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all the recent and careful rehabilitation of Stalin, it is most unlikely that he will ever be restored to anything like moral and political equality with Lenin. The latter remains master and teacher, and as such he will be celebrated this hundredth year since his birth.

II

The unique position of Lenin explains even if it does not fully excuse Soviet sensitivity when it comes to his biographical data. Already in the relatively easygoing days of the twenties, publication of materials concerning Lenin's life and activity was becoming somewhat selective. Later and predictably, as the situation grew worse, successive editions of Krupskaya's memoirs of her life with her great husband grew more and more panegyrical and politically oriented. A reverent fictionalized account of the Ulyanov family published in the thirties still drew official wrath because of its excessive discussion of Lenin's ancestry, and of the non-Russian elements of his ethnic background. Many of the most important documents concerning Lenin's personal and what might be called personal-political life have been released only when it suited the needs of the current leaders. Thus it was Khrushchev's campaign against Stalin which enabled notes of secretaries attending Lenin during his last illness, an invaluable document concerning Lenin's attitude on party affairs, to see the light of day. Many documents of equal if not greater importance must still be locked in the archives; we know, for example, of the existence of memoirs by those who had at one time been close to Lenin, such as Mme. Kollontai's, which the Central Committee in its wisdom has not thought fit to clear for publication.

Now, some of the selectivity shown in the release of Leniniana by their Soviet guardians has a direct connection with what they understand to be the essence of Lenin's legacy to their own society and the world at large. One can, up to a point, sympathize with their distaste for the current biographical fashion in the West: its psychoanalytic orientation, its mainly iconoclastic thrust, and its inordinate curiosity for intimate detail. But beyond this natural sensitivity to anything which might furnish ammunition for a sensationalist treatment of the life of the maker of the Revolution and the Soviet state, one detects a more general determination to stress those elements of Leninism which

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are useful in defending current Soviet reality and to minimize or ignore those which would serve as a basis for its criticism.

Lenin was a great revolutionary and a great restorer; a passionate patriot and a fervent internationalist. This combination of opposites enabled him to carry the Revolution through to its logical conclusion in the virtual dissolution of the Russian state; and to rescue Russia from the Revolution and lay the foundations of the most centralized state of modern times. It is no wonder that to the outside observer of the first phases of the Bolshevik Revolution Lenin and his followers appeared as "nihilists" bent upon wrecking the old and utterly incapable of creating a new social order. Even to some of his followers Lenin's pronouncements after his return to Russia in 1917 smacked of anarchism rather than socialism. "He has occupied the place vacated by Bakunin," exclaimed one of his followers upon hearing the April theses. The whole orderly world of theoretical Marxism—its canon of stages of historical development dictating the appropriate political forms—ceased to be of any interest to Lenin as contrasted with the imperative need for revolution.

But Lenin defied not only the Marxian historical laws. The whole rationalist tradition of the doctrine, its democratic accretions, appeared to him a burdensome ballast. His "State and Revolution," written supposedly as a critique of anarcho-syndicalism, comes close in its postulates to anarchism: the state and its whole machinery are not to be reformed, they are to be smashed, the need for professional bureaucracy is decried, social and economic egalitarianism extolled. "As long as there is the state there is no freedom; when there is freedom there will be no state." No need for material incentives; all officials, managers, etc., are to be paid the worker's wages. It is unlikely that in this year's celebrations those postulates of Lenin's will be often repeated.

Yet within a few months of the writing of his tract, and with power in his hands, it was the other Lenin who began to emerge. The leader and statesman supplanted the revolutionary. The task of running society became for him between 1918 and 1922 increasingly not a simple matter of revolutionary will and enthusiasm, but one of expertise and discipline. Who could have foretold in 1917 that the man who then adopted an existentialist view of revolution, who pleaded what in the parlance of the New Left is participatory democracy and an end to all centralized au-

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thority—for what else under the circumstances was meant by the slogan "All Power to the Soviets"?—would within a year decry the workers' takeover of factories, plead for retention of specialists in the army and industry, and extol the necessity of material incentives?

It was natural for the Left communists to exclaim that he had betrayed the Revolution. Outside observers commented gleefully that, confronted with the practical problems of governing, the Bolsheviks had to give up their fine theories and revert to the humdrum ways of the past. When the New Economic Policy was introduced in 1921 the Marxist purists had their one moment of triumph; Lenin had finally admitted what they had been saying all along: Russia was not ready for socialism! All such criticisms contained partial truths, yet they missed a more basic one: Lenin, even if he often disregarded the *letter* of Marxism, sought and discovered its original spirit. It was a sound instinct which had him already in 1914 seek to rename his party "Communist." World War I had undone the effects of a century of liberalism and parliamentarianism; Marxism, if it was to secure power, had to recapture its earliest militant and conspiratorial tradition and to shed those democratic and humanitarian elements which began to dominate it after 1870 when it seemed as if the main struggles ahead would be resolved at the ballot box.

With power in the hands of the Bolsheviks, the next urgent task, that of laying down the material prerequisites for a socialist society, could not be entrusted to the whimsical ways of a democracy: neither the state nor industry could be turned over to the workers. The Trade Unions had to remain subordinate to the Party. Lenin then saw the sense of Marxism, and this provides a thread of continuity between his pre- and post-revolutionary policies, as primarily an ideology of social engineering.

III

This theme of Lenin's pragmatism, of his "revolutionary common sense," will be sounded repeatedly in this year's celebrations. And just as the true story of Lenin's personal modesty has been used to lash the personality cults of Stalin and Mao, so this stress on Lenin's practicality, on his impatience with metaphysical and theoretical subtleties, is to carry an important lesson. As against the allurements of the New Left in the West (so strikingly similar in some of its attitudes to the Russian Populist

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tradition from which Lenin emerged but which he rejected in his youth) and voices of dissent in the Soviet Union, the régime is eager to invoke the supreme authority. It was to a dissident party member who complained of being persecuted that Lenin wrote in words which could be taken from today's *Pravda* editorial: "A decadent petty bourgeois intellectual when he sees an untoward incident or injustice whimpers, cries, loses his head, his self-control, gossips and puffs himself up to talk nonsense about the 'system.' . . . the proletarian . . . seeing something wrong goes about correcting it in a businesslike way. . . ." And to be sure even in his "anarchist" phase we do not find Lenin advocating rebellion for rebellion's sake, indulging in gloomy disquisitions on alienation or on modern industrial society and science subverting the sense of human existence.

To him, all political activity and struggle were to advance specific goals. Rather than dehumanizing society, industrialization was for Lenin, as it must be for every genuine Marxist, the main vehicle of social and cultural progress. There is no doubt that he would hold much of what passes for radical social thought in the West as obscurantism having nothing to do with socialism. And one must unhappily grant the Soviets that in the eyes of the father of the Revolution much of current dissent in Russia would appear as the kind of squeamishness and bourgeois hypocrisy he decried in those who protested revolutionary terror and repression of political opposition.

And yet, just as one cannot accept the official image of the monolithic Lenin, one cannot assume his unqualified approval of current Soviet reality. One has to remember not only the revolutionary leader uninhibited about violence and deception and the statesman who after October restored authority and put down anarchy, but also the man who in his last months of political activity grew horrified at some of the aspects of the system he had helped build. It was not only the intrigues of the oligarchs of the Politburo which filled him with apprehension about the future of the socialist experiment but the whole phenomenon of bureaucracy, of the new ruling class becoming entrenched in the Soviet system. One cannot credit Lenin with much genuine democratic feeling: the whole concept of socialism as social engineering implied élitism, as did his concept of the Party enunciated as early as 1902 in "What Is To Be Done." But both to himself and to others Lenin always rationalized this élitism

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with the belief that the Party would retain a close contact with, and the "feel" of, the masses, that it would rule on their behalf rather than as a severe schoolmaster. The Party was to be a vanguard, not an oligarchy. To us, of course, such hopes appear as most unrealistic, but to Lenin they constituted a cardinal part of his political philosophy. There was after all a small remnant of the social democrat left in his makeup: the old order was to be destroyed not only because it had been condemned by the forces of history but also because it was offensive to human dignity. And today in surveying Soviet society it is easier to see Lenin approving the repression of dissident individuals or groups than to see him tolerating the bureaucratic complacency of the ruling group, the lifeless ritual which Soviet official political life has become and that smug self-congratulation in which the régime is constantly indulging. The strength and vitality of the Soviet state and its peoples offer a startling contrast to the petrified form of Soviet political life. Such is the ambiguous legacy of Lenin to the society he helped create.

IV

This ambiguity is even more pronounced and the achievement more puzzling when it comes to another major dimension of Lenin's activity. He was an international revolutionary for whom the Russian Revolution was to be but a prelude to a much wider one, and the Soviet state but the beginning of the historic process leading to an eventual world federation of socialist states. Here the success of the venture initiated by Lenin has been truly breathtaking. From those few men who gathered in Moscow in 1919 and established the Third International, communism has grown into the world's most widespread ideological movement. It has conquered China, swept over Eastern Europe and has reached into and become a contender for power in practically every country in the world.

In contrast, the Western capitalist system, which loomed like a colossus against the sole embattled and backward communist state of the day, has withdrawn from vast areas of the world. Its ideology, liberalism, is no longer a triumphant, self-confident creed as it was before 1914; its remaining practitioners are increasingly beset by doubts and a sense of guilt. Again, history has seemingly vindicated Lenin's insight: his rupture with the letter of Marxism in favor of what he considered to be its spirit. Inter-

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national socialism, to be effective in the twentieth century, could not remain a loose confederation of radical parties such as the Second International had been; it had to become a centralized, disciplined and ideologically homogeneous movement. It could not, through a slavish adherence to the doctrine, confine its activities to highly advanced industrial societies. The weak and vulnerable links in the international capitalist system are the economically backward and colonial areas. Hence, according to Lenin, communism had to concentrate its activity there and blend its appeal to class war with a call to national struggles of liberation against imperialist oppressors.

The whole history of world politics since 1945 has attested to the correctness of Lenin's insight and his prescription. And yet how depressing he would find the present situation and prospects of world communism!

That communism should have become a servant of Russian nationalism, that after the emergence of other communist states it still would not be truly international, but that the whole movement and ideology should have become an arena for contending nationalisms—all this would have seemed to Lenin monstrous. And yet the personality of its founder as well as the historical circumstances dictated this fate for communism. In his own mind and in his public pronouncements he was a fervent internationalist. Often he had called Tsarist Russia "the prison house of nationalities." His very love for his country made him detest that gross bullying boorishness which the pre-revolutionary officialdom displayed in its dealings with Poles, Jews and other national minorities of the Empire. And how searing was his indictment and how clear his insight not long after the Revolution when he said of the Bolsheviks, who thought of themselves as the vanguard of the world revolution: "Scratch a Russian Communist and you will find a Russian chauvinist." Just as Lenin cannot be blamed for the full extent of the Soviet state's bureaucratic degeneration, so the veritable worship of Russian nationalism instituted by his Georgian successor and but slightly moderated by the present rulers cannot be laid to his account.

But the whole thrust of Lenin's political philosophy as well as of his political activity made it inevitable that nationalism should become the moving force behind communism. By extolling the monolithic Party, by making political dissent impermissible, by demanding submission of all other forms of social activ-

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ity to politics, he abjured all the restraints and cautions which liberalism sought to place between the state and the individual. And in such an absolute state in the twentieth century it was only nationalism which could provide a strong link between the rulers and the ruled. The Revolution was won in the name of an internationalist ideology, but revolutionary Russia could be saved only by an appeal to Russian nationalism, as the Bolsheviks recognized already during the Civil War when this nationalism was unabashedly invoked against foreign intervention and again in 1920 against the Poles.

It was, then, utopian thinking to expect that those Russians, and russified Jews, Georgians, etc., who of necessity assumed the leadership of world communism, would be able to subordinate or even to distinguish their interest as rulers of a state from their duty as soldiers of the world revolution. And after a generation of socialist construction and ideological indoctrination, this inability of the doctrine to evoke supreme loyalty was quite explicitly recognized; in the moment of its mortal danger the Soviet régime called its people to fight the invader "for our country, for Stalin," and not for the Revolution or for Marxism-Leninism. In the official historiography, the war which served communism remains the Great Fatherland War. And we have it on the authority of Stalin on the morrow of the victory that it was the *Russian* people which saved the *Soviet* people not only because it was the most numerous but also because it was the most loyal of the nations of the U.S.S.R. There is no better testimony as to what has constituted the real strength and basis for cohesion of the Soviet Union and what has been largely a façade.

How weak, then, the tie of ideology was to prove when it was not buttressed by the national interest! It would have been the most bitter disappointment for Lenin to witness how the very spread of communism had eroded its unity. After all, the sacrifices and privations of the Revolution, as well as of revolutions to come, were justified in his eyes by the imperative need to banish war as well as exploitation. Whatever the number of victims claimed by revolutionary terror, how insignificant it was compared with those claimed by the Great War! Yet such calculations and rationalizations can hardly carry much conviction in view of the experience of the last 25 years when some of the sharpest antagonisms and the most dangerous conflicts have arisen between *communist* states. History has turned around

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many of the dicta and formulae of Marxism-Leninism; instead of being applicable to the capitalist world they can be seen as fitting that of communism.

Where is there a better example of inherent contradictions of a social system than in the Soviet state, where the constant need to raise the material and cultural level of the people clashes with the vested interest of the party oligarchy in preserving unimpaired its monopoly of power? Imperialism was in Lenin's formulation the highest, *i.e.* the last, phase of capitalism, and imperialist rivalries were the main cause of wars. Yet the most significant and potentially dangerous international conflict of today is not between two capitalist powers but between the two great communist states. And it is only the vast preponderance of Soviet strength and not the common ideological inheritance which secures the unity of European communism. There will be many articles and arguments this year propounding the thesis that the current rulers of the Soviet Union have betrayed Leninism, that *he* never would have licensed persecution of writers and intellectuals, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and so on.

But in the most fundamental sense it is history which has betrayed Lenin. History has vindicated his tactics, but has repudiated his hopes. And, most important, communism has not proved a solvent of national animosities and a path to world peace. Militant nationalism, to paraphrase his statement about imperialism, appears, if we are to judge on the basis of available evidence, as the highest phase of communism. Goethe's exclamation about how green the dogma and how green the tree of life was one of Lenin's favorite quotations. This was as paradoxical as much of his life's work. For he saw himself as an orthodox Marxist and a defender of the doctrine against revisionism of all kinds. But of course he was himself a revisionist when it came to discarding much of the theoretical apparatus of Marxism in order to rediscover the essence of the doctrine and to put it to practical use. His great strength was his ability to equip Marxism with weapons necessary to fight the twentieth-century battles —weapons it eschewed or abandoned as it grew, along with nineteenth-century Europe, more moderate and democratic. Thus the zeal of a doctrinaire blended in him with the political skills of a practical politician, and this combination was responsible for much of the Bolsheviks' great success.

But by the same token Lenin could not endow his successors

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with his own personality. In due time the doctrine was bound to degenerate into a lifeless ritual, and political pragmatism would harden into cynicism. The state which Lenin helped save from utter anarchy, in many ways a greater achievement than his seizure of the Revolution for Bolshevism, would grow enormously in power and prestige. But this growth reflects primarily the vigor and ability of the Russian people rather than the superior virtues of the new social system. The spread of communism throughout the world will in turn reflect the power and prestige of the Soviet state rather than the inherent appeal of the doctrine. And once communism loses its exclusively Russian coloration it will become entangled in its own national and imperialistic rivalries.

V

To his followers, then, Lenin stands not only for the heroic days of the Revolution but for the hopes of those distant days when communism, though confined to a single backward and devastated country, still exuded more faith and self-confidence that it marked a new era in the history of mankind than at present when it is the ruling ideology in countries with nearly one-third of the world's population. The contending factions will join in this year's celebrations. There will be calls for unity and for efforts to recoup the fervor and purpose of the earlier days, but it is unlikely that they will prove effective.

Lenin was abashed to realize after the Revolution, he tells us, that Marx had actually very little to say as to how a socialist society is actually to be run. The father of scientific socialism was primarily an analyst of early capitalism, the discoverer, he believed, of those self-destructive elements in capitalist economy which eventually must bring about its collapse and clear the path to a higher and better form of social organization. Lenin's achievement was similar in so far as he sought to discover and exploit the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the liberal and social democratic traditions. Economically, Western civilization proved much stronger than Marx had expected and hoped. But politically and psychologically it has proved much less resilient and tough. It is on the realization of this disparity that Lenin's stature is based as the greatest political organizer and strategist in this century. History has confounded his hopes about communism, but has not as yet refuted his perceptions as to what is weak and vulnerable in what communism seeks to destroy.

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# LENIN:
# A CONTEMPORARY PORTRAIT

*By Victor Chernov*

*Editor's Note:* This article by Victor Chernov, Lenin's fellow revolutionary and political rival, appeared in *Foreign Affairs* March 15, 1924, following Lenin's death on January 21 of that year. It is reprinted here on the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth.

LENIN is dead—this time dead physically, for spiritually and politically he has been dead a year at least. We have got in the habit of speaking of him as a thing of the past; and for that very reason it will not be difficult now to write of him dispassionately.

Lenin was a great man. He was not merely the greatest man in his party; he was its uncrowned king, and deservedly. He was its head, its will, I should even say he was its heart were it not that both the man and the party implied in themselves heartlessness as a duty. Lenin's intellect was energetic but cold. It was above all an ironic, sarcastic and cynical intellect. Nothing to him was worse than sentimentality, a name he was ready to apply to all moral and ethical considerations in politics. Such things were to him trifles, hypocrisy, "parson's talk." Politics to him meant strategy, pure and simple. Victory was the only commandment to observe; the will to rule and to carry through a political program without compromise, that was the only virtue; hesitation, that was the only crime.

It has been said that war is a continuation of politics, though employing different means. Lenin would undoubtedly have reversed this dictum and said that politics is the continuation of war under another guise. The essential effect of war on a citizen's conscience is nothing but a legalization and glorification of things that in times of peace constitute crime. In war the turning of a flourishing country into a desert is a mere tactical move; robbery is a "requisition," deceit a strategem, readiness to shed the blood of one's brother military zeal; heartlessness toward one's victims is laudable self-command; pitilessness and inhumanity are one's duty. In war all means are good, and the best ones are precisely the things most condemned in normal human

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intercourse. And as politics is disguised war, the rules of war constitute its principles.

Lenin was often accused of not being and of not wanting to be an "honest adversary." But then the very idea of an "honest adversary" was to him an absurdity, a smug citizen's prejudice, something that might be made use of now and then jesuitically in one's own interest; but to take it seriously was silly. A defender of the proletariat is under an obligation to put aside all scruples in dealings with the foe. To deceive him intentionally, to calumniate him, to blacken his name, all this Lenin considered as normal. In fact, it would be hard to exceed the cynical brutality with which he proclaimed all this. Lenin's conscience consisted in putting himself outside the boundaries of human conscience in all dealings with his foes; and in thus rejecting all principles of honesty he remained honest with himself.

Being a Marxist, he was a believer in "class struggle." As an individual contribution to this theory he used to confess his belief that civil war was the unavoidable climax of class struggle. We may even say that to him class struggle was but the embryo of civil war. Dissent in the party, whether serious or trifling, he often tried to explain as an echo of class antagonisms. He would then proceed to eliminate the undesirable by cutting them off from the party, and in doing this he "honestly" resorted to the lowest means. After all, is not a non-homogeneous party an illegitimate conglomeration of antagonistic class-elements? And all antagonistic class-elements should be treated according to the precept "war is war."

His whole life was passed in schisms and factional fights within the party. From this resulted his incomparable perfection as a gladiator, as a professional fighter, in training every day of his life and constantly devising new tricks to trip up or knock out his adversary. It was this lifelong training that gave him his amazing cool-headedness, his presence of mind in any conceivable situation, his unflinching hope "to get out of it" somehow or other. By nature a man of single purpose and possessed of a powerful instinct of self-preservation, he had no difficulty in proclaiming *credo quia absurdum* and was much like that favorite Russian toy, the Van'ka-Vstan'ka boy, who has a piece of lead in his rounded bottom and bobs up again as fast as you knock him down. After every failure, no matter how shameful or humiliating, Lenin would instantly bob up and begin again

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from the beginning. His will was like a good steel spring which recoils the more powerfully the harder it is pressed. He was a hardy party leader of just the kind necessary to inspire and keep up the courage of his fellow fighters and to forestall panic by his personal example of unlimited self-confidence, as well as to bring them to their senses in periods of high exaltation when it would be extremely easy for them to become "a conceited party," as he used to say, resting on their laurels and overlooking the perils of the future.

This singleness of purpose was the thing that most imposed respect among his followers. Many a time when Lenin managed to survive, thanks only to some blunder of his foes, the credit for his survival was attributed to his unflinching optimism. Often it used to be mere blind luck—but then blind luck mostly comes to those who know how to hold out through a period of desperate ill-luck. Most persons soon give up. They do not care to sacrifice their strength in evidently futile attempts; they are sensible—and it is this good sense that precludes good luck. There is some supreme common sense, on the other hand, in a man who will spend his last ounce of energy in spite of all odds —in spite of logic, destiny and circumstance. And with such "unreasonable common sense" nature endowed Lenin to excess. Thanks to this tenacity he more than once salvaged his party from apparently inextricable straits, but to the masses at large such occurrences were miracles and were ascribed to his genius of foresight. Foresight on a large scale, however, was the very thing he lacked. He was a fencing master first of all, and a fencer needs only a little foresight and no complicated ideas. In fact, he must not think too much; he must concentrate on every movement of his adversary and master his own reflexes with the quickness of inborn instinct, so as to counter every hostile move without a trace of delay.

Lenin's intellect was penetrating but not broad, resourceful but not creative. A past master in estimating any political situation, he would become instantly at home with it, quickly perceive all that was new in it and exhibit great political and practical sagacity in forestalling its immediate political consequences. This perfect and immediate tactical sense formed a complete contrast to the absolutely unfounded and fantastic character of any more extensive historical prognosis he ever attempted—of any program that comprised more than today and

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tomorrow. The agrarian plan worked out by him in the nineties for the Social Democratic Party, something he had been toiling over and digesting for ten years, met with complete failure, an accident which never prevented him subsequently from hastily borrowing from the Social Revolutionaries agrarian slogans which he previously had spent much effort in combating. His concrete plans of attack were superbly practical; but his grandiose program of action after victory, which was to cover a whole historical period, went to pieces at the first touch of reality. His "nearer political outlook" was unexcelled; his "further political outlook" went permanently bankrupt.

As a man who already had the truth in his pocket he attached no value to the creative efforts of other seekers after truth. He had no respect for the convictions of anyone else, he had none of the enthusiastic love of liberty which marks the independent creative spirit. On the contrary, he was dominated by the purely Asiatic conception of a monopoly of press, speech, justice and thought by a single ruling caste, agreeing therein with the alleged Moslem saying that if the library of Alexandria contained the same things as the Koran it was useless, and if it contained things contrary it was harmful.

Granting that Lenin was absolutely lacking in creative genius, that he was merely a skillful, forcible and indefatigable expounder of other thinkers' theories, that he was a man of such narrowness of mind that it could almost be called limited intelligence, nevertheless he was capable of greatness and originality within those limitations. His power lay in the extraordinary, absolute lucidity—one might almost say the transparency—of his propositions. He followed his logic unflinchingly even to an absurd conclusion, and left nothing diffuse and unexplained unless it were necessary to do so for tactical considerations. Ideas were made as concrete and simple as possible. This was most evident in Lenin's rhetoric. He never was a brilliant orator, an artist of beautiful speech. He would often be coarse and clumsy, especially in polemics, and he repeated himself continually. But these repetitions were his very system and his strength. Through the endless re-digesting, uncouth pounding and clumsy jokes there throbbed a live, indomitable will that would not be deviated by an inch from the appointed path; it was a steady, elemental pressure whose monotony hypnotized the audience. One and the same thought was expressed many times in many differ-

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ent shapes till finally in one way or another it penetrated each individual brain; then, as a drop of water perforates the rock, constant repetition was applied to implant the idea into the very essence of the hearer's intelligence. Few orators have known how to achieve such admirable results by dint of repetition. Besides, Lenin always *felt* his audience. He never rose too high above its level, nor did he ever omit to descend to it at just the necessary moment, in order not to break the continuity of the hypnosis which dominated the will of his flock; and more than any one he realized that a mob is like a horse that wants to be firmly bestrode and spurred, that wants to feel the hand of a master. When needed he spoke as a ruler, he denounced and whipped his audience. "He's not an orator—he's more than an orator," someone remarked about him, and the remark was a shrewd one.

The will of Lenin was stronger than his intellect, and the latter was everlastingly the servant of the former. Thus when victory was finally won after years of clandestine toil he did not embark upon the task of embodying his ideas as would a constructive socialist who had pondered over his creative work in advance; he merely applied to the new, creative phase of his life's program the same methods which had been used in his destructive struggle for power, *"On s'engage et puis on voit"*—he was very fond of these words of Napoleon's.

Lenin has often been painted as a blind dogmatist, but he never was such by nature. He was not the kind to become attached for better or worse to a symmetrically finished system, he merely set his mind on succeeding in his political and revolutionary gamble, where to catch the proper moment meant everything. This is how he often became a quack, an experimenter, a gambler; this is why he was an opportunist, which is something diametrically opposed to a dogmatist.

Many critics have thought Lenin greedy for power and honors. The fact is he was organically made to rule and simply could not help imposing his will on others, not because he longed for this but because it was as natural for him to do so as it is for a large astral body to influence the planets. As for honors, he disliked them. His heart never rejoiced in pomp. Plebeian in his tastes and by his inmost nature, he remained just as simple in his habits after the October Revolution as he had been before. He has often been represented, too, as a heartless, dry fanatic. This heartlessness of his was purely intellectual and therefore

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directed against his enemies, that is, against the enemies of his party. To his friends he was amiable, good-natured, cheerful, and polite, as a good comrade should be; so it was that the affectionate, familiar "Iliich" became his universally accepted name among his followers.

Yes, Lenin was good-natured. But good-natured does not mean good-hearted. It has been observed that physically strong people are usually good-natured, and the good nature of Lenin was of exactly the same description as the amiability of a huge Saint Bernard dog toward surrounding pups and mongrels. So far as we can guess, real good-heartedness most probably was considered by him one of the pettiest of human weaknesses. At least it is a fact that whenever he wanted to annihilate some Socialist adversary he never omitted to bestow upon him the epithet of "a good fellow." He devoted his whole life to the interests of the working class. Did he love those working people? Apparently he did, although his love of the real, living workman was undoubtedly less intense than his hatred of the workman's oppressor. His love of the proletariat was the same despotic, exacting and merciless love with which, centuries ago, Torquemada burned people for their salvation.

To note another trait: Lenin, after his own manner, loved those whom he valued as useful assistants. He readily forgave them mistakes, even disloyalty, though once in a while calling them sternly to task. Rancor or vengefulness were alien to him. Even his foes were not live, personal enemies but certain abstract factors to be eliminated. They could not possibly excite his human interest, being simply mathematically determined points where destructive force was to be applied. Mere passive opposition to his party at a critical moment was a sufficient reason for him to have scores and hundreds of persons shot without a moment's consideration; and with all this he was fond of playing and laughing heartily with children, kittens and dogs.

It has been said that what the style is the man is. It would be even truer to say that what the thought is the man is. If it has been given to Lenin to leave any imprint of himself upon the doctrine of class struggle it is to be found in his interpretation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, an interpretation permeated with the conception of that will which was the essence of his own personality. Socialism means the enfranchisement of labor; and the proletariat is the warp and woof of the work-

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ing mass. In the proletariat itself, however, there are purer and less pure strains of proletarians. Now if a dictatorship of the proletariat over the working masses is required there must be, on the same principles, within the proletariat itself a vanguard-dictatorship over the proletarian rank and file. This must be a kind of quintessence, a true Proletarian Party. Within this Proletarian Party there must likewise be an inner dictatorship of the sterner elements over the more yielding ones. We have thus an ascending system of dictatorships, which culminates and could not help culminating in a personal dictator. Such Lenin came to be.

His theory of concentric dictatorships—which reminds one of the concentric circles of Dante's Inferno—thus developed into a universally applicable theory of socialist dictatorial guardianship over the people, that is, into the very antithesis of true socialism as a system of economic democracy. This favorite and most intimate conception of Lenin—and the only one really his own—was a *contradictio in adjecto*. Such an inner contradiction could not help but become, ultimately, a source of disintegration inside the party he had created.

He is dead. His party is now headed by men whom for a long period of years he moulded after his own image, who found it easy to imitate him but who are finding it extremely difficult to continue his policy. That party as a whole is now beginning to experience the fate of its supreme leader: gradually it is becoming a living corpse. Lenin is no longer there to galvanize it with his surplus energy; he spent himself to the dregs—spent himself on a party which is now, in its turn, exhausted. Over his freshly made grave it may for a moment draw closer together and pronounce vows of fidelity to the revered teacher who has told it so much in the past, but who today is telling it no more, and who will tell it no more in the future. Then it will fall back into everyday life and again be subject to the law of disintegration and dissolution.

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# OUR INVOLVEMENT IN LAOS

*By Robert Shaplen*

THE debate over Laos, almost as intense if not as bitter as the Vietnam debate, has done more than clarify the nature of the American involvement in that patchwork kingdom which has played a secondary but significant role in the Vietnam war while also engaging in its own struggle to survive as a unitary nation. The Senate's dual actions in prohibiting the use of ground combat troops in both Laos and Thailand, and in curbing the right of the President to make a "national commitment" to any country without prior Congressional approval, have temporarily satisfied the common determination to avoid "another Vietnam." But the fundamental problem of how American policy should be made and conducted in Southeast Asia has only begun to be reëxamined.

The broad outlines of our future policy in Asia were given by President Nixon during his Asian trip last year, most fully at his preliminary stopover in Guam, but much remains hazy about the nature of our current commitments and responsibilities there. The President and other administration officials in speeches and press conferences since then have reëmphasized that, in line with reducing "our involvement and our presence" around the world, as Mr. Nixon put it in his State of the Union Message, the nations of Southeast Asia will henceforth have to bear the main burden of defending themselves against all but the most flagrant—including nuclear—forms of aggression. Still unclear and requiring further reappraisal are such substantive matters as the prerogatives of the Executive and the Departments of State and Defense to make agreements or pledges short of treaties with foreign countries without "the advice and consent" of the Senate.

What must be gone into thoroughly, moreover, are such complicated and specific questions as the advisability and legitimacy of using certain methods, especially clandestine ones, to achieve limited purposes. This includes the question of what sort of assistance the Central Intelligence Agency or any other intelligence branch of the government can or should give to nations engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns or wars within or even beyond their borders. Also involved is the peaceful role that the

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CIA vis-à-vis the State Department or the armed forces should play in the internal affairs of other nations in such matters, for instance, as helping build political parties and institutions and encouraging or discouraging certain forces and events to the advantage of our own national interests and the interests of the concerned countries. Ultimately and inevitably, these attributes of foreign engagement raise the question of the morality as well as the practicality of henceforth "interfering" in the affairs of other countries, as set against our continuing obligations as a world power seeking to promote peaceful change and progress without acting as a "policeman" in situations where it ostensibly behooves us to remain aloof.

Our Laos involvement, against the backdrop of Vietnam, peculiarly lends itself to a discussion of these questions. Virtually all of the above factors, or choices, have been brought into play there over a period of many years under conditions of conflict that, while not as violent as those in Vietnam, have been even more tantalizing and confounding. In addition, the major powers, including especially Russia, Communist China and the United States, as well as Britain and France, have all been directly concerned with the Laotian situation, both diplomatically and militarily. The cocktail circuit in Vientiane is famous for bringing together a congeries of diplomats unequaled in any other small capital, with the exception perhaps of neighboring Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Along with representatives of the countries mentioned, elbows are rubbed (even if toasts are not always exchanged) among delegates and guests from both North and South Vietnam; Lao communists, neutralists and right-wingers; Poles and Canadians and Indians (all three nations being members of the moribund International Control Commission); and Japanese and other Asians and Europeans whose political complexions differ far more than the common glow on their faces would indicate in a gay Laotian evening.

The gaiety of the Lao as a people, their disinclination for violence and their desire to be left alone, even as a partitioned nation if need be, have unfortunately not prevented their being increasingly drawn into the revolutionary power vortex in the former Indochina area. It would have been difficult to guess, when the French belatedly recognized Laotian sovereignty 17 years ago that the fledgling former kingdom-protectorate of a scant two million population would become an integral part of

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a protracted new Vietnam conflict. Yet, as some historians have noted, if Laotian neutrality had been firmly agreed upon and enforced by the United States and the communist powers between 1957 and 1959, as was then possible, the North Vietnamese might not have been able as readily to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail passing through eastern Laos as their major infiltration route into South Vietnam, and the Vietnamese war might have been confined to a long guerrilla contest which the South Vietnamese might have settled themselves, one way or another, without direct American military intervention.

By the time Laotian neutrality was formally created, at the Geneva Conference in 1962, following talks between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev at Vienna in 1961, it was too late. The communists, by then fully aware of the developing new revolutionary situation in Vietnam, had cast their eye on Laos. Under the terms of the Geneva Agreement, the Americans withdrew their approximately 700 military advisers, including "White Star" Special Forces teams, but the North Vietnamese withdrew only 40 civilian advisers through the checkpoints set up by the International Control Commission. They also maintained their hold on the two northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly which had been established as "regroupment areas" under the earlier 1954 Geneva Agreement at the end of the French Indochina War, and left an undisclosed number of political and military cadres elsewhere in the country to guide the Pathet Lao. It would also have been difficult to foresee that Prince Souvanna Phouma, who in 1960 headed the pro-Left neutralist coalition that turned to the Russians and Chinese for military assistance—and at first received it, but was then denied fresh ammunition and other replacement matériel—would today be the right-wing neutralist head of a government dependent on American aid in his struggle against the North Vietnamese invaders of Laos and their Pathet Lao followers. By 1964, the shaky and fluctuating coalition of neutralists, communists and conservatives in Vientiane and in Khang Khay on the Plaine des Jarres in north-central Laos had fallen apart, chiefly because of communist subversion of Souvanna's neutralist elements. The polarization of right- and left-wing forces, thereafter exacerbated by a series of coups and countercoups, had begun.

The significance of the earlier lost opportunity to put teeth into a formula for neutralizing Laos was fully attested by 1965,

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when the pace of the Vietnamese war was increased by the entry into it of the North Vietnamese and of American troops. Soon after, convinced of the inability of their Pathet Lao surrogates




to carry the war by themselves, the North Vietnamese began putting more sizable numbers of troops into Laos; and ever since then the pattern of communist attacks and government counterattacks, alternating according to the dry and wet seasons,

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has increased in tempo. A semantic game of subterfuge also began as the "double war" situation developed. One war, along the eastern border and including the Ho Chi Minh Trail areas, concerned Vietnam. The other war, unlike the essentially unconventional one in Vietnam, was an almost conventional annual contest for control of Laotian territory and, to a lesser degree, of population. In the dry season, the communists advanced, while in the wet season the government, supported by American-donated fighter-bombers flown by Thai as well as Lao pilots, retaliated. Gradually, however, the communists gained ground in the southern and central parts of Laos as well as in the northeast. The key to their position was their sustained control of the Plaine des Jarres. In return for American help in holding off the communists within Laos—including CIA support of the now widely publicized "secret army" of General Vang Pao in the northeast and military assistance and advice to the rest of the Royal Lao Army, as well as economic and financial aid—Souvanna Phouma allowed the Americans to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail from Thai air bases as well as from Danang in Vietnam, and from American aircraft carriers off the Vietnam coast and from B-52 bases in Guam. These bombings, described as "reconnaissance flights," were never officially admitted either by the Lao or the Americans, but correspondents in Southeast Asia mentioned them frequently. And just as Hanoi mocked the official denials, so Souvanna and the Americans drew constant attention to the bland denials of Hanoi that there were any North Vietnamese troops in the country, let alone in South Vietnam.

The truth of the matter, which bears directly on the current situation and on the fuss and fury that have attended the secret Laos hearings held by the Symington subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is that nobody was fooled by anything, including that portion of the American public willing to read the newspapers and magazines with a modicum of care. Throughout Asia, let alone in the United States, the bombings of the Ho Trail were a matter of common knowledge, and there were repeated articles in the press about the so-called "secret war" in Laos backed by the CIA and the "hush-hush" airlines, Air America and Continental Airlines. (Two years ago, for example, two other correspondents and I interviewed General Vang Pao at Sam Thong, one of his northeastern headquarters, and wrote about the CIA support he was being given.)

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The situation came to a sudden head late last year and early this year chiefly for two reasons. First was the disillusion over the Vietnam war in the United States and the determination of a number of Senators to make sure that we would not slip into another Vietnam situation in Laos.

The result was secret senatorial hearings to determine the full extent of our commitment, clandestine and otherwise, in Laos and in several other Asian nations. This was a legitimate pursuit in light of the fuzzy commitments and pledges, over and above our "legal" responsibilities in the framework of the 1954 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which led us into the Vietnam morass (from which we probably should have stayed out, militarily, once it had proved impossible to reform the dictatorial mandarin régime of the late Ngo Dinh Diem). It was one thing, however, to maintain that the American people had the right to know more about what was happening in Laos and what the extent of our operations was, and something else to charge that "secrecy" had shrouded our whole operation there, which was simply not so. The second reason why the hearings were held and received so much attention was the result of an acceleration of the main war in Laos that began last summer. This seems a more important reason for studying the Laos situation, because it bears directly on the war in Vietnam, on the Paris peace talks and on a possibly missed signal that was given last year by the North Vietnamese for a reduction or even an end to the hostilities in Laos in return for a halt in our bombing of the Ho Trail.

II

It may be helpful here to deal in some sequence with the military and diplomatic events of the last year within the larger framework of both the Laotian and Vietnamese wars. It has been generally argued that a settlement in Laos will necessarily have to be part of, or shortly follow, a settlement of the Vietnam war. However, just as a secure establishment of Laotian neutrality in the late fifties might conceivably have reduced the scope of a major war in Vietnam, it is conceivable now that an opening wedge toward settling the Laos conflict could speed action on settling the Vietnamese war. Here the "double war" situation must be considered further. Just as the communists have insisted that the bombing of the Ho Trail and other parts of Laos be halted completely and that at least the principle of complete

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American troop withdrawal from South Vietnam be firmly established, so the Americans, the South Vietnamese and the Laotian government have insisted that the North Vietnamese stop infiltrating Laos and South Vietnam and begin withdrawing from both countries as well as from their Cambodian sanctuaries before any meaningful peace talks can be held.

In some ways, a political settlement might seem easier to obtain in Laos than in Vietnam. The basis for a legal settlement already exists in the tripartite formula of 1962. Despite the continuing communist excoriation of Souvanna as "a traitorous imperialist tool," he is still pretty much the indispensable man in Laos and the communists would undoubtedly still accept him as Prime Minister if they and their neutralist adherents received more seats in a newly created coalition government. Under the 1962 formula, the Pathet Lao as represented by the communist Front, the Neo Lao Hak Sat, had four seats, and Souvanna's half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, the official leader of the front, was one of two Deputy Prime Ministers. Souvanna and his neutralists, some of whom were middle-of-the-road and some oriented to the Left, had eleven seats, and the right-wingers held four seats and the other Deputy Prime Ministership. Ever since the Pathet Lao members quit the cabinet in 1963, Souvanna has held open their four seats, and a number of attempts have been made to reconcile him and Souphanouvong, who remains the tool of the Pak Pasasson Lao, the communist party in Laos, and of the Laotian Patriotic Front, which the communists also run. The Russians and the Americans, as well as the Japanese, the French and the British (who co-chair the ICC with the Russians), have all wanted to find a solution in Laos; and in February 1969 the Soviet ambassador went to Sam Neua to see Souphanouvong and his communist superiors. Souphanouvong replied insolently to a temporizing letter sent by Souvanna. The Russians, however, have been eager to deëscalate the Laos war because, among other reasons, they feel it plays into the hands of Peking. They therefore have retained their role as potential mediators, implying that they would be willing to bring pressure on the North Vietnamese to compromise with the Laotian government if the Americans could persuade Souvanna to lower his demands and stop insisting on a complete re-implementation of the 1962 Geneva Agreement, and further if the Americans would stop bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

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There have been a number of indications in the last year or so in Laos that, despite the increased pace of the fighting, the North Vietnamese would like to end or at least stalemate what they regard as a surrogate war there so as to be able to concentrate on South Vietnam. However, they have sought to make sure that they were first in a desirable military-political posture, and this raises the question of who bears most responsibility for escalating the Laotian war. In 1968, for the first time in several years, the North Vietnamese, who at present have an estimated 50,000 troops in the country, followed up their usual dry season offensive in the northeast, during which they seized some thirty "sites" or small airstrips in the Meo tribal regions, by attacks that continued into the wet season. They struck westward toward Luang Prabang, the royal capital and administrative capital north of Vientiane. They also threatened Attopeu and other towns in the south, seemingly going further than protection of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in that area warranted. The implication was that they were trying to grab as much territory as possible prior to a possible political settlement.

In March 1969, when the North Vietnamese again began their dry season attacks, they seized Na Khang, a town in Sam Neua province with an airfield that was the government's main supply center and a principal factor in its tenuous hold on the northeast. They followed this up, too, with a series of probes and attacks to the west and in southern Laos that extended into the wet season. They did this despite an increase in American-supported bombing sorties to between 200 and 300 a day within Laos, over and above the more than 12,000 being made daily by American planes over the Ho Trail (which is guarded by about half the number of North Vietnamese soldiers assigned to Laos). By May, the North Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao satellite forces were threatening the key town and airfield of Muong Soui on the western edge of the Plaine des Jarres. It was then that the Americans acceded to Souvanna's request to bomb the town of Xieng Khouang, a long-time communist stronghold off the southern edge of the Plaine. General Vang Pao moved his troops into the town following the bombing but was unable to hold it. When heavy rains curtailed the bombing, action on the ground also came to a temporary halt.

Now the diplomatic thread must be picked up again. Early in June of last year, the North Vietnamese ambassador to Laos,

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Le Van Hien, who had long been absent from Vientiane, paid his second visit to the capital in four years; he had left when Souvanna gave the Americans permission to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail and had returned to the country only once, in the summer of 1968, to attend a royal wedding in Luang Prabang. On that occasion he had snubbed Souvanna, but this time he met with the Prime Minister for an hour in what was described as a "special mission." He went so far as to say that, "We have always recognized Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister of a tripartite coalition," and, from what I have since learned, he apparently made Souvanna an offer: the North Vietnamese would stop their offensive where it was, removing any threat to Luang Prabang, Vientiane and the Mekong valley, would begin to withdraw some troops and would be willing in due time, though not necessarily immediately, to discuss a political compromise—*provided* Souvanna would withdraw his permission for the Americans to bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Hanoi was thus willing to bargain in Laos in exchange for the right of unmolested entry into South Vietnam in order to retain the initiative there and diminish the impact of Vietnamization as the Americans continued to withdraw. This meant the communists were willing to consider at least a stalemate in Laos, a diminishment of activity there and perhaps a resolution of that conflict, in order to obtain their Vietnam objectives first. Souvanna, however, rejected the offer. In effect, he told the North Vietnamese what he had told them before—"You withdraw from Laos first." It is not known to what degree he consulted the Americans, but presumably he was in regular touch with them, as he always is.

The question may legitimately be asked whether a signal was missed that might have helped end the war in Laos and perhaps have hastened a settlement in Vietnam too. The argument has long been made by some prominent Americans, including several who held high-ranking posts in the Johnson administration, that the bombing of the Ho Trail, while it has caused the North Vietnamese high losses in matériel, has never seriously affected their ability to infiltrate troop reënforcements into South Vietnam, and that it has not interdicted their logistic capabilities either, simply making it harder for them to move supplies into South Vietnam. Supposing the North Vietnamese offer to Souvanna had been accepted, and the Trail bombing

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stopped, the question arises whether Hanoi would have started talking seriously in Paris, even as some additional North Vietnamese forces unmolestedly entered South Vietnam. Then would the Americans have agreed to negotiate if and as the rate of infiltration slowed down and as American forces continued to be withdrawn? A corollary question concerns Hanoi's objectives in both Laos and South Vietnam. Given their considerable domestic problems, especially in agriculture and small industry, and the problems of party morale and discipline in the wake of Ho Chi Minh's death, were the North Vietnamese ready to reduce the level of fighting in both countries to guerrilla proportions and concentrate on winning the political war which they have always maintained is their principal goal?

III

What actually happened was a rapid escalation of the Laotian war. When the rains slowed down, the communists resumed their assault on Muong Soui, capturing it at the end of June last year. The whole western plain southward to Vientiane was then directly threatened, particularly as the North Vietnamese went on to take some vital road junctions. However, they had overextended themselves. The long, heavy rains had damaged their supply lines, and they were having trouble bringing food, ammunition and medicines all the way across the Plaine des Jarres—in fact, they were using coolies from North Vietnam to reënforce their flagging Lao supporters. Moreover, they were suffering from malaria and from a severe hemorrhagic form of dengue. More importantly, however, they had not expected the forceful American-Lao response. For the first time since the war began, acting at Souvanna's request, American fighters from Thailand struck throughout the area of the Plaine, attacking Khang Khay and Phongsavan on the plateau as well as Xieng Khouang and key roads and supply centers. Thousands of refugees fled to Sam Thong and other havens to the south and west. Some 8,000 troops of Vang Pao and additional elements of the Royal Lao Army thereupon swept into the Plaine and regained it for the government for the first time since 1964. The remnants of the fleeing North Vietnamese holed up in the mountains around the plateau, throwing down occasional mortar barrages and waiting for reënforcements. The government captured thousands of tons of military and medical supplies stored on the

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Plaine, most of it in caves and much of it still unwrapped and unused, including a single cache of 2,500 AK-47 guns and 122 millimeter rockets, and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition, several score trucks and a dozen heavy Russian PD-76 tanks.

The angry charge of the communists that 12,000 Thai and American troops had taken part in the counterattack was not true. There are no American combat troops in Laos and no more than a few hundred Thai technicians and advisers, although Lao-Thai from across the Mekong sometimes serve in the Lao army; Thai pilots are still flying in Laos and a battalion of Thai artillery that fought at Muong Soui may be returned to duty. There was no doubt, however, that American fighters and bombers, including Phantom and other modern jets, had made it possible for Vang Pao to recover the Plaine. Nor was there any doubt that in this instance the communists had escalated the war first. It seems unlikely that they would have been willing to risk an attack all the way to the banks of the Mekong, but it is possible if not probable that they had at least wanted to force Souvanna's back to the wall and make him accept their earlier offer or a less advantageous one.

I flew around the Plaine in late September, and set down in a helicopter at several places, including the site of the large ceremonial funeral jars that give the plateau its name. By then the communists had fled Muong Soui, which had also been bombed out, and the government troops had walked back in. The Plaine, which is 3,500 feet above sea level, is unbelievably beautiful. Although the hot weather of the dry season sears it yellow, on the sunny day after a rainfall when I was there it was a magnificent emerald green savannah, except for a few undulating slopes and ravines with trees which cast oblique shadows. Pools of water glistened like broken mirrors. We landed and examined one of the abandoned Russian tanks and visited one of the command headquarters of the Royal Lao Army in the west where fighting for control of two nearby hills was still going on. A light spotter plane for the bombers circled the hills, and large helicopter transports ferried Lao troops in and out—there was no doubt about the difference American support had made. The scars of the long war were everywhere visible—the remains of half a dozen varieties of American and Russian transport and light passenger planes, as well as tanks, trucks, artillery guns

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and jeeps. Herds of cattle and wild ponies roamed the area, but except for one refugee camp the plateau was otherwise deserted. Xieng Khouang was mostly rubble, except for a pagoda, in the empty waste of which stood a large and a small Buddha; and Khang Khay was a shell of houses.

The recapture of the Plaine des Jarres primarily cost the communists heavy losses in matériel and bought Vientiane four or five months' time. By mid-January of this year, the expected communist counteroffensive had begun. Though the North Vietnamese were still having logistic problems and were suffering from sickness, including cholera, and their Pathet Lao elements as well as Lao porters showed increasing signs of being tired of the war, they quickly recaptured some key ridge-lines on the eastern and northern edges of the Plaine. They were obviously building slowly for a new thrust westward, but the continuing American bombings were making it harder for them than in previous years. For much of the time, they were forced to keep under cover, hiding in caves and moving carefully through the mountains. It seemed doubtful at first that they would try to take and hold the open plateau again. But as I write they have forced the government troops to abandon their last positions there, putting the situation back to roughly where it was a year ago. It remains to be seen how seriously they threaten Sam Thong, Xieng Khouang and Long Cheng, Vang Pao's headquarters south of the plateau. They may even press to the northwest and threaten Luang Prabang, the capital of King Savang Vatthana, to whom the communists now look as a symbol of possible future unity under their dispensation.

In the southeast, moreover, the North Vietnamese, also in January, retook Muong Phine, a town near the Ho Chi Minh Trail that the government captured last summer; in the central part of Laos, they seized most of the Savannakhet province; in the west they were successfully ambushing Route Thirteen, the nation's principal north-south highway, and sporadically cutting it both north and south of Vientiane. Rockets had been thrown into Pakse on the Mekong below Vientiane, while all along the river to the north of the capital both road and river traffic were interdicted. The continuing American bombing was unlikely to keep the communists from holding any key areas, but, while the strategy of the war had not changed, its scope and pace had; it definitely had become a war of fresh escalation. The govern-

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ment, aided by the wider scope of American bombing, was doing its best to keep the communist supply lines cut and to destroy the social and economic fabric in the Pathet Lao areas. The communists were moving more widely in guerrilla fashion to disrupt the government administration in every way, especially in the upper Mekong valley. The ordinary Lao were the chief victims, and, as in Vietnam when the war spread, the number of refugees swelled; the total since the Laos conflict began was now 600,000 though only about a third of these were new, most of those from the period prior to 1968 having been resettled. The majority of the refugees who fled the communist areas under the impact of the bombing voiced strong grievances against having been impressed as porters for long hours and subjected to harsh disciplinary measures and stiff indoctrination by political cadres; but they were also increasingly resentful over being forced to flee their homes because of the American air attacks.

Another factor of some concern as the Laos war has widened has been the resumption of roadbuilding by the Chinese communists in the far northwest. Some years ago, with Souvanna's approval, the Chinese began building a road down from Yunnan, in China; it reached 50 miles into Laos, to Muong Sai. From there they built a spur eastward toward Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam, and started another section south toward the Mekong near the Thai border. They then stopped, but late last year they resumed work on both sections, with some seven thousand engineer troops supported by several battalions of infantry and anti-aircraft units. Souvanna remained strangely silent, but the general feeling among the Americans was that the Chinese were simply taking advantage of the situation to let the Lao and the North Vietnamese know that they intended to maintain a position in Laos. At the same time they wanted to scare the Thais enough to reassess their relationship with the United States.

## IV

It seems apparent that, whatever form American policy takes in Southeast Asia as the Vietnam conflict diminishes, insurgency situations will continue to arise. Neither President Nixon nor anyone else in the U.S. administration has so far made clear the distinction between insurgency within a nation and support of it from without to the degree where it constitutes an "invasion" —this point having been left particularly obscure during the

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President's post-Guam visit to Bangkok. As in Vietnam, for example, how many communists infiltrated from the North to the South did it take to constitute an invasion? And in the future what will determine, in the words of a top presidential spokesman at a background session in Bangkok, the actual extent of our obligations to respond to an invasion under "existing treaty obligations," and who will define what he described as "the importance we attach to the threat and the significance of the threatened country"?

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was exercised last year over a 1965 "secret" agreement between the Pentagon and Thai officials, which apparently was nothing more than a military contingency plan, based on the outdated 1954 SEATO agreement, to meet a possible variety of situations. Such planning is, or should be, pro forma in any nation. Limits and restraints can be set by the Senate constitutionally and should be observed; but it has been argued, mostly by military men, that in certain emergency situations, and in meeting obligations already spelled out, there may not be enough time to consult the Senate. In the Thailand case, confusion was confounded by the statement of Defense Secretary Melvin Laird that, while the 1965 agreement was still on the shelf at the Pentagon, it was not regarded as "operative" by the present administration since it had been drawn up during the administration of President Johnson.

In Laos, a somewhat similar situation has developed as a result of undertakings apparently given to Souvanna Phouma in 1964 by our ambassador at the time, William Sullivan, concerning American responsibilities in supporting the country's defenses against further communist encroachments. Whatever Ambassador Sullivan, acting on orders from Washington, told Souvanna, then and afterward, was gone into by the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee when he was called as a witness during the recent hearings. (As of this writing the testimony has not been released to the public because of the State Department's insistence that part of it be censored.) Sullivan, a highly competent and literate career diplomat, was given "a rough time" by his Senate interrogators, according to those who have read the record, undoubtedly due to his having been placed under certain restrictions by his State Department superiors. On the other hand, Richard Helms, the chief of the CIA, be-

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ing less restricted, primarily detailed the history of the much-maligned "secret war" in Laos and explained what the CIA has been doing there all these years. At the end of the hearings, Senator Fulbright, chairman of the committee, admitted that "the Agency is just following orders," although he expressed the opinion that the National Security Act under which it operates "never contemplated this function." In adding his disapproval of the kind of activity in which the Agency had been engaging, referring obviously to its assistance to Vang Pao, the Senator rather bleakly said that, "If it is in the national security to do this, it seems to me it ought to be done by regular United States army forces and not by an intelligence-gathering agency."

There are many, both in and out of government, who would disagree. Whatever the success or failure of the CIA in specific instances, the background and training of its personnel would seem to qualify it uniquely to carry out operational duties dependent on information gathered and analyzed secretly before action is taken. To argue otherwise is to deny the advantage of ever adopting covert means, something the communists nowhere in the world would admit.

In Laos, at any rate, the CIA's low-level counterinsurgency operation was successful in the "pre-escalation" period prior to last summer. I doubt that it could have been as efficiently implemented by any other government organization, since it enjoys a mobility and applies a flexible approach that the bureaucratic hierarchy of the army lacks. Its agents saw in the Meos a people willing to fight for their territories, their hills. Out of a rather motley total of about 250,000 tribesmen they formed a "secret army" of 15,000 regulars and another 25,000 part-time soldiers. And in Vang Pao the CIA found a leader who often proved to be as intractable as he was amenable to guidance but who never lacked courage or imagination. It gave him and his men assistance ranging from modern M-16 rifles and ammunition to highly sensitive communications equipment, some of which was used to guide and protect American bombers over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Whether it was in "the national security interest" to do this (in Senator Fulbright's phrase) will ultimately be decided by the historians.

In any event, the "secret war" that never was very secret has by now become a matter widely reported in the world's press, and of national concern. There are bound to be similar situations

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arising in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world in the coming years, and it must be decided how we are going to handle them. That kind of decision promises to be more complicated than the making or breaking of treaties and the ordinary conduct of diplomacy. Our failures in Vietnam have been essentially political failures. Our current soul-searching resulting from that circumstance demonstrates the need for such questions to be determined not only by Congress but at the executive level of the White House and the National Security Council, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department, and by the CIA itself. The resolution of these policy-making problems entails the settlement of some deep-seated intragovernmental rivalries.

If we are to do more than verbalize the reformulation of foreign policy, or simply indulge ourselves after Vietnam in our predilection for self-expiation, the process of sorting out these matters must be carried beyond bureaucratic housecleaning, though that is also necessary. In this process of revising the philosophy of our foreign relations the voice of the American people clearly should be heard.

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# ALLIANCE RHETORIC VERSUS LATIN AMERICAN REALITY

*By Abraham F. Lowenthal*

MORE than ten years have passed since Fidel Castro entered Havana in triumph. It is almost as long since the Alliance for Progress was proclaimed. A great deal has changed in this period, both in Latin America and in the United States. Much has happened in the hemisphere; more has failed to happen.

Whatever its motivations and results, President Nixon's attempt to revise policies of the United States toward Latin America is timely. Many of their premises had been exposed as faulty or actively undermined by the events of the decade. Slogans without much substance and programs without clear purpose had come to characterize the approach. Contradictions and confusion abounded; the gap between the Alliance's rhetoric and inter-American reality had become painful and embarrassing.

One purpose of this essay is to contribute to current redefinition of U.S. policy toward Latin America by showing that many of the basic premises of the Alliance for Progress must now be discarded. Many of the Alliance's programs were based on unwarranted assumptions, challenged by the past decade's experience. There is a danger, however, that new clichés may arise to replace those of the 1960s, and that the easy optimism and excessive ardor of the Kennedy administration's initial approach may be displaced now by exaggerated pessimism and detachment. The second aim, therefore, is to counter the current tendency to discredit entirely all aspects of the Alliance, and to focus instead on conclusions relevant for improving U.S. policy in the 1970s.

## II

Overall U.S. policy toward Latin America in the early 1960s can be conveniently discussed in terms of the key premises of the Alliance for Progress. Not all of these tenets were accepted by every architect of the Alliance, but taken together they represent a fair summary of the opinions shared by those who shaped Washington's pronouncements and practices during the Kennedy years.

It was widely believed that Castro's Cuba represented the

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advance base of a Soviet (or even a "Sino-Soviet") threat to U.S. interests in the hemisphere, and that the U.S.S.R. would seek other such bases. Cuba was thought to pose a potentially grave security threat to the United States, directly because of its links with the international communist movement and indirectly because of its support for subversive groups elsewhere in Latin America.

Washington felt a genuine sense of urgency. It was feared that discontent was growing fast in Latin America, especially in the burgeoning cities and among *campesinos* and workers, and that radical political movements would gain strength. It was expected that Castro's example might soon be followed elsewhere in the hemisphere. It was said that in Latin America it was "one minute to midnight," that either "evolution or revolution" would soon occur there, and that only U.S. support for far-reaching reforms could stave off shattering violence.

At that time, Latin America seemed to be experiencing the "twilight of the tyrants." Although the rise of Castroist movements was feared, many persons then influential in the United States and in Latin America believed that evolutionary reform could be advanced as an alternative under the leadership of social democratic politicians of the generation of 1930. These leaders were expected to build their political base on the support of the "middle sectors," supposedly committed to political democracy, social progress and economic growth. U.S. support for Latin American democratic leaders would greatly aid them, it was believed.

Rapid economic growth was predicted for Latin America and was pledged at Punta del Este in 1961. Sustained infusions of external capital, from both public and private sources, were expected. And it was thought that the expansion of foreign exchange available for investment, from public and private sources, would have a significant positive impact on the rate of economic growth.

It was also believed that economic growth would be substantially aided by the U.S. Government's acceptance of two instruments long championed by Latin Americans: regional economic integration and international commodity agreements.

Particular importance was attributed to proposed agrarian and tax reforms in order to improve Latin American economic and social development policies, and to increase the effectiveness

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of resources allocated to development, through national planning, comprehensive annual reviews, and the use of international aid as leverage.

It was believed, or at least fervently hoped, that direct political intervention by Latin American armies was on the wane. In this climate U.S. programs of military assistance and training—particularly the emphasis on civic action programs—would increase the influence of the United States on Latin American military establishments and thereby discourage Latin American officers from making *golpes*. By supporting civilian régimes, they would contribute more effectively to national development.

It was assumed that economic growth, social equity, political stability and constitutional democracy all went hand in hand and could therefore be advanced simultaneously in Latin America. All these objectives were also thought to be compatible with protecting various U.S. interests in the hemisphere, including national security and private U.S. investments.

Latin American countries were deemed ready, for the first time, to coöperate closely with each other in multilateral arrangements. It was also thought, by some at least, that positive initiatives by the U.S. Government would make possible truly effective inter-American coöperation. A switch in Washington's approach from the studied disinterest of the 1950s to active encouragement of Latin American development was expected to produce major gains.

Finally, it was believed that the American public, and particularly the Congress and various élite groups, were particularly concerned about Latin America and would willingly support a sustained commitment of U.S. economic assistance for the area.

III

The Alliance for Progress was launched in 1961 by an administration which proclaimed that Americans were willing to "pay any price, bear any burden. . . . to assure the survival and the success of liberty." By 1970, Americans have evidently wearied of the costs and burdens of foreign involvements and become skeptical about their benefits.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the U.S. Government's perspective toward Latin America is now very different from that of the early 1960s. Urgency and optimism keynoted the Alliance in 1961; complacency and disappointment mark Wash-

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ington's approach in 1970. It is especially instructive to reëxamine the premises outlined above as they are generally assessed by many in Washington in 1970.

Cuba under Castro is no longer perceived as the advance base of a Soviet (or "Sino-Soviet") threat to U.S. interests. The administration's cool reaction to Governor Rockefeller's call for a Western Hemisphere Security Council stems not only from Washington's realization that the plan is opposed throughout Latin America but also partly from the fact that no immediate security threat to the United States is now expected in or from that region. A direct threat, such as the introduction of strategic missiles, seems unlikely to occur because of the state of Russian-American relations since October 1962. It is now generally agreed that the international communist movement is fragmented, that the Soviet Union has no great interest in promoting "more Cubas" in Latin America, that the U.S.S.R. seeks to avoid confrontations with the United States in this hemisphere and that Cuba is no mere satellite. Nor is the indirect threat posed by subversive groups in Latin America likely to materialize. No insurgent movement in Latin America seriously threatens governmental authority on a national scale. Direct Cuban support for guerrilla activity appears to have dropped off sharply, at least since Che Guevara's death, and Russian noncoöperation with such movements was clear long before that.

The sense of urgency felt in Washington about Latin America had by the end of the decade been replaced by almost universal unconcern, at least until Governor Rockefeller's ill-fated trips. Numerous analyses show that the urban poor crowded into Latin America's shantytowns have been nonrevolutionary, even anti-revolutionary. *Campesinos,* too, have usually resisted radical appeals, and labor unions have been a politically conservative force in most situations. Castro's takeover is now generally attributed to factors unique to the Cuban case, including a particularly exaggerated American presence, an unusually unbalanced pattern of economic development, and Fidel's own charisma. Castro's example has not been followed in Latin America, which has not experienced anything resembling another successful revolutionary movement during the decade. Neither major reform nor violent revolution has occurred in most of Latin America; some observers argue that stagnation, even decay, has taken place.

The replacement of a number of military régimes by constitu-

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tional governments from 1957 to 1961 turned out to be temporary, as the cycle turned again after 1962. Social democratic leaders from the generation of 1930 did reach office in a number of countries, but they turned out on the whole to be poor reformmongers, unable or unwilling to mobilize and sustain widespread political support or to implement major social and economic changes. Some were more adept at the politics of exile than that of program; others accommodated all too easily to opposition. The hoped-for democratic and progressive commitment of the "middle sectors" turned out to be largely illusory. Middle-class politicians have shown themselves to be committed most of all to their own advancement; often they ally with the traditional élites —whose values, attitudes and consumption patterns they emulate —rather than with those promoting change. And U.S. support for democratic leaders turned out to be insufficient to prevent military coups in one country after another, even after Washington actually tried withdrawing recognition and suspending aid to back up its opposition to such coups.

General disappointment is now felt about Latin America's rate of economic growth under the Alliance, which did not achieve the goals adopted at Punta del Este. No massive infusion of external capital into Latin America occurred after 1960. The capital inflow which concessional aid and direct private investment represent has been counterbalanced by debt-servicing and the outflow of private sector capital remittances. Concessional aid never reached predicted levels; it has actually been declining in recent years. And private U.S. investment in Latin America has been encountering increasing difficulties as economic nationalism intensifies. U.S. investments in extractive industries are already under intense fire in most of the area, and investments in services like banking and shipping are expected to face heightened pressure in coming years. President Nixon and others have pointed out that the overall rate of economic growth in Latin America under the Alliance has been no higher than it was during the previous decade nor as high as elsewhere in the world. Many of the gains that have been made, moreover, have been eaten up by the unchecked population explosion; Latin America's current rate of population growth is the highest ever recorded anywhere.

The U.S. Government's belated acceptance of regional economic integration and international commodity arrangements as

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legitimate instruments for assisting Latin American development did not have the dramatic impact Latin Americans predicted. The progress of the Latin American Free Trade Area slowed, and then almost stopped, as the different interests of its members clashed. The Central American Common Market was badly hurt by the war between Honduras and El Salvador. Even before that tragic confrontation, the Central American Market had begun to encounter severe problems, as members troubled with balance-of-payments difficulties and insufficient revenue undertook unilateral measures in violation of regional accords. Nor have internal commodity agreements made a major contribution to solving Latin America's economic problems. Except for the International Coffee Agreement, which has benefited Brazil and Colombia considerably, the countries of the hemisphere have been unable to reach accord on any concrete arrangements.

Latin American economic and social development policies still leave very much to be desired. Most Latin American governments have lacked the political support, the administrative capacity, and in some cases the will to translate paper economic plans into actual programs. The leverage of external aid in influencing resource allocation or otherwise improving development policies has proved to be very limited. Land redistribution has been slow in most of the hemisphere, except where agrarian reform antedated the Alliance, and many other promised reforms remain to be accomplished.

Political intervention by Latin American armies is back in style. Military governments of one kind or another now rule in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru; even Chile and Venezuela have recently been threatened by military movements. To the extent that they have aimed to encourage Latin American officers to abstain from politics and to support civilian régimes, U.S. programs of military assistance and training are perceived as dismal failures. In fact, the U.S. emphasis on counterinsurgency may even have tended to legitimize the political involvement of Latin American military institutions. Even civic-action programs may actually have expanded political activities by some Latin American armies.

The key premise of the Alliance—the simultaneous compatibility of all its objectives: economic growth, social equity, politi-

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cal stability, constitutional democracy, the promotion of U.S. private economic interests and the protection of U.S. national security—has been continuously undermined since 1961. It has become clear instead that each of the Alliance's objectives is difficult to achieve, that they may be impossible to accomplish simultaneously (at least in the short run), and that U.S. security may not be threatened in any immediate sense even if none of the other goals is attained. Recent economic growth in Latin America has tended, in many cases, not to promote social equity but to exacerbate the inequality of income distribution, not to stimulate fundamental change but to reinforce existing structures, not to promote stability but to raise expectations and intensify frustration.

The goals of economic growth and social equity, in turn, no longer appear compatible with that of constitutional democracy. Latin Americans from various parts of the political spectrum have come to reject representative government, arguing that parliamentary régimes cannot amass enough power to undertake the "structural changes" they feel must take place if economic growth and the redistribution of its benefits are to occur. Conflicts between private U.S. investors and Latin American investors and governments—and also between various U.S. private and public interests—have punctuated the Alliance; they have been exemplified by the recently modified requirements of "additionality" and "tied" aid (both of which subsidized uncompetitive U.S. exports) and by the still unresolved International Petroleum Company imbroglio in Peru.

Despite the "Western Hemisphere idea" that the states of North and South America are bound together by their common background and aspirations in a special and close relationship, the experience of the past decade has underlined the fact that profound differences exist in culture, attitudes, aims and interests among the nations of Latin America and between them and the United States. Coöperation among the Latin American states has proved to be difficult to achieve. Many nations have preferred to deal directly and separately with the United States rather than with each other, thus undercutting the effectiveness of several multilateral arrangements. Various forms of intrahemispheric conflict have beset inter-American organizations. Coöperation between Latin American governments and the United States seems farther away in 1970 than it did at the out-

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set of the Alliance. Perhaps President Kennedy's personal diplomacy and the lofty rhetoric of Punta del Este temporarily obscured the fact that, far from identifying the United States as a fellow member of their community, many Latin Americans define their intensely felt nationalism in terms antagonistic to the United States. Latin Americans fear the encroachment of U.S. business and technology, reject U.S. "cultural imperialism," and resent the overwhelming U.S. presence in their midst.

Developments abroad and at home have produced in the United States a period of disengagement from foreign commitments. The national mood of withdrawal produced by the Vietnam tragedy, together with this country's balance-of-payments difficulties and with the diminished perception of a security threat from Latin America, have combined to make it increasingly difficult for the U.S. Government to secure from Congress enough resources to support extensive programs of direct U.S. economic assistance for Latin America. Separate hearings on the Alliance for Progress held in 1969 by subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee revealed the skepticism with which many in Congress now regard the Alliance.

IV

Excessive rhetoric, exaggerated urgency and unwarranted optimism accompanied the Alliance for Progress from the start. During the 1960s, the U.S. Government toned down its rhetoric considerably, put Latin American problems into better perspective, and came closer to understanding the intractable nature of many of the area's problems. Washington's focus on Latin America has undoubtedly sharpened; there is a risk, however, that its new perceptions may in turn become distorted because of a tendency to overcorrect for past errors. U.S. policies for the 1970s may come to be based on premises as inadequate, albeit in different directions, as those which underlay the Alliance. To become a less obtrusive and domineering partner is one thing; to reduce our real interest in the common enterprise of inter-American development would be quite another. Further consideration suggests that there may be both more reason for concern and more cause for hope about Latin America than is currently realized.

In regard to hemispheric security, the absence of an im-

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mediate threat should be taken not as a reason to forget about Latin America but rather as an opportunity for the United States to deal with fundamental problems of the area rather than subordinating them to immediate defense priorities. It should not be assumed, moreover, that no future security threat can arise from Latin America, in the absence of constructive U.S. policies in the region. Governor Rockefeller's concern about the supposed communist threat is anachronistic, but conditions unfavorable to U.S. security could still arise. Attention in advance to the problems of the Caribbean would be particularly prudent, for the unviable, unstable and dependent enclaves of that region are especially susceptible to sudden convulsions and shifts, from which future security problems might emerge.

Complacency about the absence of radicalism in Latin American politics should be challenged on two different grounds. First, it may well be premature to write off the possibility seen in 1961 that the area's politics would become increasingly radical and violent. The second generation of urban poor may well be more revolutionary than their parents, for whom the move from the countryside to the city seemed a distinct improvement. Blue-collar workers still may become radical when regional integration forces a productivity showdown in protected industries. Middle-class students and professionals, their anti-American predispositions fueled by such episodes as the Bay of Pigs and the Dominican intervention, have certainly become more strident during the 1960s; they may become more influential in the 1970s.

Second, it may be time for the United States to welcome some strengthening of radical movements in Latin America. If we are really concerned with "the quality of life in the Americas," we should consider carefully who is doing what to improve it. Young priests, university students and professionals, peasant organizers, new-style entrepreneurs, militant labor leaders, nationalist military officers—none of these particularly friendly to the United States nor likely to become so—are often those doing most to advance Latin American development. U.S. policymakers should drop their bias against radical movements in Latin America, unless they are shown to be part of an international alliance directed against the United States.

Again, as far as the democratic alternative is concerned, President Kennedy and his advisers were undoubtedly oversold on

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the ability and potential of some of the social democratic politicians, but considerable growth and reform were accomplished during the 1960s under civilian leadership, notably in Venezuela, Colombia and Chile. Constructive analysis should no longer focus on debunking the leaders who failed, but on analyzing the politics of successful reform-mongering and learning lessons from it. And the realization that American power is limited and that democratic reformers cannot be sustained from outside against strong domestic opposition should not lead the United States to underestimate the influence of its decisions and its example on Latin American politics. For the United States to treat all Latin American régimes exactly alike, regardless of their degree of liberty or repression, as long as they do not export revolution—as Governor Rockefeller seems to propose—would not only violate this country's values but would undoubtedly weaken decent elements in Latin American politics. The United States should try to maintain at least minimal diplomatic relations with all the governments in the hemisphere, including Cuba's, but should continue to make clear its abhorrence of repression and dictatorship.

Regarding economic development, overall percentage figures on Latin American development obscure impressive absolute growth in a number of Latin American countries during the 1960s and remarkable growth rates in a few. Disappointment about the lack of massive concessional aid makes some observers forget that Latin America absorbed aid during the 1960s at a level three times higher than that of the 1950s. And despite the difficulties faced, foreign investment in Latin America (including that from Europe and Japan) continues to expand, particularly in the manufacturing and distribution sectors.

Even more important, many of the obstacles to Latin American economic development encountered during the 1960s may be at least partially overcome by revised U.S. and Latin American policies for the 1970s. Concessional aid has not been as productive as it might be because of restrictive and expensive conditions, because of the excessive debt burdens Latin American governments are carrying, because of the U.S. Government's frequent resort to aid as a means of pursuing short-term political objectives, and because the annual authorization process precludes effective long-term planning. The difficulties encountered by U.S. private enterprise have often been caused by failure

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on the part of Latin American régimes to establish clear and consistent guidelines for foreign investment, and on the part of U.S. corporations to adopt policies adjusted to contemporary realities. And the impact of population expansion on Latin American development has been permitted to multiply by the slowness with which Latin American countries have adopted national population policies and programs.

The United States can and should help remove these obstacles. Conditions on aid designed to promote special interests or to advance immediate political objectives should be ended, Latin America's debt burdens should be relieved, and long-term aid commitments should be authorized. The contribution of foreign investment (and divestment) to Latin American development should be maximized, first by recognizing that liquidation of U.S. investments in certain fields would be in the mutual interests of Latin America and the United States, and next by encouraging specific types and forms of investment. U.S. tax laws should be revised to facilitate joint ventures abroad and to allow U.S. enterprises and foreign subsidiaries located in Latin America to offset their foreign losses against domestic gains.

Backing should be given to imaginative devices, such as those being developed by the Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America (ADELA), which permit U.S. firms to transfer capital, technology and management skills to Latin America during fixed periods of time and at reasonable profits, without removing from Latin America control of the enterprise. And discreet efforts, private and public, to help Latin Americans face their demographic problems should be supported and financed by Washington in the context of overall social and economic development programs.

Although the expectations aroused in some Latin Americans during the 1950s that economic integration and international commodity agreements could be regional panaceas were not sustained by the experience of the 1960s, each of these instruments has made a substantial contribution to the region's economic growth. The Central American Common Market, particularly, has helped multiply trade among its members and thereby spurred the area's expansion. The Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) has also registered notable gains in inter-regional trade and its recent overall slowdown has been

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at least partially offset by the establishment of the Andean subregional agreement.

Retrospective analysis suggests that the Johnson administration's decision to embrace the cause of regional integration in 1967 may actually have been counterproductive. Many Latin Americans came to suspect that LAFTA was really a stratagem for favoring U.S. businesses in Latin America and that therefore regional integration should be resisted. U.S. attempts to assist regional integration arrangements during the 1970s must be more skillful and sensitive. President Nixon's emphasis that the United States wishes to help only if asked was a commendable change in style. What is needed now are positive indications that the United States is willing to consider contributing to a regional "buffer fund" which would provide temporary credits to attenuate balance-of-payments deficits arising from the integration process, assisting with the retraining of laborers dislocated by regional integration, and helping Latin Americans prepare and finance multinational projects.

With respect to commodity agreements, what Brazil and Colombia have already gained from the International Coffee Agreement should not be underestimated, and efforts should be intensified to remove the imperfections of this instrument. It may be, moreover, that conditions in the 1970s will permit a further extension of such international measures, particularly to benefit the sugar-producing territories of the Caribbean. Beyond these possibilities, priority attention should now be devoted to designing new arrangements to benefit Latin American development. The United States has begun this process by ending its restrictions against a few Latin American exports, by lowering some tariffs, by affirming its support for international preferences by the industrial countries to the less developed countries, and especially by indicating that it would be prepared to consider offering general tariff preferences to less-advantaged countries not already receiving special preferences from some metropolitan country or group. What is needed is further action along these lines—lowering import quotas on farm and other primary products and reducing the high effective tariffs on processed raw materials, for instance—and intensified efforts to win Congressional approval where it is needed.

Regarding Latin American economic and social development policies, certainly much needs to be improved—particularly

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regarding the allocation of scarce resources—but considerable progress was made during the 1960s. Budgets for military expenditures declined in some countries, and allocations for education and infrastructure climbed in almost all. National planning agencies gained competence in most countries and important influence in a few. Several countries introduced tax reforms, both legislative and administrative, thereby increasing revenue and making taxation somewhat less regressive. U.S. aid officials used program and sector loan techniques to back particularly well-designed development programs.

What is necessary in the 1970s is to reinforce these trends, especially by encouraging multilateral institutions—including the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank—to incorporate self-help criteria into their review procedures. President Nixon's October 31st speech completely neglected the U.S. Government's interest in supporting Latin American reforms; the continuing priority accorded by Washington to such measures could best be demonstrated by tying much of U.S. assistance to the pace of reform programs, as analyzed by the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) or a similar multilateral advisory group.

U.S. military assistance programs have actually been worse than ineffective during the 1960s, for in some cases their real impact probably was to decrease U.S. influence with particular Latin American armies. In some countries, at least, Latin American officers have come to resist civic-action programs as U.S. impositions and they have particularly objected to North American attempts to decide what equipment they should have. Governor Rockefeller's recommendations to terminate permanent U.S. military assistance missions and to refrain from vain attempts to determine what equipment Latin American countries buy should be implemented, bureaucratic and other vested interests to the contrary notwithstanding.

Paradoxically, the failure of U.S. influence to prevent the resurgence of military governments in Latin America does not necessarily mean a setback for the Alliance's basic objectives. Some military régimes—most notably that in Peru—seem to be cut from a new mold and to be implementing many of the major development-oriented reforms civilian politicians have been promising for years without result. The United States should be alert to the need to analyze each situation on its own,

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without reference to established stereotypes, and should seek to help military régimes which are implementing economically and socially progressive policies, if they avoid repression.

While it is essential to recognize the inadequacy of the original Alliance's premise that all of its stated and unstated objectives could be simultaneously pursued, what is needed for the 1970s is not elimination of its major goals but more careful definition of the essentials and a better structuring of priorities in terms of time. American security should be conceived, not merely in terms of the absence of missiles or guerrillas but in terms of the environment for the development of national and hemispheric ideals. Political stability should be thought of, not in terms of permanence in office of a particular régime, but of the expanding capacity of political institutions to respond to social demands. Promoting democracy should be conceived of as enlarging effective civic participation, not just providing the forms and trappings of representative government. Economic development should be understood, not merely as increasing gross or per capita product, but importantly, as the more equitable distribution of economic and other opportunities. And the objective of assisting U.S. business should be advanced over the long term by helping Latin American countries develop and thus expand their own purchasing power, not shortsightedly by attaching niggardly conditions to U.S. aid or using international credit as a means of pressuring Latin American régimes to accept particular U.S. investments.

Given Latin American feelings toward the United States, the extent to which the Alliance's programs were presented as North American undoubtedly decreased the chances for their successful implementation. President Nixon's emphasis on the importance of Latin American initiatives and on the U.S. desire to be a partner is certainly salutary, as long as American actions demonstrate soon that the President's words were not merely a euphemism or a cover for U.S. inaction.

It may be, moreover, that the increasing frictions between the United States and Latin America may produce curiously productive results. For the first time last year, Latin American governments were able to offer agreed positions on significant subjects for discussion with Washington. The development of the European Committee for Coöperation in Latin America (CECLA) and other self-confident Latin American organiza-

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tions to deal with the United States should be genuinely encouraged by U.S. policy in the 1970s. It might even be useful for Washington to dilute its overweening presence in some regional organizations by becoming a creditor instead of an equity partner in the Inter-American Development Bank, for instance.

In a period of general American withdrawal from foreign engagements, it is all the more important that the United States concentrate a major part of its attention, energy and resources on building satisfactory relations with its neighbors in the hemisphere. The symbolic priority accorded Latin America by President Nixon's proposal to elevate the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to the rank of Undersecretary should be accompanied by more concrete steps to focus attention on the region.

Despite Congressional skepticism about the Alliance for Progress, there is considerable evidence—including the reports emanating from the 1969 committee hearings in the Senate and the House—that Congress would be receptive to a clearly designed program directed more specifically toward Latin America than is the overall AID apparatus. Efforts should be intensified to mobilize the constituencies which would support a long-term program of assistance to Latin American development; the recently established Inter-American Institute for Social Development is a step in this direction.

The United States cannot disengage from Latin America. The Colossus of the North is bound to cast its shadow southward no matter what direction it chooses to face. The challenge of the 1970s, for the United States and for Latin America, should be not to abandon the Alliance, but to forge a real one.

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# STALIN'S SUCCESSORS

*By Robert Conquest*

IT is common ground that something roughly describable as "re-Stalinization" has been taking place in the Soviet Union over the past five years. More precisely, the present leaders are re-Stalinizing in the sense that they are consolidating the Stalinist institutions (a little shaken by Khrushchev's various reorganizations); preserving the rule of Stalin's chosen personnel; restoring the rigor of his doctrines; putting a stop to the exposure of any more indecent facts of Soviet history; and tightening up the ideological and political disciplines required by his system. They are not reinstituting (and are occasionally and mildly deploring) those elements of Stalin's technique which were directed to terrorizing the party apparatus itself. Nor are they practicing indiscriminate repression against the population. Stalin, to atomize society and build his new system on its ruins, relied on creating total insecurity among friend and foe alike. The present rulers have neither the need, nor the will, to do this: only their critics have anything to fear from them. Stalin revolutionized a society; the present-day "Stalinists" wish to consolidate the new one. The aim is different: but above all the mood is different—a timid (though sometimes panicky) mediocrity has replaced a raging will.

In a world of rapid communication an impression is given of greater cultural unity than anyone would have suggested 100 or 500 years ago. Where every political leader wears trousers, it seems to be felt that basic cultural differences cannot exist as they would have been understood to do between a turban-clad Sultan and a periwigged Hanoverian King. It is always tempting for us to take the unconscious assumptions of our own society as natural and universal. The polity created by Stalin and inherited by the present leaders does not have the norms of our own (though in many respects it *claims* to have them, thus further confusing the outside observer).

The Soviet leaders speak, in however debased a form, one of the political dialects of the West. In it they constantly imply that the main difference between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is one of social organization. In reality this has little bearing on the matter—as can perhaps be deduced from the Soviet use of

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almost identical propaganda criteria in differentiating between the U.S.S.R. and Jugoslavia and between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. The differences, in reality, are at basic levels of civic culture and cannot be understood in terms of "capitalism" and "socialism." (And if socialism has anything to do with the idea of society exerting some control over the economy, the United States is more socialist than Russia as well as more capitalistic.)

Understanding the different attitudes of this alien culture is difficult, but the effort must be made. It depends partly on imagination. It is always difficult, for example, for us really to grasp in ancient times the powerful element of inhumanity, of minds entirely closed to the idea that a slave could have the same feelings as other men. History itself, in the ordinary sense, cannot give us this feeling: we have to read "Salammbô." In the Soviet case, fiction is unnecessary, but we still have to avoid lifeless general concepts divorced from historical or current reality.

Nor is it simply a case of such errors about the communist polities arising among Westerners more or less sympathetic toward them. For example, more recently, the basic political-strategic error in the conduct of the war in Vietnam was surely the failure to understand the motivation of the Politburo in Hanoi; the whole sophisticated mechanism of "graduated response" was based on the unconscious and false assumption that the other side would act according to what would appear from our point of view to be normal common sense. And, even now, on both sides in the argument about ABMs (if in different degrees) one notes a similar failure to look at the real Russian leadership, as against an abstract, computerized opponent. For example, it is argued[1] that since a technical solution to the ABM problem is very difficult, a political one should be sought instead. To put it this way is to forget that the political problem might be more refractory still.

On the sanguine view, the U.S.S.R. is in principle much like any other country, and if its political principles are at the present time to some degree aberrant, this is a minor phenomenon, rapidly being overcome by the forces of convergence, common sense and the natural law. Close and concerned observers, on the other hand, see a different picture. Reports from the Czechoslovak communist leaders who were taken to Moscow under

[1] *E.g.* by Professor H. F. York in *Scientific American*, August 1969.

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arrest after the 1968 invasion all emphasize that while they had expected the Soviet leaders to be narrow dogmatists, they were surprised at their coarseness and thuggishness. Observers in the U.S.S.R. have similar opinions of the low standards and the narrow horizons prevailing. American readers will, or should, have read Anatole Shub's striking series in *The Washington Post* last year.[2] The British left-wing *New Statesman's* even more left-wing East European correspondent, K. S. Karol, writes: "Stalin's heirs have shown themselves completely incapable of carrying on either his mission or his methods. They have forgotten all he previously taught them on the art of dividing the opposition, or of dressing up every action in plausible doctrinal robes. In a word, they are completely ignorant of politics, which they have replaced with plain brute force incapable of deceiving even the citizens of their own country."[3] Karol quotes a Russian who remarked that the Soviet Government had contrived to antagonize nearly all the nations in the world, and adds that propaganda attacking, for example, complicity between Mao Tse-tung and West Germany and between Mao Tse-tung and the "imperialists of Israel" inspires genuine fear in Russia for its lack of any sense of proportion: "instead of stimulating, it demoralizes an already traumatized and apolitical country. . . ."

Roger Garaudy, the noted French communist recently deposed from the Politburo of the French Communist Party, points out that "the present Soviet leaders" had by 1966 "completely interred the criticism of Stalinism," and gives the reasons: "the leaders who form the essential framework of the Party and the State were formed by Stalinism and put in position in Stalin's time on the basis of the criteria of the epoch: the acceptance of official dogmas; the fulfillment without discussion, at every level, of directives coming from above; and centralized, bureaucratic and authoritarian functioning."[4]

Andrei Amalrik, in a profound analysis, similarly notes that not merely is the present degree of freedom in the U.S.S.R. minimal compared with what is required of a developed society, and is moreover shrinking, but that the whole concept of "liberalization" is misleading, since it implies some sort of deliberate

[2] Now in book form: Anatole Shub, "The New Russian Tragedy." New York: Norton, 1969.
[3] *New Statesman*, April 25, 1969.
[4] "Le Grand Tournant du Socialisme." Paris: Gallimard, 1969, p. 135.

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plan to adapt the Soviet system to modern conditions: "as we know, there was, and there is, no such plan." At the same time he feels that it is equally false to think of the régime making piecemeal concessions to the pressures of society. On the contrary, "the régime regards itself as the acme of perfection and so deliberately does not want to change its ways either of its free will, or, still less, by making concessions to anyone or anything." In so far as relaxation takes place, it is merely a sign of "growing decrepitude," of a decline, in this as in every other field, of the vigor and energy of the ruling caste.[5]

Michel Tatu—long, as the Moscow correspondent of *Le Monde,* the most respected of all direct observers of the Soviet scene—takes a similar view, and sees no way out except through either a disintegration of the system or a reversion to one-man rule, as the result of some form of coup.[6] Garaudy, from his different political position, also sees no hope for the present leadership, and equally no hope of "change of political orientation" except by "the way of an explosion, or of a 'palace revolution'." And failing any democratic development, he envisions the "bureaucratic-military" leadership perhaps developing into "a reactionary neo-Bonapartism and a dictatorship of the army."

But how does the contrary conception arise? Professor Hugh Seton-Watson, head of London University's School of Slavonic Studies, remarks sardonically that, evidently, "What 200,000 Communist Party officials, from Brezhnev down to the secretaries of party branches in factories or collective farms, tell their subjects is all camouflage. The *real* views of the Soviet leaders are what some nice guy from the Soviet delegation at the U.N. said over a drink or what an itinerant Midwestern scientist heard from some friendly academician in Novosibirsk."[7]

Dr. Ronald Hingley of Oxford University remarks upon a certain type of Westerner who "has seen the bastions of Soviet reaction fall again and again," and "remains permanently poised for the great moment when, somehow, all will change and the dawn of enlightenment, reasonableness, ease and prosperity will suddenly break. . . . In an instant of time (and with luck as the result of a 'summit conference') a new era of sweetness and light will be ushered in on the international and Soviet domestic

[5] *Survey,* London, no. 73, p. 47–79.
[6] "Power in the Kremlin." London: Collins, 1969, p. 538–9.
[7] *The Washington Post,* September 14, 1969.

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arena." Hingley comments that basic misapprehensions about the U.S.S.R., almost unknown among specialists in Soviet affairs, are also rare among the ordinary people, being confined to men of fair intelligence. "For it is surely true, if not generally recognized, that real prowess in wrong-headedness, as in most other fields of human endeavor, presupposes considerable education, character, sophistication, knowledge, and will to succeed."[8]

These more or less frivolous, or unconscious, misapprehensions are compounded by certain writers with something resembling a general theory of the "convergence" of the Western and Soviet systems. Both are largely industrial (this view has it), so economic pressures will impel them, and in fact are already impelling them, into an essential similarity.

Of course it is true that economic pressures, like all other living forces in the U.S.S.R., tend constantly against the present system. But there is no evidence, as opposed to sanguine generalities, to show that the present régime is likely to bend to them more than minimally. Their release, when it comes, can hardly be other than as part of a general disintegration of the system. The collective farm system, for example, is quite alien to genuine productive principles and constitutes a vast investment in inefficiency and inadequacy. Yet there is no sign whatever of its abandonment; here, as everywhere, political dogma and political discipline are decisive for the present ruling group.

Rather than examining general probabilities, we must examine the available evidence as to the actual cultural-political content of Soviet society. The political machine Stalin created was designed, among other things, to enable him to impose his will against the natural economic trends. For perhaps the first time in history, a political organization was created that was powerful enough to take on the social forces and break them.

## II

The present leaders started for the most part in humble posts in the newly Stalinized Party of the early thirties, whose main activity (particularly in the Ukraine) was an almost unbelievably brutal crushing of the peasantry. Most of them made their careers in the great purge of 1936–38, a period when the qualifications required for promotion were denunciation of one's comrades and servility to the Stalin machine.

[8] *Survey*, London, no. 51, p. 102–110.

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At the February–March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee, which marked the final establishment of Stalin's personal autocracy, he told those present that all party officials should "select, within a certain period, two people in each case, two party workers capable of being their real substitutes." As it turned out, his estimate was conservative. Throughout the country, it was very common for only the third or fourth of a series of party secretaries—or of army commanders or factory directors—to be holding their positions by the end of the purge. Academician Andrei Sakharov, the atomic scientist, has lately told us that one-half of the party membership (over 1,200,000) was actually arrested in 1936–39—and that of these only 50,000 ever came out of jail again.[9] Moreover, this casualty rate was highest among those who held any sort of responsible position.

Nor was it possible to rise without full complicity in the terror. A typical instruction put out in April 1938 made a special call to those conducting the purge not to forget to bring the "silent, politically spineless ones" to account.[10] That is to say, no one could remain in good odor at all without denouncing and exposing "enemies." And we can be quite certain that anyone who rose rapidly must have given particularly acceptable service in this field.

In fact the Brezhnev-Kosygin generation is the actual product of the Stalin terror. The rulers who preceded the present group—Molotov and Malenkov, Khrushchev and Beria—had a record of ruthless brutality. But they had reached positions of influence before the terror. They were its creators rather than its products, Frankensteins rather than Monsters. (Indeed, it was only from them, with their residual independence of mind, that the various attempts at de-Stalinization could come.) This is not an ethical differentiation; the most noticeable change seems to be, rather, that the later generation is far more constricted in imagination, in the ability to look at the world and the ability to conceive new policies. As a victim, and close observer, of the purge pointed out of those who then came up, "They had not even the normal advantages of youth in their favor, for the choosing had been a very negative one. They were

[9] Andrei D. Sakharov, "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom." New York: W. W. Norton, 1968, p. 55–56.

[10] Yu. P. Petrov, "Partiinoye Stroitel 'stvo v Sovietskoy Armii i Flote." Moscow, 1964, p. 301.

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men who had denounced others on innumerable occasions. They had bowed the knee whenever they had come up against higher authority. They were morally and intellectually crippled."[11]

To see how these processes took place, how the present leadership was formed, it is worth examining the facts of their political origins in some detail. Leonid Brezhnev became a member of the Communist Party in the Ukraine in 1931, at a time when its main activity was the crushing of the peasantry. The party membership was mobilized to extract from the peasantry a certain amount of food for export, regardless of whether that left the peasant anything to eat. As one Soviet novelist, Ivan Stadnyuk, has put it, "First the children died, then the men and finally the women." Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in his "The First Circle," has a peasant describing how earlier in that year someone would drive round the village shouting at each house "Anyone dead?" but later on this was changed to "Anyone alive?" Five and a half million is the most probable figure for deaths simply by famine. In all, ten million peasants were starved, killed or deported. Party members, and particularly the students among them, were formed into squads to carry out these actions. Brezhnev was at this time a student at the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute, with previous agricultural experience, and he did his duty.

From 1935 he held a post in a local factory. The Great Purge was just about to begin. From 1936–39 the Ukraine suffered more heavily than almost any other part of the country under Stalin's new super-terror. Of the 1937 Ukrainian Central Committee of 102 members only three reappeared the following year. The whole Politburo went. All the Secretaries of the Provincial Committees and all their successors disappeared. The entire Ukrainian government was replaced, and then its successors were replaced in their turn. The Party and State virtually ceased to exist except as appendages of the NKVD. The Prime Minister, Lyubchenko, committed suicide with his wife. The First Secretary, Kossior, was shot with his wife and two brothers. Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, and *his* successor, Marchak, were shot. Every profession and every industry were ruthlessly purged. The general commanding the Kiev military district, Yakir, was shot, and so was his successor, Fedko. The head of the opera, Yanovsky, was shot, and the purge raged through

[11] Alexander Weissberg, "Conspiracy of Silence." London: Hamilton, 1952, p. 364.

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the cultural institutes. Of the 13 secretaries of the Kiev Academy of Science who succeeded each other between 1931–38, none was spared. Of the seven principals of Kiev University one died a natural death and the others were all arrested.

In the factories the same atmosphere prevailed. Dr. Weissberg, who worked with the foundry industry, recalls that usually it was the third or fourth director who kept his place. To please the Party a factory executive of the time required certain qualities. Brezhnev had them. In 1937 he was promoted—to be deputy chairman of the local Executive Committee (*i.e.* deputy mayor). In 1938 he became a full-time party organizer, which at this time bore its own meaning. Starting as head of a department in the Dneprodzerzhinsk Provincial Party Committee, by 1939 he had become its Secretary. By 1950 he was First Secretary in Moldavia, a "republic" formed from territories annexed from Rumania, and noted for a particularly harsh style of party rule. Stalin appointed him one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee in Moscow in 1952 at the height of the gathering new wave of terror centered on the Doctors' Plot. He was only demoted, for the time being, after Stalin's death.

The present leadership contains a number of other veterans of the Stalin machine in the Ukraine. Andrei Kirilenko's career is very similar. He, too, was a party member in the Ukraine from 1931 and by 1938 had become party secretary of a district committee and by 1939 Secretary of the Zaporozhe Provincial Committee. President Podgorny joined the Communist Party in 1930 and he too worked in the Ukraine from 1931–37, and by 1939, after various promotions, was a Deputy Minister. In 1944 he held for a time the post of plenipotentiary of the Ukrainian Republic in Poland, to supervise the deportation of Soviet citizens.

Outside the Ukraine, the worst-hit area was Leningrad, where (apart from two honorary non-Leningrad figures) *none* of the city's 152 delegates to the 1934 Party Congress was there for that of 1939. In 1935 Alexei Kosygin graduated from the Leningrad Textile Institute, then became a foreman in a textile mill. He advanced his career as a result of the purge, and "played an active role" in Leningrad's party life as a member of the city's Vyborg District Committee, when the main "activity" was the denunciation and purge of previous secretaries and bureaus. In 1937 he filled a gap left by the purge when he became director

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of the "October" Textile Works. In 1938 he moved up to head the Transport-Industry Department of the Leningrad Provincial Party organization, and then to be Mayor of Leningrad (replacing the executed I. F. Kodatsky) and in January 1939 was already a People's Commissar in the central government.

Mikhail Suslov worked from 1931 with the disciplinary bodies of the Party and took part in the official party purges from 1933–34 in the Urals and elsewhere. At Rostov-on-Don, the notorious former NKVD man Evdokimov was in charge. Even he is said to have protested against the extent of the purges, and he and his colleagues were shot. Suslov became a secretary of the Rostov Provincial Committee in their wake. He was promoted again and by 1939 was First Secretary on another much purged provincial committee, Stavropol. In this area he covered the Karachai, a Turkic people of the Caucasus. Their deportation en bloc, as part of Stalin's genocide policy, came in 1944. It was, of course, a police action, but Suslov seems to have had the immediate political responsibility. We do not know the casualties of the Karachai, but Academician Sakharov has recently told us that in the parallel case of the Crimean Tatars, 46 percent died, mainly children and old people. Perhaps as a result, Suslov was transferred later in 1944 as one of the three plenipotentiaries reimposing Soviet power in the Baltic states. Suslov got Lithuania, the most difficult of the three, and there supervised the ruthless crushing of the local partisan movement—which, however, continued to fight on after his departure in 1946. In 1947 Stalin made him a Secretary of the General Committee of the Party, the position he has held ever since.

Kiril Mazurov, a younger man, went into the political administration of the railways in Byelorussia in 1938. The railways were among the most purged section of Soviet life. At this time vast nests of "Trotskyite-Japanese spies" had been uncovered on every track in Russia. Railwaymen were held by the thousand in prison trucks in sidings where special courts presided over their execution. By 1940 Mazurov had become First Secretary of the Provincial Komsomol Committee at Brest in the territories newly seized from Poland, where the main party activity was mass terror, and organizing the deportation of the Poles and Western Ukrainians by the hundred-thousand.

Alexander Shelepin was too young to be involved in the early purges, but became important in the Moscow Committee of

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the Young Communist League from 1940, and from 1943–50 was a secretary of Stalin's Young Communist Central Committee. Stalin promoted him to head this body in October 1952, the worst period. Stalin's idea of a Komsomol, since officially stated in a speech of S. Pavlov at the November 1962 plenum of the Soviet Party's Central Committee, was that "the very first task of all Komsomol education work was the necessity to seek out and recognize the enemy, who then were to be removed purely forcibly, by methods of economic pressure, organizational-political isolation, and methods of physical destruction." Shelepin held this post till 1958 and then became head of the KGB, which organized such actions as the assassination of the Ukrainian leader Bendera and other anticommunist leaders in exile, by means of the notorious gas-gun pistols.

Similar things, at various levels within the Stalin machine, could be said of the remaining members of the Politburo and Secretariat. No less than 36 members of Stalin's 1952 Central Committee are members of the current one elected in 1966. They are even more strongly represented in the leadership. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Shelepin, Suslov, Voronov, Grishin, Ustinov, Kapitonov, were all full members and Ponomarev was a candidate member. In general, the mere continuity of the present régime with Stalin's is remarkable. Khrushchev's attack on Stalin rid the Central Committee, in all, over a period of eight years, of eight "Stalinists," of whom one, Voroshilov, was restored to his position by Khrushchev's successors. In fact, there is now an increasing tendency to rely on old trusties of Stalin. Alexander Yepishev, Stalin's nominee as Deputy Minister of State Security during the horrible Doctors' Plot period, now plays a most important role. General Shtemenko, Stalin's Chief of Staff in the postwar years, who was much despised in professional circles and degraded two ranks at Stalin's death, is now back in high position and played an important part in organizing the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

It was of the political origins of such men as these that Alexander Solzhenitsyn suggests in "The First Circle," that "While Stalin would not tolerate failure, he also hated it if people were too efficient. . . . so Stalin's touch turned everything into mediocrity." Other accounts of the period, for example that of Professor Tokaty (Tokaev), who had direct experience of the top leadership, also give the impression that while a handful of

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the younger members in the postwar Politburo, such as Malenkov and Voznesensky, were men of decisive intelligence, immediately below them one found nothing but bureaucratic windbags, whose main concern and only skill was in shifting the blame.

III

The anti-Semitism of the *apparat* is another sign of intellectual degeneration. Anti-Semitism cannot be traced in the régime until about 1943–4. By 1948, junior *apparatchiks,* of the type now at the top, were boasting to the Jugoslavs of how "Comrade Zhdanov purged all the Jews from the apparatus of the Central Committee and how the Assistant Chief of the General Staff, General Antonov, was exposed "as being of Jewish origin."[12]

Later came the arrest of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and the horrors of the Crimean Affair and the Doctors' Plot. There is little reason to believe that Stalin himself was seriously anti-Semitic except for what he took to be political advantage. But the attitudes which were now absorbed by the apparatus in general did not have this cynical limitation. It was *after* Stalin's death that the crudest anti-Semitic attitudes prevailed. Konstantin Paustovsky, the writer, noted the "pogromist" jokes of senior officials in 1956, and we later saw such things as the by no means isolated case of the notorious book "Judaism without Embellishment," by Z. T. Kitchko (1963). That these feelings thoroughly permeated the present leadership became obvious at the meetings between the Soviet and Czech communist leaders —still in slightly toned-down form—at Cierna-nad-Tiszu, and in their full crudity when the Czechoslovak leadership was kidnapped after the invasion and taken to Moscow, where Kriegel was openly referred to in front of his colleagues as "that damned Galician Jew."

Any serious estimate of the Soviet leaders must deal, too, with the built-in tendency to irrationality which has pervaded the Soviet Communist Party from early days. The irrational element may be seen in scandalous form in spheres usually regarded as nonpolitical, for example in the medical area, always a favorite stamping ground for the irrational layman. Lenin, in a well-known letter to Gorki, in November 1913, advised him to avoid Bolshevik doctors: "But really, in 99 cases out of 100,

[12] Milovan Djilas, "Conversations with Stalin." New York: Harcourt, 1962, p. 170.

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doctor-comrades are asses. . . . To try on yourself the discoveries of a Bolshevik—that's terrifying!" He realized, in fact, that the intellectual likely to be attracted to Bolshevik political theory was only too likely to be "advanced" in crackpot fashion in other fields.

During the great "show trial" of 1938, it came out in evidence that a number of high party officials had been receiving treatment from one of the accused, Kazakov, who was admittedly a complete quack. After the war the régime sponsored the notorious "longevity" quack, Lepeshinskaya, and others—as well as the terrorist charlatan, Lysenko, in biology. Lysenko was discredited with his protector, Khrushchev.

None of this is, of course, to deny a rational component in Soviet political decisions. It is, however, to assert the existence and the importance of the irrational. Observers who do not make allowances for this sort of thing, who do not correct their own natural tendency to impute rational (even if mistaken) motives to policy decisions, will surely fall into misinterpretation.

It is also true and important that the present leaders have no natural ascendancy over the other members of the Central Committee, including men (themselves comparative third-raters like Patolichev, Mikhailov and Pegov) who were in positions just below the most senior long before Podgorny or Kirilenko were ever heard of. It seems clear that a good number of *apparatchiks* of the second rank must regard the present Politburo as a more or less accidental concatenation of nonentities who could in principle be replaced. That any replacements now visible would also, in general, equally lack credibility is one of the cruxes. It implies that the decadence of the present leaders is not an accident of personalities but inherent in the whole political situation.

As Rosa Luxemburg long ago predicted, the absence of political liberty has resulted in the dying out of true political life and intelligence. The sequence Lenin-Stalin-Malenkov-Khrushchev-Brezhnev is a rapidly plunging graph. The present Politburo is the first to show no superiority in ability or prestige over the main body of the party *apparat*. One is reminded, on its different scale, of the "heat-death of the universe." In this closed system entropy has done its work. There is now hardly a sign of anything rising above the mediocre norm.

Moreover, the current Politburo has not, as I write, produced any one figure capable of providing genuine direction. It op-

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erates, rather, as what the science fictioneers have hypothesized for us as a "hive-mind." But the linking of 11 third-rate members has not produced the single will required. Vacillation, the attempt to combine contradictory drives, has been the pattern. The predominant motive seems to be a desire to avoid all change and reform in the hope that no crisis will spring up and that the contradictions within their society and economy will go away. There is an absence of motivation, except for the apologetics—and the defense—of power.

One of the strongest impressions given by the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia is of the extraordinary political incompetence of the Soviet action. Even Hitler's comparable invasion of March 1939, crude and brutal though it was, showed a far higher degree of political finesse. First, a more or less spurious, but at least detectable, Slovak appeal against Prague was set in motion. Then, President Hacha was actually induced (by the most bullying methods, it is true) to sign the appeal to Hitler. The German troops met almost no overt opposition, and marched through and out of the cities. The Czechoslovak ministers formally handed their powers over to the Protector in the Hradcany. None of this in any way implies that the Czechs were not as wholeheartedly opposed in principle to the Nazis as they are to the Russians. It was simply and solely a matter of the superior exercise of political technique. It was thought clumsy at the time; and Ribbentrop became notorious as the most oafish of top diplomats. Since then, standards of duplicity, of competence in villainy, have sunk.

They have sunk even since 1956, when Khrushchev could at least produce some sort of puppet government among the Hungarians. And this diplomatic degeneration, as one might put it, can be seen not only in such major crises, but also in the day-to-day conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The ambassador in Prague, Chervonenko, was, indeed, an all-purpose square peg, responsible in his last post for the immediate conduct of the split with Peking, and therefore evidently regarded as suitable to exacerbate the next intra-communist crisis.

In fact, what we are seeing is not simply a more or less chance taking of power by a Stalinist faction. It is not the equivalent of a return to political control of Molotov or Kaganovich. On the contrary, it is a much deeper phenomenon (and one less easy to reverse). It represents, in effect, the taking of power by repre-

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sentatives—one might almost say extrusions—of the lower-level, narrow, heavily indoctrinated products of the Stalinist political tradition.

Neither in foreign relations nor toward their own people do they nourish the active, aggressive malice of the founder of Stalinism. Nor do they reach his level of intellect. Nor, too, do they possess his single, and enormous, will power. It is as though the death of a Sultan were to be followed by the rule of a committee of his eunuchs.

They, or their carbon copies, will, at least for the present period in which we now have to formulate a foreign policy, be the dominant factor on the "other side of the hill." No good can come of imagining that anonymous economic or other forces can be relied upon to change their political psychology.

As Orwell shrewdly remarked, "The early Bolsheviks may have been angels or demons, according as one chooses to regard them, but at any rate they were not sensible men." Over half a century, the angelic, or demonic, drive has departed. Yet it is still not as sensible men that the rulers in Moscow should be regarded, but rather, perhaps, if we are to keep within Orwell's metaphor, as trolls.

## IV

I would share the view of M. Tatu and others that revolutionary changes are possible in Russia, and perhaps in the fairly near future. But the mere strength of the party and state machinery in being at present should not be underestimated. So long as it does not (and it certainly might) commit suicide in the course of an ungovernable faction fight at the top, or is not overwhelmed by some vast objective crisis (as is again possible), it is fully capable of blocking and containing all the economic, intellectual and other forces which run continually against it. Changes, if they come, will not come with its collaboration or permission. Whatever our hopes for the long run, the political régime whose characteristics we have been considering is the one which will participate in and cope with the crises of the period immediately upon us.

The most urgent, and most immediately dangerous, of these is clearly the confrontation with China. In principle, of course, the Brezhnev doctrine has established the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in any other communist country by armed

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force in order to install a government and leadership of which it approves. (And its specific right to do so in China has been implied in a recent Prague broadcast.) To be empowered to do something in principle is not the same as to feel capable of doing it in practice. But the Chinese problem is a refractory one at every level. China is not merely aberrant from "true" communist doctrine, but also shows every sign of being actively and dangerously hostile to the U.S.S.R. The motives for a Soviet preëmptive attack before the development of adequate Chinese rocketry are thus both ideologically and militarily compelling. The arguments against it are merely practical: that the installation of an anti-Maoist régime by Soviet arms does not look an easy proposition; and that the Chinese air force may already be in a position to carry out suicidal nuclear bombardments of Soviet cities. What decision will be taken cannot, of course, be predicted, and we may hope that the dangers and complexities may be enough to prevent the outbreak of a possibly uncontrollable war in Asia. All the same, it is clear that the narrow ideological pretensions of the Soviet leaders make such a war more rather than less probable.

As to Soviet-American relations, one can say that in principle, for a communist leadership which regards even non-Soviet-style communist régimes as necessarily illegitimate, no "capitalist" societies have a right to exist at all (though, indeed, in practice heresy is and has always been hated more than unbelief). This régime will never abate its total theoretical hostility to the United States. On the other hand, it has long accepted as a principle that it should reach temporary accommodations where these are beneficial. Unlike China, the Soviet Union for the past 15 years has usually shown a healthy revulsion from the idea of nuclear war with the United States. At present, with enemies on both flanks, it is showing some desire for a measure of détente, if only temporary, with the West, though here one remarks (in the Helsinki negotiations, for example) an absence of any clear-cut willingness to see the full logic of the position and cut through the old line as Stalin did in 1939. And as we refer to the Nazi-Soviet pact, it is worth recalling that, of all the treaties signed by the Soviet Government during the Stalin period, this is the only one which it did not break—because Hitler was too strong. The present neo-Stalinists, clearly enough, will seek to avoid serious trouble with

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a United States which remains strong. Unfortunately, this is no guarantee that they will not blunder into unforeseen confrontations by pursuing a policy of petty advances, local pinpricks, and a general, continuous, low-pitched hostility to the West throughout the oceans and continents of the world.

Informed and intelligent opinion in the U.S.S.R. has few delusions about the competence and vision of the present leadership (fewer, indeed, than are found in the West). They see rulers who have contrived to antagonize almost the entire world (and have even produced that totally unprecedented phenomenon—a Jugoslav-Albanian détente); who have got the economy, once again, into an impasse; who show no signs of being able to handle the nationalities problem—for example, the Crimean Tatars—either by Stalin's simple methods of oppression, or by the alternative of concession. This sort of disillusionment is at present politically negligible, but it forms an important part of the pressures which, if ever given a chance, could destroy the régime.

V

It may well be true, as Engels commented of an earlier time in his "The Foreign Policy of Russian Czardom," that "As soon as Russia has an internal development, and with that, internal party struggles, the attainment of a constitutional form under which these party struggles may be fought without violent convulsions . . . the traditional Russian policy of conquest is a thing of the past!" That, however, is not yet. In the meantime, various evolutions are possible. But for the immediate future Russia is stuck with a group of rulers who, though faced by a society tending in every respect away from their concepts, are in possession of an immensely powerful instrument for blocking social and political change—and immensely powerful military resources.

Hostile, suspicious, shortsighted, timid—and with the timid man's tendency to lash out at what he fears—the Soviet ruling group is not the one we might wish to see in power. Meanwhile, there it is, and any tendency in the West to pretend otherwise, to see it in a delusive light, may be comforting for the moment, but may also be lethal in the long run. About Russia we need, as ever, not stronger feelings, but stronger understandings.

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# NONALIGNMENT AND THE GREAT POWERS

*By Leo Mates*

NONALIGNMENT emerged and developed in the years of the dominant bipolar pattern of great-power relations. It was a product of the rising tensions of the cold war and a reaction against the alignments formed at the end of the Second World War, when the split between East and West converted allies into rivals and then into enemies. It was the result of the desire to stay out of the developing conflict and have no part in the new alliances which later formalized the postwar division of the world. This desire was prompted not only by lack of affinity for the causes of the split, but also by the determination to preserve as much freedom of behavior in international relations as possible.

This attitude (which came to be termed nonalignment much later) reflected aspirations toward the greatest possible measure of independence, not only in international relations but even more in internal developments. From the very beginning the postwar period was characterized everywhere by an intense urge toward accelerated economic development. This craving was particularly strong in countries which, when they reëmerged on the world scene as independent nations, had found themselves far behind those which were more industrially developed.

Unlike the first years of the past decade, the later sixties was a period in which coöperation among the nonaligned was at a low ebb even in matters connected with their own economic problems. In 1967 and 1968 a revival took place in connection with the second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in New Delhi. Efforts were made, too, to plan for a third conference of the nonaligned as a sequel to the Bandung meeting in 1955 and the Cairo gathering in 1964.

Throughout the sixties the pattern of international relations changed profoundly. Its most significant aspects were the substantial lessening of tensions between the two superpowers and a loosening of ties within the two alliances. Though antagonism and rivalry between the two major powers remained, in practical matters they developed a better understanding of their problems. They recognized their mutual overkill capacity and

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on this recognition there developed a new modus vivendi. Indeed, they gradually became partners in a peculiar and quite unprecedented relationship. It appeared that their exalted position and the growth in their material strength, especially their military striking power, gave them an opportunity to preside over the affairs of mankind—provided they could work out an acceptable formula of coöperation.

But this trend, generally described as détente, did not bring about a general easing of tensions. Rather than opening an era of harmony and tranquility, it has been marked by a growth of disturbances, conflicts and upheavals, particularly in the third world. The major powers became entangled once again in conflicts and tense situations on all continents. But even when they faced each other as opponents, they never permitted themselves to be provoked into a degree of hostility comparable to the confrontation in the war in Korea in the early fifties. Moreover, they had to face new situations as they arose without the backing of their allies. In the war in Vietnam, the United States lacked the moral support and troop contributions from its allies which it had had in the war in Korea. The Soviet Union had to face China without the unwavering assistance of its allies in the Warsaw Pact.

The ability of the superpowers to influence the behavior of other and much less powerful states did not grow with the increasing superiority of their military power. Colonial empires crumbled at a time when the metropolitan powers had far greater material superiority than when they were establishing their empires through conquest. Moreover, a determination to strive for emancipation increased even among peoples who had not hitherto shown an inclination toward militancy.

It was in these general circumstances that a third power—China—started its ascent and began to seek recognition as a major world leader. China's challenge started with a split and confrontation within the Eastern bloc, in part due to the decline in cohesion in the bloc which accompanied the East-West détente, in part an escalation of a long-standing rivalry between Russia and China, and in part an expression of the ancient ambitions of a country which once considered itself the central power of the world. In any case, the strife has now intensified to the point where a reconciliation, in the sense of China's return to the fold under Soviet hegemony, appears impossible.

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China's conflict with the U.S.S.R. was marked by acrimonious invective and hostility, yet at the same time it implied a recognition of affinity. The exaggerated accusation of collusion with "American imperialism" would have made no sense except on the assumption that the Soviet Union was ideologically related to Peking. Obviously the accusation was made in the hope it would create political and psychological difficulties for the U.S.S.R. in its pursuit of a rapprochement with the United States.

II

The emergence of China as an independent and undoubtedly major power made it even more difficult for the nonaligned countries to adjust to the great changes introduced by the détente and the ensuing local and regional disturbances. All earlier hopes of the third world proved greatly exaggerated if not altogether erroneous. The détente brought neither more stability and security for the less developed and militarily weak nonaligned countries nor economic aid in larger quantities. The position of these in the world market became still more unfavorable. Moreover, China, the major new power, had risen from the ranks of the less developed countries; she had been a partner in the first efforts to rally the underprivileged peoples in Bandung in 1955 under the banner of Afro-Asian coöperation, primarily with the aim of improving the lot of the new countries both politically and economically. Now China had, in a sense, defected from the group of nonaligned nations.

The conference of the leaders of the nonaligned countries in Cairo in 1964 demonstrated the internal differences provoked by these new circumstances. The divergences at Cairo had a dramatic follow-up at the end of the year when Indonesia, one of the "radicals" at Cairo, temporarily abandoned nonalignment and left the United Nations. However, the consequences predicted in Djakarta and Peking, *i.e.* the breaking up of the nonaligned group and the collapse of the United Nations, did not occur; nor did the idea of a new international organization under the leadership of Peking and with headquarters in Indonesia prove more than a dream. This was, nevertheless, the most extreme crisis the nonaligned group had yet undergone.

It is important to establish whether or not this crisis, which was felt for years after the debates in Cairo, resulted from the

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disappearance of the raison d'être of nonalignment or because of difficulties of a temporary nature. As already stated, critics have always thought that nonalignment had no prospect because of its insistence on standing aloof from the general trend of alignment around the major powers. In fact, the alliances proved to be less attractive to outside states than was at first believed. There have been defections from the ranks of the nonaligned but not to either bloc. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of new states that attained independence in the sixties, like those in the fifties, supported the nonaligned group.

However, the East-West détente brought hesitation and discord into the camp of nonaligned countries exactly at a time when the cohesion among them should have increased. They themselves were as surprised as the rest of the world to observe signs of disintegration following the reduction in tensions between the two blocs. This unexpected result provoked a new definition of the alleged impracticability of nonalignment. It was stated that the end of the cold war would remove the need for any nation to be nonaligned since no rigid alignment would be possible after the loosening of ties within the two blocs.

But actually the détente did not develop along expected lines; it caused no general relaxation of tensions. Furthermore, the nonaligned did not abandon their sense of belonging to a distinct category of states; nonalignment remained alive as an article of faith, as the expression of identification with a separate and distinct position in international relations. This was best exemplified by the renewal of activity among the nonaligned countries in 1969. The crisis was not characterized by the loss of a sense of belonging. Rather it was a crisis of inactivity caused by frustration and by the search for a line of action which would promise results. It was not a decline in the will to coöperate.

The emphasis on staying out of cold-war alliances, the literal interpretation of the word "nonalignment," had led to the continued insistence that the nonaligned countries act as intermediaries between the two sides even when this was no longer necessary. It led to the insistence on the need to abolish the blocs at a time when the two alliances were neither the main cause of tension nor a threat to the independence and welfare of the less developed countries. Most of the statesmen of the nonaligned countries, however, did not pay enough attention to the shifts in the world situation to realize this.

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The one attempt to explain the changes taking place had no decisive impact on the policies of the group as a whole. It was a statement made by President Tito of Jugoslavia before the plenary meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York in October 1963. The passage referring to these problems is rather general but still sufficiently clear to show an understanding of the changing circumstances. He emphasized that "nonalignment is thus changing, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms, and is transforming itself into a general movement for peace. . . ." Tito even went so far as to suggest that the very term "nonalignment" was being "overcome by new and positive developments in international relations." He was aware that "we stand at a historical crossroads." This did not mean abandoning nonalignment but rather adjusting the concept to the new conditions that prevailed.

For despite the changes in the world power structure, the nonaligned countries had good reason to continue to feel that they were a separate species among nations. They were no longer needed as the promoters of the détente; indeed they suffered from its becoming a reality, and were frequently the battleground of new clashes. India had a confrontation with China on the mountain ranges of the Himalayas and a second war over Kashmir; Egypt had two outbreaks of war with Israel; Ghana and Indonesia were shaken by coups d'état; and Sukarno and Nkrumah, two of the distinguished leaders of nonalignment, were deposed. The intervention in Vietnam, which continued over long years, as well as the interventions in the Dominican Republic and Czechoslovakia, were additional signs that the nonaligned could not assume the role of a third party but had to reorient their line of action. They could no longer blame the blocs or cold-war tensions for the insecurity of small nations.

Moreover, the appearance of China on the stage introduced another complicating factor. The comparatively simple pattern of the cold war made understanding and coördination among the nonaligned relatively easy. In the new situation there was no such certainty. For instance, when the nonaligned launched a campaign to stop the war in Vietnam, it gathered little momentum. Only 17 countries signed the letter of April 1965, sent to the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, Britain and to all parties in Vietnam. The situation was no longer so clearly defined as it had been during the

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cold war. One of the disorienting elements was the divergent assessment of the role and position of China. Politically it was considered a potential ally of the third world by some of the nonaligned, while others saw in it another disturbing element for domination in the world.

China, of course, did not have the military capacity to threaten either of the two thermonuclear superpowers, but it could and did successfully defy both of them. The superpowers themselves, though for different reasons, were not able to use their tremendous striking forces in open military conflict. Thus, a new pattern came to replace the earlier bipolar pattern. And other nations, allies of the big powers, nonaligned countries, or those living in the shadow of power, formed a background of considerable significance to the new triangular constellation. The divergence in the ranks of the nonaligned grew substantially; and this was particularly felt at the time of the second nonaligned summit in the fall of 1964, when China tried to outmanœuvre the nonaligned by efforts to convene a second Afro-Asian conference in Algeria.

The influence of China in the third world has since dropped substantially. But the triangularity of the pattern of power politics has remained an important element—even during those years of the Cultural Revolution when China turned in upon itself. For the nonaligned, it became increasingly difficult to play the role of moderator or mediator; such a role in the triangular pattern proved beyond the diplomatic skills of the nonaligned and may well be altogether impossible.

The change also affected the position of the major powers. They experienced a significant decline in influence, even over minor allies who were thought to be utterly dependent. The United States could not prevent the defection of Cuba, and the Soviet Union was unable to control Albania. Moreover, the individual major powers proved to be unable to impress their less powerful friends and influence their policies even when serious efforts were made either individually or in concert with others. The latest example is the war in the Middle East. American and Soviet policies did occasionally arrive at certain agreed points; but it was impossible to carry them out in view of the opposition of the states in the Middle East directly involved.

The ability to resist outside pressure, the ability to survive against incomparably more powerful military forces, as in Viet-

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nam or Algeria, has introduced new elements into the relations between states and peoples. We should therefore approach the problem of the possible influence and role of the nonaligned countries in the light of these observations.

## III

The nonaligned countries have never influenced international developments by relying on their military or economic resources. Their military capability is mostly of a strictly defensive character. They can sustain heavy military pressure and survive, but they are not likely to be efficient in offensive actions. This is probably one of the explanations of why they have felt and continue to feel secure without seeking formal protection in military alliance or from either of the two major nuclear powers.

India has had no reason to abandon its nonalignment because of the military conflict with China. Although the Chinese pushed back the Indian army from its positions at the border, they knew that this should not be confused with the bigger issue of the conquest of India. The cases of Algeria and Vietnam have had a profound effect upon a world already inclined to discount military reconquest of the lost colonial empires.

But the nonaligned counted on another factor even more. The major powers proved rather sensitive to repercussions of their behavior which occurred in the third world. One should not overestimate this factor, for no truly great power would jeopardize its vital interest because of loss in influence or prestige; nevertheless, the role of these imponderables should also not be underestimated. The Soviet Union may have been ready to sacrifice its prestige and influence in many places in the world when it decided to invade Czechoslovakia, but it made great efforts later to minimize the damage as much as possible.

Though public opinion has less influence within the U.S.S.R. than in the United States, some signs of dissatisfaction and protest were evident in Russia following the occupation of Czechoslovakia. But while the feelings of the Soviet masses could probably not be wholly ignored it is doubtful whether expressions of dissent did, or could in the future, influence the Soviet government's conduct of foreign affairs. However, the Soviets are not indifferent to the impact of public opinion in certain circles outside Russia. Of these, two are most important as areas where the Soviet government seeks approval and where dissent

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causes embarrassment. The first is, of course, the world communist movement. The second is among the nonaligned countries in the third world.

The limits of the Soviet Union's economic development and the exigencies of its internal needs have markedly reduced its economic impact on less developed countries. Furthermore, its restricted ability to deploy classical expeditionary forces in remote places of the world where it might like to back up one side or the other makes it imperative for it to strengthen its global role by cultivating ideological and political bonds with the leftist movements in the third world. This also helps to explain the extraordinary bitterness of the polemics between the Soviet Union and China. It has been caused not so much by the territorial dispute as by China's attempt to replace the Soviet Union as the center of the world communist movement and to take over the leadership of the third world.

Thus, the nonaligned countries can, at least to some extent, influence the attitude of one or possibly both of the major powers. The ability to influence the behavior of the United States is less significant, but should not be ruled out. China's emergence from its self-imposed isolation during the Cultural Revolution opens up new possibilities in this respect.

The nonaligned temporarily exercised some influence on the Soviet Union's attitude in economic relations during the first UNCTAD conference in Geneva in 1964, but after the second one in Delhi four years later the U.S.S.R. became less sensitive to third-world problems. This very likely resulted from China's disappearance from the scene after the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution and also was connected with the failure of the third world to exact concessions from the West at Delhi. Lacking the competition of China and in view of the loss of influence of the nonaligned countries, the Soviet Union could temporarily disregard their vital interests. Further, the cautious and rather general expressions of disapproval that came from the nonaligned countries concerning the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia only increased Moscow's conviction that this element in world public opinion could be almost completely disregarded.

Recent developments have once again changed the atmosphere. In the first place, the opening of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation demonstrates that the two superpowers understand certain vital

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questions of common interest. The opening of this dialogue was postponed by the crisis over Czechoslovakia, but it now looks as though there is a good prospect for the continuation and progress of these talks. Thus, a growing rapprochement has developed between two of the triangular powers. It started with their experiences in connection with the war in the Middle East and the war in Vietnam, neither of which produced exaggerated tensions between them.

The reactivation of China's world role after the Cultural Revolution has brought a new dimension to the relations between Moscow and Washington. The Soviet Union seized the opportunity after the death of Ho Chi Minh to start a dialogue with China over border questions before the beginning of the talks in Helsinki on arms reductions with the United States. At the same time, there were signs of a lessening of tensions between the United States and China with the reopening of ambassadorial contacts and the easing of American trade restrictions. China, on her part, initiated efforts to expand diplomatic relations with Western countries; even the normalization of relations with Jugoslavia was announced.

This favorable climate is not likely to last. The détente within the Moscow-Washington-Peking triangle relies on the coincidence of a number of parallel developments. It would be wishful thinking to believe that it can remain a stable relationship among the three major powers. The same mechanics which have contributed to the détente could, at some future moment, produce the opposite effect.

There is and must be some interdependence in the behavior of the three pairs of partners. No one will permit too close a rapprochement between the other two. If such threatens, efforts will be made by the third power to drive them apart. When this is not possible, the one which feels threatened with isolation will obviously try to repair its relations with the one or the other in order to avoid being left out in the cold. In this respect, a certain tendency to preserve the symmetry of the triangle develops. A rapprochement or disruption along one of the connecting lines tends to cause a reaction along the two other lines. For antagonism still divides all three powers.

Thus, the transformation of the bipolar into a triangular pattern does more than add one more contender at the summit. In the new triangular pattern a total breakdown of world order

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and a catastrophic nuclear war appear less likely. There is more room for manœuvring. There are more possible combinations, more variables which could be manipulated, more uncertainties which impose caution and restraint. Consequently there are better chances for the restoration of an equilibrium, since the threat always exists that one party will be outnumbered in a bilateral quarrel with the third party standing by. Such a pattern is not likely to produce lasting peace and harmony, but neither could the bipolar pattern. The more likely prospect would be an oscillation of periods of higher and lower tension within the triangle.

This triangle is an ominous reminder of the Orwellian vision of a world divided among three major powers and constantly at war, with two changing partners temporarily united against the third. In the reality of the contemporary world, though, there is a difference because we have the rest of the world in addition to the three major powers. This other group is of considerable consequence. Finally, while it is most unlikely that this group could be divided and absorbed into clearly defined spheres of influence by the major powers, neither should it be assumed that it could be totally ignored by them.

IV

In the world today the trend toward emancipation is visible everywhere as people strive to assert their individuality and identity. If there are still spheres of influence, if it is still possible to crush rebellions against foreign domination here or there, these are more in the nature of rearguard battles of a lost cause than victories of advancing forces of history. Every time a reversal occurs, we are tempted to emphasize the momentary retreat and less inclined to compare the present with the situation a decade or two ago. The time of empires has passed and the fact that there are anachronistic survivals of old patterns should not prevent us from noting the trend.

The emergence of nonalignment as the political expression of the aspiration for emancipation in the third world is the best testimony to these changes. But it is also a new factor in international relations. By its origins and through its protagonists, it has had an important environmental influence upon the behavior of the great powers. If the nonaligned countries could adapt to the new pattern of world politics, they could again become

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the expression of the outside environment acting upon and reacting to the triangular powers.

In order to perform this function the nonaligned must discard patterns of thinking and behavior which have outlived their usefulness. Influencing the behavior of major powers locked in a triangular nexus is not the same as the effort required for moderating the tensions between two contestants in a bipolar world. At the same time, the new situation has become an unpleasant reality for the countries of the third world, for they are more exposed to all kinds of pressures and interventions from outside as well as more unstable within their own social and political framework. In the new pattern, they cannot afford to sit on the fence. They are and will be ever more directly involved in confrontation and conflict.

Since the new trends do not appear to be leading toward the rebuilding of blocs, nonalignment in the strict sense of the word certainly has lost its meaning. Furthermore, it does not appear that it is enough to be the "conscience of the world" in the sense of trying to restrain the major powers from plunging into an all-out war. The nonaligned must seek fulfillment more in concrete achievement than in loftiness of proclamation. In order to play a role in the decisive confrontations in the world, and in particular in developments within the big-power triangle, they must have a sufficiently strong material basis to overcome the debilitating dependence on outside aid.

During 1968 and 1969 efforts were made to reconvene another summit meeting of statesmen of the nonaligned countries. The initiative lay mostly with Jugoslavia, which should not be surprising in view of its role in past efforts to unite third-world states in political action or to enhance their economic position. Finally, in 1969, after much frustration, a consultative meeting of representatives of nonaligned countries assembled in Belgrade. It was followed by a meeting of the foreign ministers in New York during the U.N. General Assembly. There it was agreed to have a preparatory conference in Africa, where Tanzania would act as host, in order to prepare for a full meeting of heads of state or government in 1970 or soon thereafter.

As a first step it will be necessary to reëstablish the unity and "the sense of belonging" of the nonaligned, or at least of the core members of that group. In the years since the summit in Cairo in 1964 links have been broken and friends have temporarily

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become alienated. In preparing for new ventures and for an active participation in world affairs, the nonaligned states will require a maximum of tolerance.

One of the most important requirements under the circumstances would be to break out of the somewhat closed circle of invited participants of the earlier conferences for the purpose of political action. Efforts to do so in the past two years have produced only moderate progress. The formula, advocated by Jugoslavia, of "nonaligned and like-minded" countries has not been adopted in its full meaning. Only a modest expansion of the ranks was accepted in the consultative meeting in Belgrade and implemented in the ministers' meeting in New York. This is understandable in view of the high priority given by most nonaligned countries to their economic needs. They are naturally inclined to regard the nonaligned group as the united front of the poor and as an exclusive third-world grouping. To accept this economic definition, however, contradicts the political definition of the group's role today when a wide range of countries, more or less developed, could find a common purpose in acting as a moderating influence upon the three major powers. In other words, the task of the coming meeting of the heads of the nonaligned countries should not be a mere repetition of the first two conferences in Belgrade and Cairo, but rather the initiation of new forms of international coöperation that would create an environment in which it would be easier to maintain peace and coexistence. To further this goal, the nonaligned will have to direct their attention in the first place to the internal problems of the third world; for it is instability in those parts of the world which is more likely to generate conflicts than the antagonism between great powers.

In the new pattern of triangular relations among the major powers, the nonaligned, if operating only as an exclusive group, cannot create a moderating environment. What is needed is not a crusading campaign of a select group fighting for general principles, but a steady and constructive approach to current world problems. For this purpose goodwill and readiness to coöperate in specific cases with all partners who are like-minded would appear to be far more important than belonging to any alliance.

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# RUMBLINGS ALONG THE RED SEA: THE ERITREAN QUESTION

*By John Franklin Campbell*

Twelve hundred miles south of Suez a struggle to control the farther entrance to the Red Sea is well underway. Though naturally overshadowed by the Arab-Israeli conflict to which it is not unrelated, the contest to the south involves substantial issues for great and small powers alike, who look to the future of the African Horn and the Red Sea basin. More than this, the problem of Eritrea, together with the related question of French Djibouti's future, is an intriguing one which, for all its complexities, recorded in past United Nations resolutions and every kind of East-West, North-South compromise, still may prove soluble short of major war. For the armed struggle along the Red Sea's southern rim is thus far a conflict of subdued violence and muted, if bizarre, ramifications.

The seat of the unfolding drama is Eritrea itself, a coastal strip running seven hundred miles from Sudan in the north to French Djibouti in the south. Over the last century and a half it has been alternately under Turkish suzerainty, an Egyptian, Sudanese and Abyssinian fiefdom, an Italian colony, a British military-administered territory, a U.N.-sponsored semi-autonomous federated state and, since 1962, a province of Ethiopia. From 1941 to the present Eritrea has known four separate sets of rulers, and therein lies a good deal of the problem. Today a fifth and latest claimant for power, the Syrian-based "Eritrean Liberation Front," has entered the lists. The Front, with some 1,500 armed guerrillas (it claims 10,000) and the propaganda facilities of distant Radio Damascus, says it is fighting for an independent Eritrea and declaims against the "imperialist oppression" of Ethiopia's venerable 78-year-old Emperor Haile Selassie I. More to the point, it boasts of support from China, Cuba and most of the "fraternal Arab states" which surround Ethiopia. During 1969 the Front carried out bomb attacks on Ethiopian commercial jets at Frankfurt and Karachi, sabotaged the main power plant of Asmara, Eritrea's capital, and hit the Franco-Ethiopian Railway terminus at Djibouti. On a road trip to western Eritrea last September, the U.S. Consul General was stopped by armed partisans and detained for two hours.

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II

The troublesome Eritrean insurgency commenced eight years ago, but its root causes go further back in time, to Mussolini's defeat by the British armies of Platt, Cunningham and Wingate in 1941. The first Allied victory of World War II raised also the first thorny problem of postwar accommodation and decolonization in Africa. Now that the Allies had captured a piece of Axis real estate, what was its new juridical status?

This political question, like so many others that emerged in the wake of successful Allied military operations, was tacitly deferred by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin for later settlement




at the anticipated postwar peace conference. At Tehran and Yalta, the Soviets intimated that they would like themselves to administer two of the ex-Italian colonies—Eritrea and Tripolitania—under a postwar international trusteeship arrangement. The British, who were in military possession of Italy's African Empire, hoped to prolong their stay after the war. When the Italians joined the Allies in 1943, the Badoglio government and its successors insisted that Italy be permitted to continue its "civilizing mission" in Africa. Meanwhile the United States obtained a modest stake in Eritrea, when Britain in 1942 turned

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over a major military communications facility at Asmara to the Americans in the context of wartime collaboration among the Allies. Today, 27 years later, more than 1,000 U.S. servicemen and their families remain in Eritrea administering a $60 million complex of installations of continued strategic significance.

Amid these competing great-power interests which arose from the Second World War, Eritrea was important as well to landlocked Ethiopia, her awakening Arab neighbors and France. Haile Selassie had been the first victim of Fascist aggression in 1935, and the attack on his ancient mountain empire was launched from Italian Eritrea. Ethnically and by virtue of the ties and traditions of Ethiopian Orthodox Coptic Christianity, the peoples of the Abyssinian and Eritrean Highlands were one. Indeed the legendary Mother of Ethiopia, the Queen of Sheba, was by tradition an Eritrean; and Menelik I, the child she bore King Solomon a thousand years before Christ, was the first "Conquering Lion of Judah" and ancestor in the Solomonic line of today's royal house of Ethiopia.

From the eighth century down to the present, wars of religion have seen Eritrea pass back and forth between Ethiopian Christian and Arab Moslem rule. In the century preceding World War II the reunion of Eritrea with the "Ethiopian Motherland" had become a dream of Abyssinian patriots. Such a solution would offer the ancient empire of Haile Selassie a buffer against future aggression from the north and restore Ethiopia's access to the sea through Massawa and Assab.

To the Arab states surrounding Ethiopia on three sides, age-old enemies newly awakened to nationalism, Eritrea was chiefly interesting for its Moslem minority. The 1.6 million inhabitants of the province are Christian and Moslem in nearly equal proportion, and Arab nationalisms have sought to detach the Moslem half of the province from Ethiopian loyalties. The Free French under de Gaulle, for their part, participated in the 1941 liberation of Massawa, and were bound to view the future of the territory in relation to their interests at neighboring Djibouti.

## III

The clash of these diverse interests produced a ten-year stalemate after 1941, as Eritrea's future was debated among the wartime Big Three and the postwar Big Four. Despite the dispatch of "commissions of inquiry" and a full panoply of other multi-

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lateral devices, the United States, Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. were unable to agree. In the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 they concluded: ". . . the matter shall be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations for a recommendation and the Four Powers agree to accept the recommendation and to take appropriate measures for giving effect to it."

Three years of discussion at the United Nations produced more than one hundred draft resolutions and another commission of inquiry before a compromise solution was reached. The four main proposals, none of which commanded majority support in the General Assembly, were the following: (1) Ethiopian annexation of Eritrea; (2) Eritrean independence; (3) partition of the territory, giving Ethiopia the eastern (largely Christian) portion including the two main seaports, and ceding the western (largely Moslem and nomadic) half to the Sudan, then a British territory; (4) award of a U.N. trusteeship to Italy or another European power.

The compromise reached, described at the time as a "middle-of-the-road formula," was finally adopted on December 2, 1950. The United States joined with seven Latin American states, Burma, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Liberia and Turkey to sponsor a resolution which recommended: "Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown." The General Assembly wearily approved this federal solution by a vote of 46 to 10, with 4 abstentions, and appointed the Bolivian diplomat, Eduardo Anze Matienzo, to carry out its mandate as U.N. Commissioner in Eritrea.

By the summer of 1952 Sr. Anze Matienzo had completed his duties and was able to report that "there is a genuine readiness for full coöperation . . . and a real respect for the unity of the Federation under the sovereignty of the Emperor." An elaborate Constitution and Federal Act had been drawn up and ratified by representatives of the Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples, and the new Federation took effect on September 15, 1952, when Haile Selassie journeyed north to cut a symbolic ribbon at the Mareb River boundary.

But the federal experience proved neither a happy nor a lasting one. As was to occur later with other federal experiments in former colonies—in Malaysia, Nigeria, East Africa, South Arabia and the British West Indies—the institutions of a com-

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plex federalism showed themselves too weak and artificial to fill the ex-colonial void.

The years of U.N. and great-power procrastination on Eritrea contributed to this result, though perhaps not decisively. As the territory's future was up for ten years of public debate after 1941, deep splits occurred in Eritrea's internal politics. Outside of the main cities, armed banditry had long been a part of traditional nomadic life, and this now received a political sanction as indigenous politicians and tribal leaders organized their own informal militias. Each visit by an outside commission of inquiry in the late 1940s became the occasion for street demonstrations in Asmara by competing power groups, while brigandage and assassination darkened the countryside. The majority of Eritrea's Christians flocked to the Ethiopian-sponsored Unionist Party, advocating full reunification with Ethiopia, while the Moslem masses of the west organized under the banner of a "Muslim League" to agitate for support from Arab neighbors in the protection of their minority rights.

A federal solution with the overlay of three sets of authorities —imperial, federal and local—could not paper over deep religious and ethnic divisions. Neither could such a solution inspire confidence in relations between the imperial government of Addis Ababa and its federal affiliate in Asmara. While the Emperor, acting through his personal representative in Eritrea, controlled defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, commerce and port administration, all remaining authority in other fields of government in the maritime territory was administered by an elected Eritrean Assembly and Chief Executive. Animosities between the ruling Amhara clans of Addis Ababa and the Tigrinya-speaking "northern" Abyssinians of Eritrea came to the fore, each group complaining of alleged discriminatory treatment. Eritrea's gifted people, who are only 8 percent of the total population of the Ethiopian Empire, today account for a substantial part of the country's export earnings and boast a literacy rate that is above the national average.

Above all, while exacerbating regional splits and jealousies and erecting a confusingly complex series of tri-layered institutions, federation tended to create a power vacuum along the southern shores of the Red Sea. A sophisticated system of federal checks and balances was not likely to inspire among neighboring powers any confidence in the lasting nature of the Ethiopian-

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Eritrean union. To the contrary, the patent instability of such a design was almost an open invitation to outside interference in Eritrean affairs. In this climate of uncertainty, disgruntled local politicians felt they could appeal not only to three sets of federal authorities but also to the United Nations and to interested foreign powers. The economy could not prosper under these circumstances, and stagnation in employment levels and economic development efforts would breed further discontent.

Ten years after the start of the federal experience, it was terminated by the Eritrean Assembly, which was pressed by the Addis Ababa Government to vote for Eritrea's full integration into the Ethiopian Empire. Relinquishing local autonomy, Eritrea in December 1962 became one among thirteen other provinces of the Empire.

The factors influencing this legal annexation were largely international. West European power was clearly in flight from the Middle East and rising Arab nationalism was beginning to make Ethiopians remember the "encirclement syndrome" that geography and Moslem-Christian religious warfare has marked out for them over the past millennium. Sudan on the western flank was now independent and building up its own army; Somalia, with irredentist claims to much of eastern Ethiopia, had achieved independence in 1960 and was commencing negotiations with Moscow for military assistance. In the same year that Somalia became independent, the Emperor faced the most serious internal threat to his half-century of rule. A group of young officers seized power in Addis Ababa while Haile Selassie was away on a state visit to Brazil, and it took three days to crush the rising, at the cost of more than a thousand lives. By 1962, the year of decision, Nasser had begun to launch his Yemen adventure, and a Moslem tribal rebellion in western Eritrea, started twelve months before, seemed to carry ominous pan-Arab overtones in a beleaguered Christian kingdom. Faced potentially with what Bismarck called "the nightmare of hostile coalitions," Ethiopia's ruler must have felt it ample time to secure the vital Red Sea coastline.

IV

Along that troubled coast, the wounds of three decades of political uncertainty and internal strife have not yet healed. The past seven years have seen some measure of economic progress in

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Eritrea, but the province's political life remains flawed by violence. By late summer of 1969 an American journalist could write of the Eritrean insurgency that it "might have escalated to Vietnamese proportions already" were it not for internal "problems" within the Eritrean Liberation Front, or "ELF." In October of last year, *The Economist* of London reported that the Eritrean struggle "seems to be getting more serious—and more international."

The Liberation Front, a largely Moslem organization, was formed a full year before Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962. For eight years now it has received clandestine arms support from Arab countries to wage low-level guerrilla warfare along the arid canyons and desert spaces of Ethiopia's Red Sea littoral.

Despite the enthusiastic comparison to Vietnam quoted above, the interesting thing about the progress of the ELF insurgency to date is its localized character. The real risk is not of an "escalation to Vietnamese proportions" or of a replay of tribal conflict in the Horn of Africa modeled on the Nigeria-Biafra war, but rather of a southerly extension of the Arab-Israeli struggle.

Northern Ireland to the contrary, it is still not fashionable to speak of religious wars in the twentieth century. Yet to the peoples of the Red Sea basin, religious conviction precedes, shapes and often seems almost to define nationalism. It can hardly be otherwise in Ethiopia, where over the centuries men have been called to "defend the Faith" by rallying to Crown and Church against Moslem invaders marching under the opposite banners of Islamic Holy War. Thus, though the religious element need not dominate the decisions of political leaders in the region, it remains a powerful and incalculable element in the minds of the people they rule.

Though as many mosques as churches dot the Eritrean landscape and there are few outward signs of communal violence, the Liberation Front continues to win limited support in the Moslem world, from Algeria to Pakistan, by alleging "persecution of Moslems" in Ethiopia. The régime of Haile Selassie has retaliated with mass loyalty demonstrations in the streets of Ethiopia's major cities, organized around the slogans "Hands Off Eritrea" and "Arabs Go Home."

During 1969 Radio Damascus added a new theme to the continuing propaganda warfare, claiming that "international Zionism" is establishing itself in Eritrea, a land which is "part

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of the Arab Nation." While maintaining diplomatic relations with both Israel and most of the Arab countries, Ethiopia has sought to stay aloof from their war. It is an uneasy balancing act, for Ethiopia is almost surrounded by potentially hostile Arab neighbors and has a Moslem minority comprising some 30 percent of its population. At the same time, the Christian Empire of Haile Selassie receives some modest economic development aid—including a police training program—from Israel, and as the only non-Arab country with a Red Sea coastline, its ports are hospitable to both Arab and Israeli shipping.

Capitalizing on Ethiopia's links with Israel, Damascus broadcasts have implied a virtual anti-Arab alliance between the two countries. The Syrian Radio alleges that the "Arab" struggle for Eritrea is part of the battle for Palestine and that ELF guerrilla trainees in Syria and Iraq are being schooled shoulder-to-shoulder with *fedayeen* of the Palestine Liberation Organization. It is not always clear whether these Syrian broadcasts truly reflect the thinking of Moslem Eritrean leaders of the ELF. It is also hard to imagine why the Syrian Arab Republic, beset with deep internal problems of its own and nearly two thousand miles northward and five intervening international borders removed from the Empire of Ethiopia, should take so keen an interest in the affairs of that distant land.

Whatever the answer, the majority of ELF cadres seem to be receiving training in Syria in the arts of guerrilla warfare, and are presumably being infiltrated into Eritrea along its Red Sea coastline and from adjacent countries. After a year's interruption following the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, this Syrian pipeline bringing arms and matériel to the Eritrean insurgents apparently began to function again in mid-1968. Most of the rebel weapons captured by Ethiopian forces and displayed in the press since then have been of Soviet or East European manufacture. One can assume that a small trickle of the estimated $3 billion in military assistance supplied by the Soviet Union to the Arab states has found its way into Eritrea.

Since the June War, the Liberation Front's announced political goals have identified ever more closely with pan-Arab, anti-Zionist aspirations, including the demand that the Red Sea should become an "Arab Lake." Mr. Osman Saleh Sabbe, Secretary-General and chief foreign spokesman for the Front, on several occasions last year told American and Arab journal-

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ists that he is committed to a truly independent and "Arab" Eritrea. On the other hand, Mr. Tedla Bairu, titular Vice President and sole Christian member of the Front's Executive, has told an Italian interviewer that the ELF maintains its original goal of a return to the pre-1962 Federation with Ethiopia under U.N. guarantee. Bairu's argument, and the past position of the Front, is that the 1962 Eritrean Assembly vote for full union with Ethiopia was "illegal" in that it unilaterally abrogated the U.N. resolution of 1950 recommending federation, and that the 14 co-sponsors of that resolution should raise the issue in the General Assembly to bring about a "return to legality," presumably enforced on Ethiopia by the United Nations. The international legality of Eritrea's incorporation into Ethiopia seven years ago was, however, widely accepted at the time; and a world body sufficiently occupied with more sensational political crises has not seen merit in a reëxamination of the Eritrean question.

As time passes, the legal arguments grow increasingly academic. For the Front, through the pronouncements of Mr. Sabbe and Radio Damascus, is coming to demand an independent and Arab-oriented Eritrea. That goal is clearly not acceptable to the Christian half of the population, thus raising once more the specter of a Christian-Moslem partition which is favored by none of the parties involved.

Up to 1969, the Liberation Front's military achievements within Eritrea were less than spectacular, consisting of an occasional attack on an isolated police post. Periodic amnesties, army sweeps and appeals to patriotism by the Addis Ababa government had served to keep the guerrillas off balance, but without undercutting a hard core of activism and an ability to exploit Moslem grievances. The largest single engagement in the eight-year insurgency, fought in September 1968, proved a fiasco for the rebels. ELF units attacking a remote commando police encampment at Hal-Hal in northwestern Eritrea were routed in a one-day battle, leaving 60 dead on the field.

But a change in tactics and an apparent step-up in training and infiltration gave the Eritrean war a more dramatic turn in the spring of 1969. During March and April, uniformed ELF troops appeared on the vital Massawa-Asmara highway to stop and destroy oil tanker trucks. On March 11 an explosion ripped through an Ethiopian Air Lines commercial jet parked at Frankfurt, Germany, an attack to be repeated on another jet

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two months later at Karachi. In August a smaller plane was hijacked to Aden. On December 13 plainclothes detectives foiled in mid-air another ELF hijacking venture, which occurred on an international jet flight between Madrid and Athens. Ethiopia's national flag airline is one of the country's biggest foreign-exchange earners. Thus the new "economic tactic" of the insurgents is extremely worrying to Ethiopia, which at this point must put armed guards on its planes and protest to international civil aviation bodies, lest its commerce and prestige be further undermined.

The number and variety of skilled sabotage operations in Eritrea and abroad during the past year suggest a new pattern of ELF activities designed to achieve more world publicity for the Liberation Front. The Front has evidently concluded that it will be unable to win power in Eritrea by classic guerrilla means alone. It faces indifference or hostility from at least the Christian half of Eritrea's population, and it cannot in the final analysis compete militarily with Ethiopia's 40,000-man army and modern air force—Black Africa's most substantial military establishment. Instead, it can seek to undermine confidence in the régime of Haile Selassie by sabotaging carefully selected economic targets, winning wider publicity and international support for its cause, and prompting Arab countries to intervene more openly on its behalf.

## V

Thus far international reaction to the ups and downs of the Eritrean conflict has been characterized by a prudent restraint. There has been some name-calling between Syria and Ethiopia, but little more. Undoubtedly there remains a modicum of support for the insurgents from most Arab governments, though their main attentions are fixed on Israel. Undoubtedly the fighting is far from over and the sabotage operations of the ELF continue, as do Ethiopian army and police actions. The cost in lives and in damage to economic development and neighborly relations along the Red Sea coast will continue to take a certain toll. Up to now one can say only that the damage and the level of violence have been, thankfully, limited.

French decisions about the future of Djibouti could up the scale of trouble in the region, at least marginally. That once-strategic but now wasting colonial asset (officially, French Ter-

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ritory of the Afars and the Issas; formerly, French Somaliland) may seem all the more expendable to a new régime in Paris which has already devalued the franc. Djibouti's 5,000-man French air and naval base is a drain on metropolitan finances, somewhat comparable to the cost in sterling of Britain's strategic base at Aden, which the British left in November 1967. Djibouti remains also the terminus of the only rail line from the Red Sea to the inland Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, a railroad controlled jointly by Ethiopia and France. Since both Ethiopia and Somalia lay future claim to this ethnically mixed, Moslem enclave (the size of New Hampshire) a French pullout and grant of independence could spark a chaos of competition for control of the port and its railhead. That the most interested neighbors not come to blows over Djibouti, but come instead to a rational understanding which respects their mutual needs and interests is a coming task of statesmanship in the African Horn, and one in which Paris can play a useful mediating part if it chooses.

Whatever the outcome in Djibouti in the 1970s, the retention of Eritrea with its Red Sea coastline and two ports will remain a vital interest to Ethiopia. Without coastal access, the foreign commerce of this nation of 22 million (Black Africa's second largest state) would be dependent on others. With Suez closed and the Strait of Bab-al-Mandab at the southern extremity of the Red Sea potentially subject to hostile control and blockade, the economy of Ethiopia could be placed at the mercy of foreign interests. Hence the clear relationship between Eritrea and Djibouti, which, with the ex-British colony of Aden, now the Arab "People's Republic of Southern Yemen," controls the southern strait.

The United States has over the past two decades contributed some $240 million to Ethiopia's economic development and provided $140 million in military assistance. The total of nearly $400 million represents one of the largest American aid commitments to any country on the African continent. There is, then, ample reason for American interest in the success of Ethiopia's efforts to modernize.

At the same time, looking to the complex ambiguities of the Eritrean question—one which for ten years plagued the Big Four and the United Nations prior to the provisional compromise settlement of 1950—there is reason for restraint on the part of outsiders. Eritrea has known so many rulers and such frequent

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changes in administration in the past thirty years that she craves a pause. Her problems, interesting though they may be to great and small neighbors, and to participants in the northern struggle for Palestine, are susceptible of solution without foreign pressure.

Though any "political solution" of the differences between the Liberation Front and the Addis Ababa government now seems remote, the elements of such a solution are not difficult to imagine. However great the ancient religious enmities, Ethiopia knows that it must live among Arab and Moslem neighbors. Attempts to improve relations with Sudan and Somalia, both of which have new governments as a result of military coups within the past ten months, give evidence of this knowledge. For its part, the Liberation Front must know that there is a difference between its announced maximum and minimum claims. If it should ever seek agreement on a degree of local autonomy and recognition of minority rights within Eritrea, then the Front would realistically have to recognize the security requirement of any Ethiopian régime that it control its own commerce through its own secure seaports.

As the conflict drags on, any suggested solution at this point seems hypothetical and beyond the pale to both sides. But however interesting control of the entire Red Sea basin may appear to nearby Arab countries, it is to them a marginal interest and to Africa's most ancient unitary state a vital interest. Thus the notion of Eritrea becoming the seat of a southern extension of the Arab-Israeli war does not seem in the cards. One cannot rule out political irrationality of a kind that could pit Africans against Arabs in an expanding conventional war. But, especially after Egypt's experience in Yemen, most Arab leaders will most likely be loath to devote limited arms and supplies to a "southern diversion" as long as they have their hands full with Israel.

In the last analysis, if there is any chance for scaling down the violence and moving toward peace, the choice seems to be up to Ethiopians and Eritreans themselves. Here is one long-festering international problem which begs not for intervention but for restraint, which admits of solution by the peoples directly concerned without complicating recourse to big-power involvement.

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# A WORLD OF PREFERENCES

*By W. Michael Blumenthal*

VIRTUALLY last among the world's major industrial nations—but by no means least—the United States has now agreed to offer some form of tariff preferences to imports from developing countries. President Nixon's Latin American policy address last October, followed by his statement on November 10, signaled what amounts to a major shift in U.S. policy by calling for a broad system of generalized preferences, with the proviso that if this cannot be achieved, the United States may extend regional preferences to Latin America alone.

The President's statements represent a significant departure from earlier U.S. views. When the less developed countries (LDCs) raised this issue as their major demand at the first U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, the United States—unlike the majority of the world's other rich nations—was resolutely opposed. Indeed, George Ball, then Undersecretary of State and Chief U.S. Delegate to the Conference, left little doubt about the intention of the United States to resist what he considered a policy shift unrelated to real economic development needs and undesirable from almost every other economic, political and commercial policy standpoint.

In subsequent years, U.S. opposition notwithstanding, the pressure for preferences as a major means by which the rich nations would contribute to economic development in Latin America, Africa and Asia grew more insistent. It remained the single most important question debated at the second U.N. Conference at New Delhi and was pressed by Latin American countries in regional councils and in meetings with U.S. officials.

During the last two or three years, under mounting pressure and increasingly isolated from developed and developing countries alike, the United States gradually shifted its position. As the world's most important industrial nation, virtually alone in opposition to the LDCs' insistent demands, with various regional preference arrangements a fait accompli and facing the threat of undesirable extensions, Washington found itself in an increasingly onerous and untenable situation. Hence, when a Special Committee on Preferences was created within the OECD after the Delhi meetings, U.S. representatives actively participated.

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From this group there emerged late in 1969 a series of individual proposals by major OECD countries, including the United States. Their common feature was a stated willingness to grant some form of general preferences on industrial products to all developing countries around the world. These proposals were submitted to UNCTAD last November. The road, therefore, appears open for the launching of preference negotiations between developed and developing countries sometime this year.

II

The case for preferences has been argued on several grounds, some economic and some political. The economic case rests on the developing countries' urgent need for increasing their volume of exports and their earnings from export sales, with particular emphasis on manufactured goods. Preferential tariffs or—better yet—duty-free entry into the world's major markets for raw materials, semi-manufactured and manufactured products alike would, it is argued, contribute materially to achievement of this objective in several aspects.

They would: (a) make LDC exports more competitive in major world markets; (b) reduce LDC dependence on a few traditional commodity exports by diversifying the source of export earnings to include more processed goods; (c) increase LDC export revenues by capturing part of the tariff component, world competition permitting; (d) augment foreign exchange earnings; (e) encourage foreign investments in LDCs; and (f) accelerate industrial development by placing within LDC reach larger total markets at home and abroad, with beneficial effects on cost structures arising from economies of scale.

Those familiar with the reality of commercial policies of industrialized countries and the economic development problems of LDCs know that there is another side to the story. For one thing, the developing countries are more different than alike in economic potential and in ability to compete in world markets, regardless of tariff levels. Tariff preferences may or may not be of benefit to relatively developed LDCs, such as Mexico or Brazil. Their situation, however, is most certainly worlds apart from that of the least developed of the LDCs—typically one-product economies with little real scope for industrialization and export diversification.

Secondly, we know from the experience of India and Pakistan,

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most of French-speaking Africa or, for that matter, from the history of our own economic relations with the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico that the preferences these countries enjoyed at various times in their history did not, alone, help to achieve any of the above objectives. Puerto Rico is a good case in point. For decades, its products had duty-free entry privileges into the U.S. market—with little or no effect on either the volume of export earnings or the pace of industrial growth. What eventually made the difference in launching Puerto Rico on the road to export diversification and growth was not preferences but "Operation Bootstrap," with its emphasis on internal structural reforms, investment incentives, labor training, improved marketing techniques, and the like. In French-speaking Africa, long accustomed to regional preferences in Metropolitan France, the system hindered rather than helped development by obscuring the need for internal reforms and by orienting these countries toward high-cost production for an artificially protected preferential market rather than for competitive sales in world markets at large. Suffice it to add, moreover, that neither pre-Castro Cuba nor the U.S.-Philippine relationship is a much more brilliant example of the efficacy of tariff preferences in action.

Third, most LDCs enjoy their greatest comparative advantage in processing raw materials and in relatively simple, labor-intensive manufactured goods. Hence, the benefits from preferences for a wide range of more sophisticated industrial products are likely to remain more theoretical than real. Even Brazil will, for a long time to come, be world-competitive in textiles rather than in jet aircraft, *i.e.* in goods where the principal limiting factor is not tariffs but restrictions on access to major industrial markets.

The preference question being as much a political issue as an economic one, there are those who, while recognizing the limits of the economic case, have argued for favorable action on essentially pragmatic and political grounds. Since the LDCs have focused so heavily on this issue—and precisely *because* its trade effects are likely to be limited or, at least, amenable to some form of limitation—the argument that it is politically wise and not too costly for the world's rich countries to accede to LDC demands has had considerable force. For UNCTAD, an organization born out of the frustration of the world's LDCs over the ever-

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widening gap between rich and poor countries, success on the preference question would be of considerable value and do much to defuse the increasingly acrimonious debate over trade discrimination against LDC exports. Politically and psychologically, some evidence of progress and some sign of hope are needed. Preferences have emerged as the number-one candidate for this role.

Finally, in the case of the United States yet another factor, partly economic and partly political and tactical, has played an important part. This relates to the long-standing U.S. antipathy to already existing regional preference arrangements between the EEC and Francophone Africa and between the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries. There is indeed much merit in the firm U.S. view that regional preferences threaten to divide the world into relatively closed trading blocs of one or more rich countries, each with its favored appendages of LDC client states. The latter enjoy preferences for their exports in the rich country and sometimes, as a quid pro quo, provide reverse or reciprocal preferences for industrial products from the donor country. The European regional arrangements—quite apart from their inherently dubious economic and political implications—have discriminated both against U.S. exports to Africa and, more importantly, against Latin American exports to Europe. Clearly it would be preferable, instead of opting for a parallel closed system between the United States and Latin America, with or without the reciprocal feature, to eliminate regional schemes in Europe in favor of an open, nondiscriminatory world system between all developing and developed countries. This would be much the preferable solution, whatever the merits of preferences per se.

## III

A world system of preferences will be a success to the extent to which it deals with both the political and economic aspects of the problem. This can be accomplished in one of two ways. Ideally, if a scheme can be evolved which provides real opportunities for expanded LDC trade, economic benefits would ensue and, to a degree at least, the present stress in relations between developed and developing countries would be eased. Similarly, agreement on a system of preferences can be envisaged which, while not providing substantial economic benefits for LDCs,

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could nevertheless improve political relations by removing present elements of discrimination between groups of developing countries or, at the least, by demonstrating the willingness of the rich countries to meet the LDCs' principal UNCTAD demand.

Yet another outcome is possible, however. For there is real danger that the type of preference system which the industrialized countries can accept will meet neither the economic nor the political requirements of the situation. On the one hand, the rich countries may so circumscribe their offers—particularly in the very manufactured products of greatest potential interest to LDCs—that no important additional trade flows will ensue. If this occurs, heightened disillusionment and frustration in LDCs could well leave relations with these countries worse off than ever before.

If, on the other hand, the industrialized countries can overcome domestic pressures and offer a relatively generous and comprehensive world preference scheme, it is still likely that this will, at best, yield less than sensational results. Under the right circumstances, the benefits to some LDCs might be quite important in the longer run. But the effects almost surely will not be immediate nor will they measure up to the high hopes of LDCs, engendered over the years by the intoxicating fervor of national rhetoric and international debate.

In either case, then, the road to preferences will not lead trading relations between the world's rich and poor nations to a state of universal happiness. The potential for some improvement of LDCs' export earnings is real; but the danger of an adverse effect on international trade relations is no less real. The challenge confronting the industrialized nations lies in their willingness and ability to make the hard choices necessary for agreement on a system of preferences which will represent an improvement rather than a deterioration of the present situation.

What would the major characteristics of such a system have to be?

First, preferences should be general, worldwide and comprehensive rather than regional and limited. All industrialized countries should participate and all developing nations should be beneficiaries. If existing regional arrangements in Europe were supplanted, discrimination against Latin American and Asian countries would be eliminated and the proliferation of regional spheres of influence between major powers and LDC

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client-states avoided. The economic and political benefits flowing from access for all LDCs to all of the world's major markets are beyond dispute.

Second, introduction of a new system of general and worldwide preferences should entail the elimination of remaining "reverse" or "reciprocal" preferences where this archaic and pernicious hangover from another age is still in effect.

Third, preferences should apply to all products—agricultural, mineral and industrial, and including raw materials, semi-manufactures and manufactured goods. There should be a minimum of exceptions, particularly for the semi-processed or labor-intensive manufactured goods of greatest potential export interest to LDCs.

Fourth, there should be simple and exceptional methods for temporary suspension of preferences when LDC exports can be shown to threaten serious damage to domestic industries in the developed markets and when adjustment assistance is not possible. Relief measures should be subject to multilateral justification and entail transitional suspension of preferences for a relatively short time period as the preferred technique. In accord with existing GATT rules, resort to quota restrictions or other quantitative limitations should be avoided.

Fifth, since the average level of prevailing post-Kennedy Round tariffs is rather low, preferences should as a rule involve duty-free entry without limitations, rather than preferential tariff rates or tariff quotas. The greater the extent to which this objective can be achieved, the more substantial the benefits likely to accrue to LDCs.

Sixth, there should be a clear understanding that the introduction of preferences is not to inhibit the continuing effort of the world's major trading nations to dismantle tariffs on a most-favored-nation basis. The firm intent to do so should be clearly stated. It should be underscored by limiting the duration of preferences to a period of no more than 10 years, at the end of which MFN tariffs might, whenever possible, come down to zero levels, thereby eliminating the preferences in effect for LDCs. Obviously, the aim of eliminating tariffs, worldwide, would have to be coupled with a concomitant effort to deal with nontariff barriers, and no system of preferences should be allowed to entail the substitution of new or additional nontariff restrictions to world trade.

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IV

The detailed provisions of an eventual world preference scheme will remain uncertain until the real negotiations between industrialized countries and LDCs have been joined. Furthermore, the U.S. Congress has still to be heard from and there is, at this point, little real evidence that Congressional reaction to a Presidential request for authority to grant preferences is likely to be positive.

A great deal of work has, however, been done by potential donor countries within the OECD and late in 1969 summary outlines of their plans were submitted to the UNCTAD Secretariat. This documentation will form the basis for eventual negotiations with the developing countries and provides the best evidence, so far, of what the major countries seem ready to accept.

What has emerged is not particularly encouraging. Most important, perhaps, is the intention of all major countries to limit the coverage of preferences in a number of important ways. Practically all agricultural products are to be excluded by restricting the application of preferences essentially to the industrial sections of the Brussels Nomenclature. Furthermore, the United States is proposing to except all textiles, shoes and petroleum products. This is a significant limitation in itself and if the experience with exceptions lists in the Kennedy Round is any guide, other major countries will almost certainly not agree to be much more liberal.

The present list of definite U.S. exceptions is subject to a further possibly critical qualification in that it is the initial one, not yet submitted to Congressional review and approval. Any U.S. preference plan, whatever its nature, will require specific new legislation, and prospects of Congressional approval for wide-ranging preferences involving relatively unrestricted duty-free entry of LDC products into the U.S. market are cloudy at best. The dozens of protectionist bills introduced into the Congress since the end of the Kennedy Round are not a particularly good omen and it has required all of the considerable skill and ingenuity of no less a Congressional power than the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means to block these measures. The nature and extent of these proposals attest to the strong protectionist sentiment in the Congress, which is focused precisely on those products of highest export interest to LDCs.

It is worth recalling that what was considered a resounding

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success in the Kennedy Round involved agreement on a halving of tariffs rather than on their complete elimination, as is now suggested. Even then, the Kennedy Round lists of products totally or largely excepted from 50 percent cuts went, in the case of all major trading nations, considerably beyond textiles, shoes and petroleum. Anyone who has lived through the months of interagency struggle in Washington over minutiae in the exceptions list knows the herculean efforts required to keep the pressures of protectionist sentiment within bounds. That situation is no different in London, Paris or Bonn. One cannot but reflect with awe, therefore, on the task ahead for the Nixon administration in dealing with the exceptions issue when the preference question comes before Congress.

Conditions will be less favorable in 1970 than they were in the 1960s. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 provided the President with general authority to cut tariffs in half. No Congressional approval of specific exceptions was needed and protectionist pressures thus could not be usefully deployed against individual Congressmen. The reverse is true today, and if present circumstances had prevailed in the early 1960s, U.S. exceptions lists for the Kennedy Round would almost certainly have looked very different indeed. Questions of trade policy, in particular those relating to sensitive labor-intensive imports from LDCs, touch the most delicate political nerves and arouse strong and passionate fears in all major developed countries. It is not overstating the case, then, to say that the outcome of the struggle over the exceptions lists may, in the end, determine the fundamental success or failure of the impending preference negotiations.

Another major problem relates to the nature of the preferences themselves. While all major trading countries have agreed to offer zero duties rather than preferential duty rates, only the United States, the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries seem prepared to adopt a straightforward and unqualified rule to this effect, subject only to the exceptions lists and escape clause action when special difficulties arise. The EEC and Japan, for their part, have added at least two important qualifications. In the first place, they propose to set specific annual ceilings in value terms for each product, limiting these to the total value of the preceding year's imports from all LDCs plus a small annual growth factor of five percent of the value of the preceding year's imports from non-LDC sources. Secondly, preferential imports

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of a given product from a single LDC will not be allowed, as a rule, to exceed 50 percent of the total ceiling fixed for each product. This provision is intended to limit the advantages accruing to the more advanced LDCs and provides that any such country which exceeds 50 percent of the total ceiling in any one year is no longer entitled to *any* preferential treatment in the following year.

These provisions would have some very undesirable results. In the first place, they restrict the developing countries' opportunities to expand trade and are potentially much less liberal than the proposals by the United States and other countries. Secondly, they amount, in fact, to the introduction of an elaborate tariff quota scheme requiring the establishment of a whole set of administrative arrangements, with all that this implies. One of the major advances of the postwar trade negotiations under the GATT rule has been precisely the elimination of quota mechanisms to limit trade. The reappearance of this machinery for the administration of tariff quotas carries with it the danger that its application is available for other purposes.

There is yet another aspect of the tariff quota concept which gives rise to concern. The idea rests on the underlying notion that it is valid to calculate fixed formula ceilings beyond which, *automatically,* imports from LDCs are presumed to cause problems in the markets of the industrialized countries. This runs counter to a basic principle underlying U.S. and European postwar trade policies, namely, that it is necessary to show damage or disruption before restrictive action should be taken against imports from any source. It would be exceedingly dangerous to abandon this concept—a step many protectionist groups have been urging for a long time. If the EEC and Japan adopt this notion in the context of a preference scheme, there is no doubt that the pressure to adjust the administration of general U.S. trade policy along similar lines will increase accordingly.

Finally, the EEC system involves a continuation, albeit in attenuated form, of regional preferences for French-speaking Africa. The special preferences now accorded these countries for tropical and other agricultural exports to the EEC would continue unchanged, since these products are not to be granted general preference treatment. Moreover, the ceilings for industrial products will not apply to the African countries either. A

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major potential benefit of a worldwide preference scheme—the elimination of existing regional and discriminatory arrangements —would thus not be fully achieved.

While all this limits the value of preferences to the LDCs and raises risks of new difficulties in the future, not all features of the OECD proposals have equally negative effects and a good many are quite positive and encouraging. For the first time, all major industrialized countries have joined in a common effort for a major trade initiative of potential benefit to LDCs. That, in itself, is an important step forward. It is equally encouraging that basic agreement has been achieved to provide duty-free entry, rather than merely preferential tariff rates. Moreover, the choice of what is, in principle, a multilateral and general arrangement, rather than a regional one, constitutes an important decision in favor of an open system of world trade. The prospect that reverse preferences for developed countries are to disappear is certainly a long-overdue change for the better. Finally, the proposals all envisage ten-year plans, thus underlining on the one hand the transitional nature of the arrangements and a continuing commitment to MFN as the basic rule underlying world trade and, on the other hand, opening the way to continued pursuit of a general liberalization of world trade barriers.

## V

The shift of the position of the United States in favor of preferences has opened up a critical set of problems which the world's major trading nations must now face. The result may be progress or it may be retrogression. The challenge lies in devising a system of preferences with optimum economic and political benefit for LDCs and a positive impact on the quality of international economic relations. But the threat exists that wrong decisions may be taken or that only half-measures or sham preferences may be possible.

The role of the United States will be critical in providing the leadership necessary to negotiate improvements and avoid the more serious shortcomings of the present proposals. The scope and complexity of the difficult policy problems raised for the United States and its trading partners in the upcoming negotiations are quite considerable.

What is an LDC? The OECD proposals simply imply that

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any country claiming LDC status is presumed to be one. Perhaps this deceptively simple resolution of an inherently difficult and politically loaded problem is best, but it may not, in the end, prove quite good enough. Will domestic pressure groups in the advanced countries agree that Hong Kong be accorded LDC status? What about Israel? How will Cuba be treated? Must all donor countries agree on a common roster of LDCs, or can each make up its own list without doing violence to either the general and worldwide nature of the scheme or to the principle of burden sharing?

Although preferable, it will not be necessary that every developed country apply precisely the same formula so long as the effect of the different schemes is roughly equivalent. This is certainly not the case as matters now stand and U.S. policy should be strongly directed toward correcting this deficiency. No system of preferences which fails to eliminate completely the existing discrimination against Latin America in Europe should be adopted. Equally important, no major country should be allowed to limit in advance the volume of exports to be accorded preference treatment, save for a small list of exceptions. Here lies a possibly fatal deficiency of some of the present proposals and a major effort should be made to correct it.

Most importantly, it will require hard work by all countries to limit the exceptions lists and to include processed agricultural goods wherever possible. In the United States, the President's influence will be of fundamental importance in ensuring that protectionist sentiment in the Congress is kept within bounds. If this effort succeeds, LDC export earnings may indeed benefit. If it fails—and if other countries follow the U.S. lead—few if any economic benefits for developing countries will ensue and the political reactions could be unfortunate.

Whatever the difficulties in reaching agreement on a constructive global scheme, the United States should avoid a regional arrangement for Latin America alone. Does it really serve our interests to divide the free world into a number of closed trade blocs? What would the situation be for such countries as Korea and Taiwan—certainly important areas from the viewpoint of the United States and not covered by any regional scheme? The potential benefits for our likely clients under a regional arrangement, limited to the U.S. market alone and recognizing the exigencies of even a minimum U.S. exceptions list,

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would be small indeed. On the other hand, the cost to the free world trading system would be high. Nor is a regional arrangement a particularly useful bargaining card for a subsequent elimination of the EEC arrangements. There are many in Europe who would welcome this approach as the best means to eliminate, once and for all, world pressure against the colonial arrangements of the past. Francophone-Africa itself, given its close and historic economic ties to Metropolitan France, is unlikely to find the threat of a regional U.S.-Latin American arrangement a very potent argument for abandoning its special position in Europe.

The United States will face a serious dilemma if the preference negotiations do not lead to a successful solution of this multitude of difficult and vexing problems. If a regional scheme as suggested by President Nixon is not an alternative, then what is? In that situation, the next best choice may well be to have no preferences at all. Matters would be left as they are today, and an active effort would have to be launched to increase access of LDCs' products to the markets of the rich nations on a multilateral basis, while pursuing the postwar effort for the reduction and elimination of tariff barriers wherever possible and mounting a special attack on nontariff barriers to trade.

Given the LDCs' strong desire for preferences and the stated readiness of the world's industrialized nations to accept a generalized scheme, it is, of course, to be hoped that the current effort will be successful. Should it nevertheless fail, the United States will at least have demonstrated its good will and readiness to accept a reasonable arrangement. This fact, together with the continued pursuit of a general, open and liberal world policy on trade, would leave us in a good position vis-à-vis our trading partners, perhaps with a chance to make another effort at a later date.

Let us hope that the fight for a reasonable world preference scheme can succeed. There is opportunity for the establishment of an imaginative system yielding positive improvements in the economic conditions of the LDCs. It remains to be seen whether the industrialized countries can marshall the wisdom, courage and leadership to take advantage of this opportunity.

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# FOREIGN AID

## A Report on the Reports

*By Willard L. Thorp*

THE phrase "foreign aid" has been used to cover many activities—missionary enterprises, disaster relief, general postwar rehabilitation, aid to refugees, defense support, market expansion, foreign investment, political intervention, cultural extension and multilateralism. However, with the breakup of empires and the acceptance of the relatively new concept of government responsibility for social and economic conditions, aid has become focused on the development of the less developed world.

At first, there was full confidence that this could easily be done. Since there already were advanced countries, all that was needed was to follow in their footsteps. And the extraordinary success of that fortunate improvisation, the Marshall Plan, was also a source of optimism. But where the Marshall Plan involved the rehabilitation of societies already modernized, a repair job rather than a transformation, the less developed countries started off with few of the essential requirements for a modern society. Nor were they homogeneous but large and small, new and old, far and near, rich and poor in physical resources. They differed in traditions, religions, languages, unity and character of leadership. Some already were in the process of changing while others had hardly started.

Both the League of Nations and the United Nations had procedures for a temporary, tutelary status to deal with situations where preparation was needed between the colonial condition and full independence. However, after World War II, with India as the exemplar, the insistence on instant independence in colony after colony was so strong that almost all skipped any transitional stage. And they wanted to parallel the sudden political change with a similar social and economic mutation.

Nor were the developed countries much better prepared for giving assistance. There existed no body of recorded experience and knowledge to provide answers to the obvious questions of how, where, how much, and on what terms, or to the more subtle problems created by national sensitivities and pride of sovereignty and by uncertainties about the development process itself. Aside from anthropologists, social scientists had paid little attention to the problems of less developed areas. And the colonial powers were equally at a loss. They had considered their main function to be preserving order rather than inducing widespread change.

During the forties and fifties, foreign aid was regarded as a temporary phenomenon. The metropolitan powers often agreed to give assistance to the newly independent for a few years. The initial Common Market agreement with former colonies was for five years. And in the United States, not only has the central foreign aid legislation always been of one-year duration, but in extending the Mutual Security Act in 1953 Congress stipulated that economic aid was to end within 24 months and military aid within 36. That particular death sentence, however, was commuted and the early years of

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the sixties saw economic assistance at much higher levels for nearly all supplier countries. Under United States leadership, they formed the Development Assistance Committee in 1961, agreeing "to secure an expansion of the aggregate volume of resources made available to less-developed countries and to improve their effectiveness."

II

The last twenty years have greatly increased the awareness of the difficulties of speeding up the growth process in the less developed countries. The disappointment of exaggerated expectations has led to a sense of frustration in many quarters. Aid itself has been increasingly challenged as ineffective and unjustified. As a consequence, a number of full-scale appraisals of foreign aid have recently been appearing.

The most comprehensive examination is that by the Commission on International Development, sponsored by the World Bank and headed by Lester B. Pearson. The Commission assembled a staff of experts and held regional meetings with some 70 governments to assess the results of 20 years of assistance and offer policies for the future. Its report was published in September 1969. There is also the report of the U.N. Committee for Development Planning, a group of experts with Professor Jan Tinbergen as chairman, which has been working on guidelines for the Second United Nations Development Decade. Supplementing these overall reviews is a study of the United Nations Development System carried out by Sir Robert Jackson at the request of the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme.

Since its initiation, the U.S. program has been reviewed by at least a dozen official groups. The President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Problems (James A. Perkins, Chairman) addressed a series of recommendations to the new administration in October 1968. President Nixon on September 24, 1969, appointed a Presidential Task Force on International Development (Rudolph A. Peterson, Chairman) to develop "a new U.S. approach to aid for the 1970's." The Rockefeller Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere submitted its report August 30, 1969 and it was released to the public on November 10, 1969. This should be read in connection with another report—the Latin American Consensus of Viña del Mar, which discusses Western Hemisphere coöperation.

A number of independent studies were made by private groups in 1969. Perhaps the most comprehensive are those of the National Planning Association, "A New Conception of U.S. Foreign Aid," March 1969, and by the Committee for Economic Development (CED), "Assisting Development in Low-Income Countries: Priorities for U.S. Government Policy," September 1969. Each of these reports was the result of initial staff work revised and approved by committees of businessmen and scholars.

These studies vary considerably in emphasis, but they all are reports of progress and agendas of unfinished business. They stress the immense magnitude of the problems of development, the interaction of economic, social and political change, and the diversity of experience and achievement. Taken out of context, their frank criticisms of past procedure and policies might be

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regarded as throwing doubt on the whole enterprise, but the authors would be the first to deny any such conclusion. Their deep concern for the needs of the less developed countries has led them to seek ways of increasing the effectiveness of the efforts of the less developed countries themselves and of the aid provided by the richer nations. The talk is not of withdrawing but of reorganizing and revitalizing.

III

As to why foreign aid should be provided, only the Rockefeller Report gives much weight to cold-war considerations. In general, the others present plural objectives, including economic, cultural, social and moral concerns as well as security interests. The Pearson Commission paraphrases President Kennedy's dictum by declaring "that it is only right for those who have, to share with those who have not," and supports the moral argument with a discussion of the increasing interdependence of the world community. "If we wish the world to be secure and prosperous, we must show a common concern for the common problems of all peoples." The rich will benefit from the greater availability of resources, expansion of trade and more friendly political relationships.

The President's Advisory Committee, in addition to stressing humanitarian considerations, maintains that more rapid material progress in less developed countries will lower tensions caused by hunger and other misery and reduce the risk that violent political instability will disturb world peace. Development efforts will direct energy to constructive activities rather than international grievances and adventures. Joint efforts by advanced and developing countries provide opportunities for more contact and improved understanding of each other's interests. Finally, the Committee points out the danger of ignoring the frustrations of poverty abroad as well as at home.

All the reports make it clear that rapid growth will not necessarily win friends or insure peace and stability in the less developed world. However, profound changes in these countries are inevitable, and, as the CED report puts it, "the long-term political rationale for aid . . . rests on the calculated risk that accelerating the modernization process, and reducing the sacrifice required to achieve it, will enhance the odds in favor of an earlier evolution of responsible and independent states." Creation of a sense of common purpose is an important instrument of foreign policy. And since foreign policy is a form of national expression, the American image of itself as generous, peace-loving, and all for the underdog requires the demonstration of these characteristics beyond national boundaries.

The reports deal in various ways with specific criticisms by arguing that the domestic cost is small compared with the possible gain in reduced world tension; the effect on the balance of payments is very limited; there is no evidence that economic aid leads to military entanglement; the evolution of procedures has made assistance more and more effective; and the cases of corruption and mismanagement are relatively few. As to the criticism that aid has failed to win friends and influence peoples, all the reviewers agree that assistance should be primarily directed at development, and not at short-run political or economic objectives.

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Thus, the stated objectives range from the simple purpose of reducing hunger, disease, ignorance and poverty to economic, cultural and social benefits—the desire to help channel change toward higher living standards, more open and liberal societies and a stronger world community.

IV

While the reports emphasize difficulties and obstacles, they tend to be basically optimistic about the possibilities; they point out that extraordinary progress is being made by the two-thirds of the world's people who are struggling with post-colonial instability, racial bitterness, ignorance and massive poverty, and assert that the prospects for their further development are brighter than ever because of the improved performance of both donors and receivers of aid. In fact, the U.N. Committee for Development Planning would step up the economic growth target from the annual rate of 5 percent set for the sixties to 6–7 percent for the seventies. To be sure, the overall percentage figure creates too favorable an impression—due to the cases where high growth rates have resulted from circumstances which are not likely to be generalized—Libya, Korea, Taiwan, Israel, Mexico and Iran. In fact, many unfortunately fell below the 5 percent rate, and per capita progress was much lower.

The reports discount the use of simple growth rates as a measure of progress, pointing out that development is a matter of quality as well as quantity and involves the building of institutions necessary for the future, such as expanded educational systems. To be sure, they admit social change is not easy since it requires altering established traditions and institutions. And political change raises the specter of external interference in the most sensitive area.

While the reports emphasize social needs, especially with respect to population and its growing concentration in cities, they do not give enough weight to the political problems and uncertainties in the less developed countries. They recognize the key position played by governments and talk about the importance of effective planning, policies and performance. But they pay little attention to the disintegrating influence on the political structure of tribalism, religion, language or rigid class distinctions. Likewise, the specter of massive unemployment is kept in the wings.

It is a common criticism that foreign assistance has failed to set social and political objectives, although that was the central idea of the Alliance for Progress, which endorsed not only economic and educational development but agrarian and tax reforms. Probably these sectors have not been stressed because of the problems involved in trying to influence them from the outside. However, foreign aid can contribute readily to economic change through technical assistance and capital flows, and the economy is not isolated from society. Roads and electric power and education are great revolutionary forces. Feudal systems were built on isolation and ignorance. Social and political change is the inevitable consequence of economic expansion.

No one can predict the form of the institutions which will finally emerge but our ability to influence the patterns of the future depends in large part upon the aid relationship. In the early years of aid, most of the less developed

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countries had great expectations but were not ready to plan and carry out a development program. Often the requirements for infrastructure such as roads, power, schools, health facilities and civil service were so obvious that the problem was less one of planning than of mobilization. At that time, the international and national agencies played a very active role.

The reports are opposed to any such paternalistic or tutorial position. The word appearing most often is "partnership," although even this is probably too strong. The infancy of the 70 or more new nations is rapidly disappearing into the past. They not only are capable of assuming greater responsibility for shaping their own development but it is inevitable that they will do so, a point stressed particularly by the National Planning Association Report. To be sure, they were part of a larger world and they have important needs that must be supplied from outside, but their social and economic development cannot be imported. It will be the result of their policies and the way they organize and use their own resources. "Assistance" is the right word, for much can be done from outside to help in the process, but the influence and importance of foreign countries are limited. It follows that one must not be surprised when the less developed countries move in directions which are contrary to Western experience—and this may be the course of wisdom for them.

This does not mean that the reviewers favor handing over assistance funds nonchalantly. They recommend that each recipient and its suppliers work closely together so that domestic policies and foreign assistance can be fully coördinated. The U.N. Committee for Development Planning proposes that both developed and less developed countries make commitments as to what they propose to do, and that a review and evaluation procedure be established to keep track of performance.

One way of reducing the national element in the aid relationship is to increase the flow through multilateral institutions. This receives universal support, though with a caveat by Jackson as to their present capacity. The Pearson Report calls for 20 percent of the official flow from donor countries to go to the multilateral agencies, especially urging the expansion of IDA because of its soft lending. The Pearson formula for total volume combined with this recommendation would increase contributions to international agencies from the $618 million average for 1966–1968 to $3.2 billion in 1975. In addition, some of the agencies would raise additional funds in private markets. The President's General Advisory Committee urges increased contributions as rapidly as the managements can expand their competence, but would want other countries also to step up their contributions. Rockefeller urges the shifting of much of the policy responsibility to various regional organizations. In addition to expansion in lending activity, it is generally felt that the World Bank and IMF should provide more coördination to the assistance given to individual countries through consortia and consultative groups.

The Jackson Report deals with the capacity of the United Nations Development System. While stressing the importance of the work being done, particularly technical assistance and pre-investment activity, the author suggests that it needs stronger central control, that planning must be focused

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on the individual country, and that an improved organization could make an exceptional contribution, given substantially more money and sufficient management talent and supporting manpower.

V

The reports show surprising agreement on development strategy. Family-planning programs, while limited in their foreign requirements, would probably top the list, followed closely by agriculture and by education and vocational training. Of special interest is the possible use of aid to backstop a desirable national program, say of tariff reduction or exchange adjustment or land reform, where the local government recognizes the need for action but is dependent on technical help or financial underwriting.

Technical assistance is emphasized, though less is said, except by Jackson, about the problems of manpower and effective operation. In early 1969 a report was issued by a Task Force of the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, drawing on their own experience in developmental assistance and emphasizing the importance of technical assistance in human resource development and institution-building, as well as the need for a much greater research effort.

The reports dwell extensively on the impediments of procedural encumbrances and unrelated policy restrictions, including: requirements for expenditure in the aid-supplying country (tied aid), freight rates and shipping restrictions, unrelated policy positions by the recipient (expropriation, fishing rights, nonrecognition of this or that country), the use of engineers or other specialists from the supplying country, and elaborate inspection procedures. While each requirement may seem reasonable, they often increase the administrative and annoyance costs and make aid appear to be a payment on account. Tying is particularly criticized for reducing the area of choice and increasing the cost of aid programs. On this subject, the Pearson Commission makes an interesting suggestion for parallel untying of aid by donors in such a way as to leave the balance of payments of each virtually unaffected.

There is also considerable criticism of the gradual shift from grants to loans. In 1968 about one-half of the official commitments were either outright grants or loans with payment to be made in local currency, which would be used again in the country for development purposes. The regular loans vary greatly in their terms, but it is estimated that in total they are sufficiently below capital market terms so that they can be regarded as about half grant and half loan. The troublesome debt-service situation is aggravated by the fact that there is a large and growing volume of high-cost export credits and payments related to private capital flows. To be sure, the resources which the loans provided have been in use and may have added to the foreign exchange available for debt service. Nevertheless, the backflow may create a transfer problem. In general, the experts recommend softer loans and earlier efforts to deal with situations which may require debt relief.

The problem of the wide variety of expanded requirements and payments to outside countries which development requires is never put in its full

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perspective. To be sure, recommendations for the expansion of trade are common but they are usually expressed in terms of substituting trade for aid. In fact, added means of payment are required not only for growing debt service but also for increased supplies of non-indigenous raw materials, spare parts, more varied technical advice, increasing representation costs abroad, and growing import demands resulting from rising consumer incomes.

The trade recommendations are directed largely at the richer countries, urging them to reduce as soon as possible tariffs and excise taxes on possible imports from less developed countries. Less developed countries are also advised to extend tariff concessions to each other. The idea of preferential tariffs for less developed countries, as distinct from broader most-favored-nation cuts, was put forward most strongly in the Rockefeller Report, where it was recommended that the United States should lower tariffs to the less developed countries of Latin America if it could not obtain agreement with the European importers to give more general preferences.

VI

With respect to volume of foreign aid, the most frequent recommendation is for each supplier to bring its aid at least to the U.N. target of one percent of gross national product. Pearson and the CED set 1975 as the goal, while the U.N. Committee for Development Planning prefers 1972. CED remarks "that the proposition that the United States can afford a substantially larger aid program cannot be reasonably doubted." The President's Advisory Committee proposes a goal to be reached in 1973 of one percent of national income, which is about 20 percent smaller than GNP.

No one is entirely satisfied with this target, especially since it disregards quality (for example, the proportion of grants) and makes no allowance for the principle of progressive taxation, whereby the richer countries would make a relatively larger contribution. Since it combines official and private flows, Pearson proposes as a supplemental target that official aid shall be .70 percent of GNP by 1975 or at latest 1980.

The OECD Secretariat has made an estimate of the probable size of this target for official aid. Allowing for growth in GNP, the .70 percent figure in 1975 would be $16.3 billion. To reach their individual goals, seven countries would merely have to maintain the rate at which their aid was increased from 1964 to 1968—Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. For the four largest, the annual rate of increase would have to be: United States, 13.8 percent; United Kingdom, 12.5 percent; Germany, 12.0 percent; France, 5.6 percent.

While recommending "that greater and more assured resources be made available to the U.S. foreign aid agency," the National Planning Association concentrated its thinking on restructuring the aid effort because it sees little prospect of a substantial increase in appropriations. The Rockefeller Report makes no comment as to the volume of aid but proposes a number of procedural changes to increase its effectiveness.

Suggestions for increasing the official volume other than through direct appropriation include applying part of the new SDR purchasing power to this purpose, subsidizing interest payments so that high-cost private borrow-

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ing can be turned into low-cost lending, and setting up special arrangements for offsetting depressed primary export earnings. However, the most usual approach is to seek the further expansion of private investment. Its value lies not only in providing capital, but in the technical and management skills which are part of the investment process.

While it is recognized that private aid will not replace official aid for infrastructure purposes, and that its distribution among countries is related more to resource availability than development objectives, the process of growth inevitably opens up increasing opportunities for private foreign investment. The problem is how to do it, since the carrot must be provided by the less developed country and private investment depends upon private decisions. The source government can stop private flows but cannot turn them on. The most that can be done by government is to make the process more attractive.

In late 1968 the International Private Investment Advisory Council reported to AID on ways and means to increase the flow of private investment. Its central proposal was the organization of an overseas private enterprise development corporation funded by the U.S. Government. The President presented the proposal in somewhat limited form to the Congress, which has approved an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) with a mixed board of public officials and private businessmen, a proposal strongly endorsed also by Rockefeller. It will take over the existing insurance and guarantee programs and have the debt service on AID loans plus some newly appropriated funds to invest in private projects.

VII

A favorite exercise of American systems analysts is to propose some scheme of reorganization. Rockefeller suggested the transfer of aid programs to the Executive office and much more coöperative decision-making by CIAP. The President's General Advisory Committee advocated the replacement of AID by the Development Coöperation Fund, the transfer of military assistance to the Defense Department budget, and an overseas investment corporation to promote private foreign investment. The National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges proposed the establishment of a quasi-autonomous group for technical assistance. The Congress has recently authorized the establishment of an Inter-American Social Development Institute for technical assistance to Latin America through private channels.

So far as the United States is concerned, these organizational rearrangements do not add new functions, though changed and fresh personnel might bring imaginative and energetic activity into old patterns. Actually, most of the suggestions run counter to general expert opinion that closer coördination is needed rather than fragmentation. However, there are two new proposals which may have a considerable positive effect: one is some reduction in the exhaustive procedure of annual authorization legislation; the second is the provision of more of the assistance through funding arrangements not requiring annual appropriations.

Reorganization is not only an American phenomenon. The Pearson Commission calls for strengthening the U.N. machinery for coördination on an

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individual country basis, and for a centralized means of reviewing development policies in all fields—aid, trade, monetary policy and private capital movements. It stresses the need for some means of making reasonably authoritative estimates of development objectives and aid requirements, of assessing regularly the performance of the less developed countries, and of reviewing donor aid policies and programs. The fact is that on each subject listed, progress has been made in the last decade. The greatest advance in coördination is being made by the less developed countries themselves as they strengthen their administrative structures and their civil services. Coordination is an attractive concept, but the learning process is not yet complete and there is much to be said for multiple participation and responsibility.

VIII

One can find books and articles which are hostile to foreign aid but most experts on the subject give it strong support. The reports described above generally conclude that, broadly speaking, substantial progress is being made, that the productive capacity of developing countries has increased significantly, that much has been learned so that both developed and less developed countries have improved their performance and that the record justifies an even greater effort in the future. To be sure, the experts make many suggestions for improvement, a large number of which are widely recognized and often already are being put into effect. The chief actions recommended for the developed countries are that they regard the objective as development and not immediate economic or political reward, that they increase substantially the flow of technical assistance and financial resources on softer terms, and that they open up their markets to exports from less developed countries.

In startling contrast to this picture of foreign aid is that painted by the U.S. Congress, where aid is seen as obsolete, outmoded and unrealistic, mindless, a boondoggle, a giveaway by Uncle Santa Claus, and a bureaucratic maze beyond comprehension, consisting of waste, frauds, sham, friends lost, enemies made and hopes dashed. To be sure, some defend the program with words of praise, but the proof of the matter is that the appropriation for economic assistance, not including amounts for the Food for Freedom program or the Export-Import Bank, reached a post-Marshall Plan high level in the early '60s but has dropped steadily since 1964–1965.

It is important to make some distinction between the attitudes of the executive and legislative branches of the government. While some Presidents have given higher priority to foreign aid than others, they have all declared its significance in messages to Congress. However, recently the recommendations by the President have been less year after year until President Nixon without apology described his recommendation for 1969–1970 as "the lowest proposed since the program began." The shrinking recommendations have been received by Congress without applause, then cut substantially and enacted reluctantly.

Since 1965, the proposals for foreign aid put forward by the President have met with more and more difficulty. In 1968, long before the program reached

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the floor of the Congress, it was common talk that the aid program was in trouble. The debate that year concerning the authorization did not begin until July. As always, there was considerable talk about rat-holes, dictatorships, corruption, balance of payments, the threats of communism, the brotherhood of man, India, and the responsibilities of global leadership. However, a new emphasis was evident. By July, the size of the 1967–1968 budget deficit stirred Cassandras in and out of government to predict imminent financial disaster. At the same time, interest in foreign affairs other than defense fell very low on a list of priorities featuring rising violence in the cities, lagging development in education, new health commitments and the realization that poverty existed at home. And pent-up dismay over the Vietnam situation found an outlet in attacking foreign aid.

Although Committee hearings were held earlier in 1969, the authorization debate did not begin until November and final action was taken December 19. The appropriation was taken up immediately but, despite Senator McGee's appeal to the Senate that "we hold our noses and adopt the conference report," it was rejected just before the Christmas adjournment because of disagreement over the inclusion of $54.5 million for Taiwan in the military assistance title of the bill.

It was finally agreed to eliminate this item, and the appropriations for 1969–70 were $1,462 million for economic aid and $350 million for military assistance, compared with $1,381 million and $375 million for 1968–69. These appropriations for the last two fiscal years, namely, $1,756 million for 1968–69 and $1,812 million for 1969–70, are less than half the amounts appropriated for the first three years of the '60s, which averaged $4,080 million. These are the figures which best indicate the attitude of Congress, although total foreign aid disbursements include funds for the Food for Freedom program, the Export-Import Bank, the Peace Corps and special appropriations for international agencies.

The 1969 debates were more limited than usual, most Congressmen evidently feeling that they were considering an interim proposal, with President Nixon yet to come forward with a really revised program. More time was devoted to the question of whether or not to earmark military assistance to South Korea and Taiwan and to certain special aids to Israel ($20 million for a prototype desalting plant and $5 million for Hadassah's health work in Israel) than to any basic policy issues. Congress did establish the Inter-American Social Development Institute "to stimulate people-to-people channels for aid" and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. More important is that the authorization legislation was made to apply for two years. This was justified on the basis of the difficulty of approving a completely new aid program when the Peterson Report was not yet completed and the coming year included an election campaign. Some supported the idea because it would hold the program to its present low level at least for the duration of the present Congress.

## IX

Clearly there is a wide gap between the judgment of the experts and the action of the Congress on foreign aid. There are a number of reasons for

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this. In the first place, the problem appears to each in quite a different perspective. The concern of the expert is focused on development. He examines it in terms of whether it is going well or badly. He seeks ways of accelerating the process by improving the performance of the less developed countries and the effectiveness of the aid from the developed countries. He feels that this endeavor is much more important than many items for which public funds are spent, but does not endeavor to establish specific priorities.

To the legislator, priorities are all important. Foreign aid is basically a budgetary problem, competing with all the other claimants. If he looks to the polls for guidance, he finds foreign aid far below such domestic interests as education, roads and health. But the polls are too simple and represent impressionistic reactions to undefined programs and inadequate information. A decision might be easier if it were possible to say that money saved here would be used there, but the appropriations procedure does not work that way. To be sure, a few members of Congress know a great deal about the subject, and the related committees usually hold several days of hearings. But in the last analysis, the pressure of immediate domestic needs is paramount. To be sure, the public can influence the situation as it did in connection with the enactment of President Truman's Point Four, or a President can shift the balance as President Kennedy did in 1961. But, much of the time, so far as the Congress is concerned, foreign aid is a political orphan.

The gap between expert and legislator is widened by differences in the source and kind of information to which each is exposed. The expert is most often someone who has had a direct connection with the development process. He knows the complexity of the problem through the diversity of his own experience. Aid matters to him.

The legislator is beset by hundreds of issues affecting government action on which he must record his judgment. He is likely to regard the experts in the executive branch of the government as prejudiced witnesses. He assumes that the proposed program has been padded to allow for Congressional cuts. And as far as public information is concerned, he, like the public at large, is the victim of the general principle that bad news drives out good. The vicissitudes of India's Congress Party are followed much more closely in the news than its extraordinary progress in family planning or agricultural yields. And the misbehavior in Antwerp of four persons on the AID payroll is more newsworthy than the proper performance of all the rest.

Sometimes the difficulty is that of the incomplete picture. The legislator and the public might be less disturbed by cocktail glasses sent to a Caribbean country if they knew that it was a tourist hotel which was being equipped. In the 1969 debates, several Congressmen were upset that the United States had borrowed $135 million from Thailand, Korea and Taiwan yet nevertheless was giving them aid. The missing piece in that picture puzzle is that these countries were substituting U.S. bonds for other assets in their monetary reserves, an objective which we have pursued for some years with many countries.

Another form of information which has quite a different impact on the two groups is the comparison of the U.S. program with that of other coun-

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tries. The expert views development assistance as a common effort in which all the rich countries should participate. One of his interests is the comparative performance of aid donors as well as that of the recipients. He is impressed that, among the 16 members of the Development Assistance Committee, the United States ranked thirteenth in 1968 in terms of its public and private foreign aid disbursements when measured as a percent of gross national product (0.65 percent of GNP, as compared with 0.92 percent of GNP for all other DAC members) and eighth if only official flows were considered. France and the United Kingdom, both also beset by inflation and international balance-of-payments problems, have nevertheless scheduled future increases in foreign aid. And Germany, by doubling her foreign aid in the last two years, has moved into second place in total volume.

The member of Congress is sure that the United States is really number one. If others seem relatively higher, it is because they have some special selfish interest, or perhaps the statistics are open to challenge. But in any event, in his view this is not a contest among countries, but among interests in and of the United States.

The expert and legislator also have differing attitudes toward foreign relations and foreign policy. The expert sees the aid process as one in which various countries are working together coöperatively and tending to reduce their hostilities in the process. He feels that a proper aid relationship will contribute to the easier handling of the many other unrelated problems involved in foreign relations, and that in a world of many countries, a nation whose behavior is ungenerous and inward-looking will have increasing difficulty.

On the other hand, the legislator is worried about excess foreign commitments which may be implied by, and be the consequence of, foreign aid. Senator Fulbright quotes former Secretary Rusk as having said that "one of the reasons justifying our involvement in Vietnam was the aid program; that the aid bill indicated Congress approved of the climate of intervention in that country." The President's Advisory Committee examined this proposition, and found no support for it in the evidence, pointing out that Korea and Vietnam had been security problems from the start, aid to the Dominican Republic had been ended before its revolution, and many other armed conflicts had occurred between or within countries where we had substantial economic assistance programs without our becoming militarily involved.

The Congressman, like the public, does not think of foreign aid as an important instrument of foreign policy. He is likely to feel that the richest and strongest country in the world should have no difficulty in dealing with the small, poor and weak. But national pride is no respecter of size or strength, and international leadership is much more a matter of demonstration, performance and the effective presentation of one's case than of arm-twisting or the distribution of largesse.

It has clearly been a disappointment to members of Congress that foreign aid has not caused countries to follow the position of the United States in international meetings or to behave with gratitude. They are disturbed by

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aid-recipients engaging in anti-American speeches, expropriating American properties and refusing to support us in Vietnam. The legislator wants specific results to report back to his constituents. He is under the pressure of the immediate and is looking at a one-year appropriation for a program with no permanent authorizing legislation.

This suggests one of the greatest differences—the time dimension. The expert groups do not expect instant development or current subservience, but they are frightened about the future. They fear that the same strains and stresses may develop internationally because of poverty as are now appearing within countries. In the words of the Pearson Report: "Who can now ask where his country will be in a few decades without asking where the world will be?"

It seems clear that there will be little change in the American aid posture until 1971. The President will then present a "new program" to be approved by Congress, presumably taking effect in the fiscal year 1971–1972. But if the expert reports discussed above are to be given any weight, there is no need for revolutionary change. Many improvements are desirable, but what is needed most is a clear commitment to the future—to increase greatly our efforts to assist the poor countries in their struggle against ignorance and poverty. The reorganizing and revitalizing would surely follow. Then the United States would be reflecting its true image.

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# RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*By John G. Stoessinger*

*with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Robert D. Crassweller, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.*

## *General: Political and Legal*

PEASANT WARS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Eric R. Wolf. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 328 p. $7.95.

An anthropologist compares six recent peasant revolutions—Mexico, Russia, China, Vietnam, Algeria and Cuba. A high level of scholarship, an extensive knowledge of history and a conscientious use of the case-study method blend here to make first-class social science.

THE MASTERS OF POWER. By Brian Crozier. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, 416 p. $8.95.

The author presents several case studies in the uses of "internal" and "international" power. Although these are, on the whole, empirically solid, his conclusions, "Towards a Philosophy of Power," come close to complete fantasy.

POLITICS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE. By Talcott Parsons. New York: Free Press, 1969, 557 p. $13.50.

A political scientist, William C. Mitchell, has selected 17 previously published essays by the eminent sociologist that are relevant to political thought and practical politics.

GENEVA 1954: THE SETTLEMENT OF THE INDOCHINESE WAR. By Robert F. Randle. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 639 p. $17.50.

This book presents the definitive interpretation of the Geneva Accords to date. It is overlong and suffers from a generous dose of doctoral dissertation heaviness, but the depth of the research and the quality of the political and legal analyses are impressive.

BETRAYAL FROM WITHIN. By James Barros. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969, 289 p. $10.00.

A case study of Joseph Avenol, the second Secretary-General of the League of Nations (1933–1940), who is pictured as having helped to undermine the organization by collaborating with the Axis powers behind the scenes. Unfortunately, the author generalizes from this and speaks out strongly against a politically active Secretary-Generalship. (Written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton.)

WHY MEN REBEL. By Ted Robert Gurr. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the Center of International Studies), 1970, 421 p. $12.50.

An effort, behaviorally oriented, to construct theoretical models for the study of political violence.

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PERSONALITY AND POLITICS. By Fred I. Greenstein. Chicago: Markham, 1969, 200 p. $5.95.

A somewhat turgid and inconclusive study of the impact of personality on politics. The author deals with his subject in highly theoretical terms.

CRISES IN FOREIGN POLICY: A SIMULATION ANALYSIS. By Charles F. Hermann. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill (for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University), 1969, 234 p. $8.50.

A rather labored attempt at simulation analysis under crisis conditions, based on Korea 1950 and Cuba 1962.

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD'S WHITE BOOK. By Gustaf Aulén. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969, 154 p. $4.75.

A profound interpretation of "Markings" by the leading theologian of Sweden.

YEARS OF DEADLY PERIL. By Henry H. Adams. New York: McKay, 1969, 559 p. $9.95.

Yet another survey of the events from the Nazi invasion of Poland to Pearl Harbor. The author covers familiar ground in a familiar manner, but his research is sound and his style is brisk and readable.

THE CONSERVATIVE MAINSTREAM. By Frank S. Meyer. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969, 488 p. $8.00.

A collection of articles from *National Review* advertised by the publisher as "the conservative *summa*." Many conservatives would disagree.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946–1967: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY. II: ASIA. By Rosalyn Higgins. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1970, 486 p. $12.50.

In this second of three volumes, the author deals with U.N. activities in Asia. Once again, this volume is invaluable as a reference work. The research is exhaustive and just about every salient fact is included. The analysis has a legal rather than political bent.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SUPERPOWERS. By John G. Stoessinger. New York: Random House, 1970, 210 p. $2.95 (Paper).

Ten analytical case studies drawn from different U.N. settings illustrating various patterns of U.S.-Soviet political interaction at the United Nations. (A revised edition.)

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS. By Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Anne Patricia Simons. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 732 p. $22.00.

This third edition of the classic interpretation of the U.N. Charter traces in a definitive manner the constitutional evolution of the United Nations over the past 25 years.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS. By G. I. Morozov. Moscow: Mysl, 1969, 231 p.

A comprehensive Marxist analysis of past and present international organizations by a leading Soviet scholar.

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, PAST AND PRESENT. By V. G. Shkunaev. Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1969, 247 p.

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A former member of the Soviet delegation to the ILO has written an historical survey of ILO with emphasis on the Soviet role.

THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. VOLUME 2. EDITED BY RICHARD A. FALK. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 1,270 p. $25.00 (Paper, $7.50).

A balanced exposition, by 34 contributors, of the principal legal problems arising over Vietnam. Immensely useful as a reference source for any legal point of view on the Vietnam involvement.

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: A COMPLEX IMBALANCE. BY ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969, 216 p. $2.45 (Paper).

A succinct review of the history of NATO with emphasis on the U.S.-European relationship during the last few years. In many of his conceptualizations the author is heavily indebted to Henry Kissinger's "The Troubled Partnership." Some sensible policy proposals are offered in conclusion.

SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION. BY FOREST L. GRIEVES. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969, 266 p. $10.00.

A valuable monograph analyzing the political premises, constitutional bases and judicial practices of five international tribunals. The author concludes that only the Court of the European Communities is truly supranational.

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER. VOLUME I: TRENDS AND PATTERNS. EDITED BY RICHARD A. FALK AND CYRIL E. BLACK. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 618 p. $15.00.

This first in a projected five-volume series is a symposium to which 12 scholars have made contributions on various aspects of the role of international law in contemporary world politics. The standard is high throughout. (Prepared under the auspices of the Center of International Studies.)

UNITED NATIONS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT—NEED FOR A NEW STRATEGY. BY SUDHIR SEN. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1969, 351 p. $10.00.

A practical and constructive study by a former official of the U.N. Technical Assistance Board.

LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION. BY THOMAS BUERGENTHAL. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969, 247 p. $10.50.

A solid and scholarly monograph, mostly of a technical nature. Lacking is a discussion of the problem of airplane hijacking.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DEVELOPING NATION. EDITED BY RICHARD BUTWELL. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969, 236 p. $6.95.

A fairly cohesive symposium on the politics of development and modernization in selected developing countries. Rupert Emerson's concluding essay is worth the price of the book.

THE PEACE TO END PEACE. BY GEORGE GOLDBERG. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969, 221 p. $5.95.

A cursory and rather chatty account of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The author places great emphasis on the personalities of the three main protagonists, Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd George.

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IS THE UNITED NATIONS DEAD? By Benjamin M. Becker. Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing Co., 1969, 163 p. $4.95.

A well-reasoned plea for strengthening the United Nations, aimed at the general reader.

THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: THE CHANGING SETTING. Edited by Lawrence S. Finkelstein. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 216 p. $8.95.

Ten essays on various aspects of contemporary international organization. The connecting tissue seems tenuous but the quality of each is high.

THE ETERNAL MACHIAVELLI IN THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD. By Victor de Guinsbourg. United Nations: The Author, 1969, 899 p. $15.00.

A collection of salient U.N. documents and proverbs assembled by a former member of the U.N. Military Staff Committee. This reviewer's favorite item is Dag Hammarskjöld's: "Well, as my father used to say, being neutral is not a question of saying yes to both sides, but of saying no to both sides."

## *General: Military, Technical and Scientific*

CAPTAINS WITHOUT EYES. By Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 303 p. $6.95.

The author presents five cases of intelligence failures in World War II. His analyses of Hitler's invasion of Russia and of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor are impressive, though somewhat padded. The treatment of Dieppe, Arnheim and the Battle of the Bulge is a bit thin.

PREPARING FOR ULYSSES: POLITICS AND VETERANS DURING WORLD WAR II. By Davis R. B. Ross. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 315 p. $10.00.

An excellent monograph on the successful—and unique—American experience in reintegrating the veterans of World War II into society.

THE LAST VOYAGE OF USS PUEBLO. By Ed Brandt. New York: Norton, 1969, 248 p. $6.50.

A fast-paced narrative, very sympathetic to Commander Bucher and his men, based on the accounts of 15 key members of the crew.

AMERICAN MILITARISM 1970. Edited by Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden. New York: Viking, 1969, 150 p. $4.95 (Paper, 95 cents).

A report on the Conference on the American Defense Establishment held in Washington in the spring of 1969. In his epilogue, Senator Fulbright stresses the need to reassert control over the military.

TONGUES OF CONSCIENCE: WEAPONS RESEARCH AND THE SCIENTISTS' DILEMMA. By R. W. Reid. New York: Walker, 1969, 351 p. $7.50.

This book really consists of a number of essays about great men of science who have been involved in weapons research. Of the dozen sketches drawn by the author, the best are of Alfred Nobel, Albert Einstein and J. Robert Oppenheimer.

CBW: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Edited by Steven Rose with the assistance of David Pavett. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, 209 p. $7.50.

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A most useful symposium dealing with the current inventory of CBW and its use in Vietnam and Yemen. The book also includes an analysis of present research policies and ends with a discussion of the legal and ethical dimensions of CBW.

TOWARDS A BETTER USE OF THE OCEAN: CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PROBLEMS IN OCEAN DEVELOPMENT. By W. T. Burke. New York: Humanities Press, 1969, 231 p. $9.50.

Proceedings of a symposium held in Stockholm in June 1968. A useful but rather dry compilation. (A publication of SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.)

PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Edited by C. F. Barnaby. New York: Humanities Press, 1969, 374 p. $9.50.

An excellent symposium by leading scientists. The contributions are mostly technical in nature. The political implications, in most cases, point to the need for early ratification and entry into force of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. (A Pugwash monograph.)

THE ULTIMATE FOLLY: WAR BY PESTILENCE, ASPHYXIATION, AND DEFOLIATION. By Richard D. McCarthy. New York: Knopf, 1969, 176 p. $5.95.

A passionate and forcefully argued plea against the stockpiling and possible use of chemical and biological weapons.

WORLD WAR II: A COMPACT HISTORY. By Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy. New York: Hawthorn, 1969, 334 p. $6.95.

A good job of compression, written in military staccato style.

DONOVAN OF OSS. By Corey Ford. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, 366 p. $8.50.

An almost completely uncritical biography of the founder of the Office of Strategic Services.

THE CHAMPAGNE CAMPAIGN. By Robert H. Adleman and Colonel George Walton. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, 298 p. $7.95.

A lively account of the American parachute drop into southern France in late 1944. Ten thousand men drank hard but fought even harder. There is much of "Catch-22" in this book.

## *General: Economic and Social*

MONEY INTERNATIONAL. By Fred Hirsch. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969, 420 p. $8.95.

A former editor of *The Economist,* now at the International Monetary Fund, surveys the world of international money and finance for the benefit of the layman. An introductory chapter by Richard Cooper brings the 1966 British edition up to date.

EXPORTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Alfred Maizels with others. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969, 443 p. $10.00.

A major study of past and projected exports of sterling area countries and their relation to growth. Commodity prospects, the supply positions of individual countries, and policy issues for both the industrialized and the less developed countries are examined.

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INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES. By Jack Baranson. New York: Praeger, 1969, 168 p. $12.50.

Interesting discussion by a World Bank official of the problems of determining the technologies best suited to different developing countries, the obstacles to their use and the ways of fostering improvement.

DIE WIRTSCHAFTSINTEGRATION MITTELDEUTSCHLANDS. By Konstantin Pritzel. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1969, 263 p. DM. 28.

Detailed account of Eastern Germany's part in Comecon with a good bit of material on its economic policies and political developments.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1968: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND APPREHENSIONS. Edited by John H. Adler. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1969, 351 p. $10.00.

Rich material on a wide range of subjects by many first-rate people. (The Proceedings of the Society for International Development's Tenth Anniversary World Conference.)

LE MARCHÉ DES EURODEVISES. By Max Crochat. Paris: Éditions de l'Épargne, 1969, 252 p. Fr. 18.

Useful history and survey of the emergence and use of eurodollars and other euromonies.

PUBLIC ECONOMICS. Edited by J. Margolis and H. Guitton. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 574 p. $21.00.

Includes several interesting papers on state enterprises as well as East-West comparisons and discussions of planning. (Proceedings of an International Economic Association conference.)

THE GOLD-MONEY RIFT: A CLASSICAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY. By P. R. Brahmananda. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1969, 351 p. Rs. 36.

In a style that is often sprightly, combining theory and observation, an Indian economist ranges widely over the problems that beset the international monetary system.

THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY. By Mahlon R. Straszheim. Washington: Brookings Institution, Transport Research Program, 1969, 297 p. $7.50.

This study measures the efficiency of international aviation, assesses the effect of public regulation, national and international, and suggests improvements. Unfortunately the data are six to eight years old.

NEW TRADE STRATEGY FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY. Edited by Harry G. Johnson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969, 344 p. $7.95.

Four studies (previously published as pamphlets) with a stimulating essay by one of the champions of the idea of a multilateral free trade association.

THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT CYCLES IN A SOCIALIST ECONOMY. By Nikola Čobeljić and Radmila Stojanović. White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969, 168 p. $15.00.

Two Jugoslav economists survey a wide range of theoretical and empirical material from a number of countries in order to "contribute to the overall development of the economic theory of socialism."

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FOOD RESOURCES: CONVENTIONAL AND NOVEL. By N. W. Pirie. Baltimore: Penguin, 1969, 208 p. $1.25 (Paper).

Full of interesting facts and some unconventional ideas but leading to the familiar conclusion that the production of food must be greatly expanded.

AGAINST THE TIDE. By Wilhelm Röpke. Chicago: Regnery, 1969, 251 p. $7.50.

Essays spread over 30 years that give a good sampling of the German economist's leadership in neo-liberal thought.

## *The United States*

HIGH ON FOGGY BOTTOM: AN OUTSIDER'S INSIDE VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT. By Charles Frankel. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 240 p. $6.95.

A philosophy professor's log of his experiences as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs in the Johnson administration. His somewhat melancholy reflections on "the taste of power" and a moving chapter explaining the reasons for his resignation in 1967 are worth pondering.

THE IDEAS OF HENRY LUCE. Edited by John K. Jessup. New York: Atheneum, 1969, 405 p. $12.50.

The outstanding editor's writings, lovingly selected from a span of almost half a century by the former chief editorial writer of *Life*.

THE AMERICANS: A CONFLICT OF CREED AND REALITY. By Ronald Segal. New York: Viking, 1969, 340 p. $6.95.

An angry and well-researched polemic against the reality of modern America, capped by a defense of the American dream. The author, a South African living in Britain, writes with the invective of the betrayed lover.

ROBERT KENNEDY: A MEMOIR. By Jack Newfield. New York: Dutton, 1969, 318 p. $6.95.

This biography is an affectionate tribute to the man "who might have united the black and white poor into a new majority for change." One of the best books on RFK to date.

FROM THE CRASH TO THE BLITZ: 1929–1939. By Cabell Phillips. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 596 p. $12.50.

Dramatic popular history, presented in the style of Mark Sullivan's "Our Times." Not original, but arresting and often quite evocative.

ONE MAN ALONE: RICHARD NIXON. By Ralph de Toledano. New York: Funk, 1969, 386 p. $6.95.

A worshipful biography, rich in clichés, but devoid of new insight.

THE SWIFT YEARS: THE ROBERT OPPENHEIMER STORY. By Peter Michelmore. New York: Dodd, 1969, 273 p. $6.95.

An Australian journalist has produced a very personal, sympathetic and highly readable biography of the controversial physicist.

UNITED STATES OIL POLICY, 1890–1964: BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA. By Gerald D. Nash. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, 286 p. $7.95.

A useful history that concentrates on the quest for "coöperation," inside the industry and between it and the government, and the emergence of the government as the arbiter of the industry.

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AMERICA'S ROLE IN ASIA. By D. F. Fleming. New York: Funk, 1969, 209 p. $6.95.

A persistent opponent of the American involvement in Vietnam now offers in book form a number of essays written over the last five years. Most of the material is dated now but a new concluding chapter is worth reading.

CURTAINS OVER VIETNAM: STRATEGIC APPRAISAL OF SUPPRESSED ASPECTS OF U.S. SECURITY STAKE IN VIETNAM. By Charles A. Weil. New York: Exposition Press, 1969, 155 p. $6.00.

The author argues, not too convincingly, that a "Vietnam beachhead" is a strategic necessity for the United States. A hawk himself, the author is of the opinion that "a dove is either a gull or traitor."

THE GREAT BETRAYAL. By Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 562 p. $12.50.

An excellent piece of research on the relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War II. The authors' message: America betrayed herself, but at least she has tried to make amends.

THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY. By Kevin P. Phillips. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969, 482 p. $7.95.

The author, who manages to marshall impressive evidence in support of his thesis from voting pattern projections, predicts an overall national trend in favor of the Republican Party during the 1970s.

RONNIE AND JESSE: A POLITICAL ODYSSEY. By Lou Cannon. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969, 340 p. $7.95.

The author has provided political portraits of Jesse Unruh and Ronald Reagan who, he predicts, will contend for the governorship of California in 1970. A fairly objective appraisal of both politicians.

THE 1036 DAYS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. By Anatoly Gromyko. Moscow: Publishing House for Political Literature, 1969, 279 p.

The son of the Soviet Foreign Minister, currently a senior member of the Soviet Institute of American Studies, in a book aimed at the general public, describes JFK as "the most interesting political personality" in the United States since FDR.

THE CHINA LOBBY MAN: THE STORY OF ALFRED KOHLBERG. By Joseph Keeley. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969, 421 p. $7.00.

An apotheosis of Alfred Kohlberg, a moving spirit behind the "China Lobby," with vicious attacks on former Foreign Service Officers and China scholars worthy of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. A shoddy book from beginning to end.

## *The Western Hemisphere*

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: A SOCIAL INVENTION IN THE MAKING. By Harvey S. Perloff. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1969, 253 p. $8.50.

The much abused Alliance finds a staunch defender. Proposals for the program's betterment are included.

LATIN AMERICA: INTERNAL CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE. By Peter Calvert. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 231 p. $6.50 (Paper, $2.95).

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A very large subject compressed within a narrow space necessarily leaves the reader with a sense of incompleteness.

THE MOVEMENT TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN UNITY. Edited by Ronald Hilton. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the California Institute of International Studies), 1969, 561 p. $12.50.

A smorgasbord of articles, helpful and otherwise, on almost every possible aspect of integration.

THE COLONIAL HERITAGE OF LATIN AMERICA: ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE IN PERSPECTIVE. By Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 222 p. $5.00.

The theme is the influence of colonial rule and of neo-colonialist forces since 1700. The authors favor structural change—radical revision in economic and social policy—over evolutionary development.

THE LATIN AMERICANS. By Víctor Alba. New York: Praeger, 1969, 392 p. $10.00.

An overview, both in time and in space, of Latin American life in all of its facets.

GUERRILLAS IN LATIN AMERICA: THE TECHNIQUE OF THE COUNTER-STATE. By Luis Mercier Vega. New York: Praeger, 1969, 246 p. $6.50.

An analysis of guerrilla movements, their potentialities and their variations, in Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Brazil, Colombia and Peru.

LATIN AMERICAN PEASANT MOVEMENTS. Edited by Henry A. Landsberger. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, 476 p. $12.50.

Ten essays, generally thorough and well documented, in which competent contributors describe peasant movements in Venezuela, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Guatemala and Brazil.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLOMBIAN LABOR MOVEMENT. By Miguel Urrutia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969, 297 p. $10.00.

The growth of the Colombian labor movement since 1850, seen as the product of the interplay of politics and economics, is described in depth.

PARTIES AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN BOLIVIA, 1880–1952. By Herbert S. Klein. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, 451 p. $14.50.

The author traces in full detail the antecedent forces of the 1952 revolution. The comments on the seminal function of the Chaco war are particularly interesting.

PERU. By Sir Robert Marett. New York: Praeger, 1969, 288 p. $7.50.

The former British Ambassador to Peru writes interestingly and well of the heritage, history, politics, sociology and economy of a complex country.

PRESSURE GROUPS AND POWER ELITES IN PERUVIAN POLITICS. By Carlos A. Astiz. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, 316 p. $12.00.

The author concludes that revolutionary change in Peru, from above or below, is unlikely. But the verdict of the 1968 revolution, considered here only in a short postscript, has not yet been handed down.

THE POLITICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CASE. By James D. Cochrane. New Orleans: Tulane University, 1969, 225 p. $4.00 (Paper).

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A useful and balanced account of the status and significance of the Central American Common Market.

CHE: SELECTED WORKS OF ERNESTO GUEVARA. Edited by Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 456 p. $12.50.

Yet another collection, longer and better than most, of the writings, speeches, interviews and letters of the legendary Guevara. The Bolivian diary is not included.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN CUBA. By Richard R. Fagen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, 271 p. $8.50.

A scholarly study, basically sympathetic, of what the author deems "the most profound social transformation ever seen in the Americas." The Committees for Defense of the Revolution, Schools of Revolutionary Instruction, and literacy efforts receive particular emphasis.

SOCIALISM IN CUBA. By Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969, 221 p. $5.95.

A socio-economic analysis, without bibliography or index, by authors whose utopianism and dedication to socialist revolution are clearly apparent.

THE ORIGINS OF SOCIALISM IN CUBA. By James O'Connor. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 338 p. $10.00.

A laudatory explanation of Cuban developments since 1959, rooted in the premise that only through socialism could ancient ills be overcome.

## *Western Europe*

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE: A PROGRAMME FOR EUROPE. By Franz Josef Strauss. New York: Atheneum, 1970, 175 p. $5.95.

Germany's relentlessly controversial politician argues for a European policy, based on hostility to Russia and suspicion of its likely partner, America. (A translation of "Herausforderung und Antwort: Ein Programm für Europa," Stuttgart: Seewald, 1968, 231 p. DM. 16.)

JEAN MONNET AND THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE. By Merry and Serge Bromberger. New York: Coward-McCann, 1969, 349 p. $8.95.

A breezy account of the activities and achievements of one of Europe's great planners, set against the background of postwar politics, by two well-known French journalists who pride themselves on inside knowledge, without citing any of their sources.

EUROPE: AN EMERGENT NATION? By Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 269 p. $8.95.

A German-American political scientist examines the informal bases of an emergent European community and notes far more progress than a narrowly political perspective would reveal. A sober and suggestive work.

ECONOMIC PLANNING AND POLICIES IN BRITAIN, FRANCE AND GERMANY. By Malcolm MacLennan and others. New York: Praeger, 1969, 424 p. $9.00.

An interesting comparison that looks more at practice than theory and draws some sensible conclusions.

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THE COMMON PROBLEM. By Angus Maude. London: Constable, 1969, 307 p. 42/.

A Conservative MP offers a perceptive and elegant critique of existing society and of its dominant interpreters, the social scientists. In presenting the first major restatement of modern conservatism in Britain in many years, he also proposes specific, radical reforms.

THE PEOPLE'S WAR: BRITAIN—1939–1945. By Angus Calder. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969, 656 p. $8.95.

A history of the domestic aspects of the war, with more than a touch of social criticism. A work of evocation and analysis by a young Briton born amidst a war he depicts with remarkable detachment.

POLITICAL CHANGE IN BRITAIN: FORCES SHAPING ELECTORAL CHOICE. By David Butler and Donald Stokes. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 516 p. $10.00.

Two well-known political scientists present an inquiry into the political behavior of the British electorate. A joint Anglo-American effort, technical in character and hence quite demanding.

THE PRICE OF MY SOUL. By Bernadette Devlin. New York: Knopf, 1969, 224 p. $5.95.

The making of a celebrated nationalist. An evocative picture of the conditions of Northern Ireland and of a temperament that rebelled against them.

CENTRAL PLANNING FOR THE MARKET ECONOMY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH THEORY AND EXPERIENCE. By Vera Lutz. London: Longmans (in association with the Institute of Economic Affairs), 1969, 194 p. 50/.

According to this analysis, French "indicative planning" never lived up to its reputation and has been replaced by a kind of "soft" and semi-secret interventionism in which the state gives favors to private enterprises in return for promised performance.

THE POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN FRANCE, 1918–1940. By John E. Talbott. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 283 p. $9.00.

A young American historian analyzes the efforts to democratize French education, especially secondary education, in the interwar years. A versatile study, lucidly written, and of absorbing interest.

GERMANY: ILLUSIONS AND DILEMMAS. By Carl Landauer. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969, 360 p. $8.95.

A veteran German-American scholar takes stock of the current scene in Germany and pleads for greater realism in Western initiatives to the East.

PERSPEKTIVEN. Edited by Horst Ehmke. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1969, 172 p.

Socialist leaders define their party's policies with clarity and vigor.

HITLERS UND MAOS SÖHNE: NPD UND NEUE LINKE. By Giselher Schmidt. Frankfurt/Main: Scheffler, 1969, 275 p. DM. 17.

An analysis of what right and left extremism in Germany have in common: rejection of liberal tolerance, the glorification of violence and of the heroic aspects of life. Unlikely to persuade partisans of any extremist stripe, the book is a colorful contribution to the study of radical dissent.

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THE LIMITS OF HITLER'S POWER. By Edward N. Peterson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 472 p. $12.50.

Inspired by an unusual curiosity about human behavior and based on new sources, this scholarly work analyzes the far from efficient system of government which Hitler headed and which was often hobbled by local obstructionism and in-fighting.

THE TRAGEDY OF NAZI GERMANY. By Peter Phillips. New York: Praeger, 1969, 241 p. $6.95.

An essay on the deeper causes of Nazi evil, written out of fear that the West could produce another similar monstrosity. Controversial, moralistic and troubling.

SOCIAL CONSERVATISM AND THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN GERMANY, 1914–1933. By Herman Lebovics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 248 p. $8.50.

A monograph, of both historic and contemporary interest, on how the plight of Germany's middle classes inspired murky theories of a new social order that would be neither capitalistic nor socialist.

DIE DDR IST KEINE ZONE MEHR. By Hanns Werner Schwarze. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1969, 498 p. DM. 25.

Banal reportage on East Germany with the message that the country can no longer be regarded or treated as a Soviet zone.

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PLANNING IN THE NETHERLANDS, 1950–1965. By James Goodear Abert. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969, 282 p. $10.00.

A very good account of one of the most interesting European efforts at planning in a country heavily dependent on the international economy. The interplay of planning processes and the setting and pursuit of economic policy objectives is perceptively analyzed.

DIE PARTEIEN IN DER SCHWEIZ. By Erich Gruner. Bern: Francke, 1969, 277 p. Swiss Fr. 19.80.

A valuable survey of Swiss parties, their historic development and present condition.

ITALY'S AUSTRIAN HERITAGE 1919–1946. By Dennison I. Rusinow. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 423 p. $10.50.

A thorough work on Italy's territorial gains at Austria's—and her own—expense. The thesis is that the annexations of Alto Adige and Venezia Giulia encouraged Italian "irrational nationalist passion" and proved "a source of political weakness at home and abroad."

## *Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*

COMMUNIST STUDIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: ESSAYS ON METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL THEORY. Edited by Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969, 481 p. $5.95 (Paper).

This collection of essays centering on methodological, conceptual and theoretical issues in the social sciences as they bear on the study of communism is probably for the specialist, but it contains material of real interest, presented by some able authors.

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COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES. Edited by Jan F. Triska. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, 392 p. $9.00.

A collection of essays that emanate from the Stanford Studies of the Communist System. The premise of the work is that that *is* a system, "a delineated and interacting universe."

THE SOVIET MODEL AND UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. By Charles K. Wilber. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969, 241 p. $7.50.

The author constructs a model of economic development which he finds implicit in the Soviet experience and then checks its credentials as a guide for underdeveloped areas. Includes a pertinent look at Soviet Central Asia.

RUSSIAN PROSPECT. By Erik de Mauny. New York: Atheneum, 1970, 320 p. $7.95.

Interesting reflections on the changing world of Russia in the 1960s by a BBC correspondent who was there before and after the fall of Khrushchev.

THE NEW RUSSIAN TRAGEDY. By Anatole Shub. New York: Norton, 1969, 128 p. $4.50.

Able but depressing reporting on the Soviet scene, by a well-trained observer, Moscow correspondent for *The Washington Post* from 1967 to 1969, when he was expelled. The author discusses numerous domestic storm signals, and a far from adequate leadership.

MESSAGE FROM MOSCOW. By An Observer. New York: Knopf, 1969, 288 p. $5.95.

An anonymous personal account, by a Russian-speaking Western graduate student, of the present mood and temper in the Soviet Union, chiefly among intellectuals. Impressionistic but largely persuasive.

IN QUEST OF JUSTICE. Edited by Abraham Brumberg. New York: Praeger, 1970, 477 p. $10.95.

Introduced by some brief but useful Western commentaries on contemporary dissent, protest and counterattack in the U.S.S.R. today, the volume comprises a rich selection of pertinent documents: trials, protests and petitions, material on national and religious dissent and the views of writers and their censors.

ARMS FOR THE THIRD WORLD: SOVIET MILITARY AID DIPLOMACY. By Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, 169 p. $6.95.

A study of military aid as a component of contemporary Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America.

THE USSR ARMS THE THIRD WORLD. By Uri Ra'anan. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 256 p. $10.00.

Two carefully researched case studies: the 1955 Soviet arms deal with Egypt, and the military relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Indonesia in 1956–60.

COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW. By John N. Hazard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 560 p. $8.75.

A longtime and leading student of Soviet law here undertakes a "search for the common core of the family of Marxian socialist legal systems." Broadly based on a comparison of theory and practice in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, the approach is essentially thematic: the rule, or role, of law in the various fields of application.

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BASIC INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES OF THE U.S.S.R. By Theodore Shabad. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 393 p. $20.00.
A useful survey, by type of resource and by region.

SOVIET AGRICULTURE IN PERSPECTIVE. By Erich Strauss. New York: Praeger, 1969, 328 p. $8.50.
A broad review of the history of Soviet agriculture, its ups and downs, with some concluding thoughts about present problems and future prospects.

MY TESTIMONY. By Anatoly Marchenko. New York: Dutton, 1969, 415 p. $8.95.
An account of conditions in Soviet prison camps in the post-Stalin years, by a former inmate. While the scale of operations is now far less, the picture of life is a grimly familiar one.

OUR OWN PEOPLE. By Elisabeth K. Poretsky. London: Oxford University Press, 1969, 278 p. 42/; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1970, $7.95.
An absorbing account of the murky world of Soviet intelligence in the 1920s and 1930s, by the wife of "Ignace Reiss," a Polish Communist who departed from the NKVD in 1937 and from this life very shortly after.

SIBERIA: THE NEW FRONTIER. By George St. George. New York: McKay, 1969, 374 p. $7.95.
An informal account with quite a bit of pleasant, out-of-the-way information.

ME, VENÄJÄ JA MUUT. By Wolf H. Halsti. Helsinki: Otava, 1969, 313 p. 16 Fmk.
The first full-length inquiry into the meaning of the Finnish-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty, by a knowledgeable military writer.

BRĪVĀ LATVIJA. By Ādolfs Klīve. New York: Grāmatu Draugs, 1969, 493 p. $10.00.
Memoirs dealing with the establishment of the independent Baltic States. The author, a prominent Latvian statesman now living in New York, describes in particular the activities of those political forces which decided early in the First World War that the Western Allies would be the victors and, consequently, worked against the various German, Russian and Bolshevik schemes in the Baltic region.

GOMUŁKA: HIS POLAND, HIS COMMUNISM. By Nicholas Bethell. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, 296 p. $5.95.
A British journalist and translator presents a substantial biography of Gomulka. As the author grants, it is too early to offer a definitive judgment of the man, but this is a serious and balanced interim appraisal.

WINTER IN PRAGUE. Edited by Robin Alison Remington. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 473 p. $12.50.
A substantial selection of documents relating to, and illuminating, the internal crisis in Czech communism in 1968.

THE MASARYK CASE. By Claire Sterling. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 366 p. $7.95.
An extensive effort to get at the facts in the death of Jan Masaryk in March 1948. The author has followed many clues, spoken with many people and concludes that it was murder, not suicide.

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CONTEMPORARY YUGOSLAVIA. Edited by Wayne S. Vucinich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 441 p. $9.50.

A substantial and very knowledgeable collection of essays by an outstanding group on various facets of Jugoslav life since 1939.

POLITICS IN MODERN GREECE. By Keith R. Legg. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, 367 p. $10.00.

While this book contains a chapter on the 1967 coup, it is centrally an analysis of the Greek political system as a rather distinct but not unique type in the contemporary world.

THAT DAY IN BUDAPEST: OCTOBER 23, 1956. By Tibor Meray. New York: Funk, 1969, 503 p. $10.00.

A retrospective on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution by a participant who has in subsequent years gained quite a bit of additional information about the events of those hectic and tragic weeks.

BULGARIA UNDER COMMUNIST RULE. By J. F. Brown. New York: Praeger, 1970, 339 p. $11.00.

The Director of East European Research of Radio Free Europe here narrates and analyzes the years of communist rule in Bulgaria from 1953 to 1968. A useful sequel to earlier studies on the nation and the party by Dellin and Rothschild.

## *The Middle East*

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST: THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1958–1968. By Walter Laqueur. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 360 p. $7.95.

Basically a continuation of the author's "The Soviet Union and the Middle East" published a decade ago, with less reliance on recitation from current Soviet publications and more on the record of Soviet conduct. He keeps his eye on the main issues and ends with some well-reasoned though necessarily speculative conclusions. (Written under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.)

SUEZ: THE TWICE-FOUGHT WAR: A HISTORY. By Kennett Love. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, 767 p. $10.00.

This massive book tells us many things about that crisis of 1955–56 which has fascinated scholars and public alike. In details it is overwhelming and in many ways important and illuminating, especially in connection with the author's interviews with Eisenhower, Eden, Nasser and others of the cast. His view of Nasser is charitable.

MÉMOIRES. II: SUEZ . . . LE 13 MAI. By General Paul Ély. Paris: Plon, 1969, 504 p. Fr. 25.

The second volume of General Ely's memoirs, covering his service as Chief of Staff from 1956 to 1960. Most of it is about Algeria but a detailed account of the Suez affair as seen from his position is included. On both subjects he has sharp things to say about people and events. A valuable source for the history of those years.

PALESTINE IS MY COUNTRY: THE STORY OF MUSA ALAMI. By Sir Geoffrey Furlonge. New York: Praeger, 1969, 244 p. $6.95.

The life of Musa Bey Alami has been so closely interwoven with the story of the Palestine Arabs that this sympathetic biography serves also as a history of the times.

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ISRAËL EN DANGER DE PAIX. By Marc Hillel. Paris: Fayard, 1969, 350 p. Fr. 23.

A journalist's thoughtful book on the fundamental problems that confront Israel as a society and as a state.

AN ARABIAN DIARY. By Sir Gilbert Falkingham Clayton, edited by Robert O. Collins. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 379 p. $8.50.

An account of two diplomatic missions undertaken during the 1920s by one of Britain's outstanding Near Eastern hands. Unfortunately, the actual negotiations with Ibn Sa'ud and Imam Yahya tend to get lost in a plethora of travel details and extraneous social encounters. The editor's long introduction is a useful survey of some aspects of British-Arab relations during World War I and after.

REPUBLICAN 'IRAQ: A STUDY IN 'IRAQI POLITICS SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF 1958. By Majid Khadduri. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1969, 318 p. $8.50.

In large part through personal conversations and use of local publications, Khadduri does the next-to-impossible in unraveling the complex web of plots, coups and revolts that began with the overthrow of the monarchy.

LA SYRIE OU LA RÉVOLUTION DANS LA RANCOEUR. By Edouard Saab. Paris: Julliard, 1968, 309 p. Fr. 20.

Two decades (1948–67) of politics and government in a country which in many ways is neither governable nor a country. The author, a prominent Beirut editor and correspondent of *Le Monde,* combines a personal viewpoint with some objective analysis and much fascinating detail.

## *South and Southeast Asia*

UNCERTAIN INDIA: A POLITICAL PROFILE OF TWO DECADES OF FREEDOM. By Pran Chopra. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 403 p. $7.50.

The editor of *The Statesman* tells how political institutions shape India's economy, how foreign policy has guided domestic economy and politics and how, in turn, it has been guided by them.

TAXATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA. By James Cutt. New York: Praeger, 1969, 415 p. $17.50.

India's main tax devices in terms of growth rate of national income, redistribution of wealth and stabilization of inflationary price increases, together with a study of their adequacy and with recommendations for modification.

DEAR TO BEHOLD: AN INTIMATE PORTRAIT OF INDIRA GANDHI. By Krishna Nehru Hutheesing. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 221 p. $5.95.

This moving biography of India's Prime Minister, as done by her late aunt, serves as well as a tribute to her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, with whose policies she has sometimes disagreed. "Dear to behold" is the English equivalent for Priyadarshini, Indira's middle name.

BURMA AND GENERAL NE WIN. By Maung Maung. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1969, 332 p. $12.00.

Recent political events in Burma as seen through the endeavors of the builder of its modern armed forces and leader of its caretaker government.

THE GROWTH OF A PARTY SYSTEM IN CEYLON. By Calvin A. Woodward. Providence: Brown University Press, 1969, 338 p. $8.50.

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Records the changes in political institutions in Ceylon and relates and analyzes the reasons why they provide for the peaceful and democratic transfer of power in accordance with the preference of its people.

HONG KONG: A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION. Edited by Ian C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi. New York: Praeger, 1969, 378 p. $10.00.

Economic and socio-cultural effects of an extremely rapid population growth (especially through the influx of refugees) on a colony already experiencing the impact of creeping Westernization.

VIET NAM: THE ORIGINS OF REVOLUTION. By John T. McAlister, Jr. New York: Knopf (for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University), 1969, 377 p. $7.95.

A successful attempt to relate the origins of the Vietnam conflict to an understanding of the military and political bases that make for revolution. Sources include still-secret archives in the Service Historique de l'Armée at the Château de Vincennes.

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Edited by Theodore Morgan and Nyle Spoelstra. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press (for the Center for International Economics and Economic Development), 1969, 424 p. $12.50.

Trends and prospects for accelerating the rate of national economic growth and promoting trade relationships in Asia through regional coöperation and integration of on-going projects.

## *East Asia and Pacific Ocean*

NELSON T. JOHNSON AND AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA, 1925–1941. By Russell D. Buhite. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1969, 163 p. $6.00.

A former chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division and Minister to China is the subject of this work which explores his background, the influences on his thinking and his ideas and suggestions on dealing with China during a most crucial era.

CHINA SINCE 1911. By George Moseley. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 192 p. $5.95.

A factual history of China from the revolution of 1911–12 to now, with little interpretation.

IN FEAR OF CHINA. By Gregory Clark. London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1969, 219 p. 30/.

How the West's failure to appraise objectively Chinese politics during the 1959–1965 period has affected China's external behavior, and how lessons from that failure can help with the Vietnam question.

CANTON UNDER COMMUNISM: PROGRAMS AND POLITICS IN A PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, 1949–1968. By Ezra F. Vogel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 448 p. $13.95.

A socio-political history of the building and adapting of a new communist order, based on an official Cantonese Communist newspaper and on interviews with former citizens. Despite local idiosyncracies, Dr. Vogel finds no essential differences in the history of all mainland China for the same period.

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JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS. By Donald C. Hellmann. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 202 p. $5.00.

An important work on the actions and interactions by and among political parties, private pressure groups and governmental institutions which affected the course of negotiations for the Japanese-U.S.S.R. peace agreement.

THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOUR IN MODERN JAPANESE POLITICS. By Masao Maruyama, edited by Ivan Morris. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 407 p. $2.95 (Paper).

A leading intellectual adds two essays (one on Japan's constitutional revision) to this expanded edition of a work first published in English in 1963.

WAR IN PEACETIME: THE HISTORY AND LESSONS OF KOREA. By J. Lawton Collins. Boston: Houghton, 1969, 416 p. $8.95.

An authoritative and well-planned study by this top ranking officer who, as Army Chief of Staff and Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff throughout the Korean struggle, was responsible for monitoring reports to and from the U.N. Command and for transmitting instructions to it.

MARCOS OF THE PHILIPPINES. By Hartzell Spence. New York: World Publishing Co., 1969, 365 p. $6.95.

A detailed study of the lawyer, soldier and politician who is now sixth president of his nation. An expanded, updated edition of "For Every Tear a Victory," published in 1964.

THE PUZZLED PATRIOTS: THE STORY OF THE AUSTRALIA FIRST MOVEMENT. By Bruce Muirden. Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969, 200 p. $13.50.

An Adelaide *News* journalist, finding the eight-volume Clyne Inquiry report not always reliable, reëxamines the background of the Movement and of its 16 members and their arrest in 1942 on suspicion of aid to potential Japanese invaders.

## *Africa*

VIOLENCE AND THOUGHT: ESSAYS ON SOCIAL TENSIONS IN AFRICA. By Ali A. Mazrui. New York: Humanities Press, 1969, 351 p. $4.50 (Paper).

These fascinating essays, only a small proportion of them reprints of articles, all reflect the author's capacity for the analysis of political and social behavior in psychological terms. Mazrui is head of the political science department at Makerere University College in Uganda.

AFRICA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. By John Dumoga. Chester Springs: Dufour Editions, 1969, 142 p. $3.50.

Thoughtful essays on topics such as African socialism, the foreign policies of African states, the role of the press in Africa and problems of economic development, by a Ghanaian journalist.

THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND ITS CHARTER. By Zdenek Červenka. New York: Praeger, 1969, 253 p. $7.00.

A much-needed full-length study of the OAU from its beginnings in May 1963 until late 1968 when it was attempting to mediate the Nigerian civil war. The author is a Czech scholar now at the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies at Uppsala.

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AFRICA AND UNITY: THE EVOLUTION OF PAN-AFRICANISM. By Vincent Bakpetu Thompson. New York: Humanities Press, 1969, 412 p. $10.00.

An analysis and assessment of the movement toward African unity which is seen as a distant hope for Africans determined to be independent and to develop their societies. The author is a Nigerian teacher residing in London.

THE HISTORY OF BRITAIN IN AFRICA: FROM THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT. By John Hatch. New York: Praeger, 1969, 320 p. $8.00.

The Africa correspondent for *The New Statesman* has written an engrossing review of British relations with the African continent beginning with the first contacts and continuing through the Nigerian civil war.

REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: ALGERIA, 1954–1968. By William B. Quandt. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 313 p. $8.95.

A detailed study of the problems of diversity and conflict among Algerian political leaders which the author traces to differences in the "discontinuous process of political socialization."

DEKOLONISATION UND SOUVERÄNITÄT. By Nikolaus Scherk. Vienna: Braumüller, 1969, 184 p.

An Austrian scholar writes an interesting book seeking to discover to what extent the French African states have achieved true independence from Paris. He analyzes the flow of economic aid and trade, the placement of French troops on African territory, voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly and a variety of other factors.

NAISSANCE D'UN ÉTAT NOIR. By Maurice-A. Glélé. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1969, 537 p. Fr. 67.40.

Attributing the instability of politics in Dahomey to certain features of colonial experience as well as to a lack of effective leadership, Glélé argues for the development of a two-party system with a strong presidency. He studies developments through the coup of December 1965.

VOLTA: MAN'S GREATEST LAKE. By James Moxon. New York: Praeger, 1969, 256 p. $7.50.

A retired British civil servant residing in Accra has written a political and economic history of the Volta River project, designed for the general reader.

BIAFRA, NAISSANCE D'UNE NATION? By Alain Renard. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1969, 255 p. Fr. 12.50.

A temperate general treatment of Nigeria's post-independence difficulties which culminated in the attempted secession of July 1967. The author describes events through January 1969.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA: A HANDBOOK. Edited by David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University), 1969, 480 p. $15.00.

Topics of interest to a great variety of people are well covered in original essays by a group made up largely of academics. Contemporary political and economic issues as well as historical materials are dealt with.

TRADITION AND TRANSITION IN EAST AFRICA. Edited by P. H. Gulliver. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 378 p. $7.00.

During 1966–67 the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University

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of London held an inter-disciplinary seminar on the role of tribalism in contemporary East African society. Some first-rate papers presented at that time are here published; also a short essay by the late Tom Mboya on problems of modernization in East Africa.

UJAMAA—ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM. By Julius K. Nyerere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 186 p. $1.00 (Paper).

Nyerere's philosophy of development emerges clearly from this collection of party documents and presidential speeches. Of particular interest are the all-important Arusha Declaration of February 1967 and Nyerere's subsequent assessments of its implementation in Tanzania nearly a year later.

TOWARD 'UHURU' IN TANZANIA: THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION. By G. Andrew Maguire. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, 403 p. $13.50.

By focusing on one area—Sukumaland—the author analyzes the political development of Tanzania as a whole. He is an American political scientist who was with the U.S. Mission to the U.N. from 1966 to 1969.

THE HIGH PRICE OF PRINCIPLES: KAUNDA AND THE WHITE SOUTH. By Richard Hall. London: Hodder, 1969, 256 p. 35/.

It is argued that Kaunda was betrayed by British policy toward Rhodesia after UDI, and that the result has been to drive Zambia into closer economic relations with South Africa. Hall wonders if Zambia will continue to be able to finance her political and diplomatic independence from South Africa from copper revenues, now unexpectedly high.

RHODESIA: A STUDY OF THE DETERIORATION OF A WHITE SOCIETY. By Frank Clements. New York: Praeger, 1969, 286 p. $6.50.

A well-informed, critical history of white Rhodesia by the former mayor of Salisbury who was working until recently as a journalist and broadcaster in Rhodesia.

THE PEOPLES AND POLICIES OF SOUTH AFRICA. By Leo Marquard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 266 p. $1.95 (Paper).

Since its original appearance in 1952 this work has become a standard source on South Africa. Many portions of the text have now been rewritten and updated. This edition presents a balanced analysis of South African society, a society organized in a form sometimes called "domestic colonialism."

SOUTH AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR A BIRTHRIGHT. By Mary Benson. New York: Funk, 1969, 314 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.50).

A partially rewritten and updated version of the author's 1963 work "The African Patriots." She discusses the African struggle for emancipation in South Africa with the emphasis on the activities of the African National Congress.

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# SOURCE MATERIAL

*By Donald Wasson*

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


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


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


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


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


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


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

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

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


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



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


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

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


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

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

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